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We are currently witnessing unprecedented levels of ecological destruction and violence 
visited upon nonhumans. Study of the more-than-human world is now being 
enthusiastically taken up across a range of disciplines, in what has been called the 
‘scholarly animal turn’. This thesis brings together concerns of Critical Animal Studies – 
along with related threads of posthumanism and new materialist thinking – and Corpus 
Linguistics, specifically Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA), to produce a data-driven, 
lexicocentric study of the discourse of animal-killing. CPA, which has been employed 
predominantly in corpus lexicography, provides a robust and empirically well-founded 
basis for the analysis of verbs. Verbs are chosen as they act as the pivot of a clause; 
analysing them also uncovers their arguments – in this case, participants in material-
discursive ‘killing’ events. This project analyses 15 ‘killing’ verbs using CPA as a basis, 
in what I term a corpus-lexicographical discourse analysis. The data is sampled from an 
animal-themed corpus of around 9 million words of contemporary British English, and 
the British National Corpus is used for reference. 
The findings are both methodological and substantive. CPA is found to be a reliable 
empirical starting point for discourse analysis, and the lexicographical practice of 
establishing linguistic ‘norms’ is critical to the identification of anomalous uses. The 
thesis presents evidence of anthropocentrism inherent in the English lexicon, and 
demonstrates several ways in which distance is created between participants of ‘killing’ 
constructions. The analysis also reveals specific ways that verbs can obfuscate, 
deontologise and deindividualise their arguments. The recommendations, for discourse 
analysts, include the adoption of CPA and a critical analysis of its resulting patterns in 
order to demonstrate the precise mechanisms by which verb use can either oppress or 
empower individuals. Social justice advocates are also alerted to potentially harmful 
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I want to make this clear from the start–I DO NOT kill, slaughter, butcher or 
murder my calves…they are harvested. Just like other farmers, I’m raising a crop 
destined to provide sustenance for human consumers.  




The relationship between humans and the rest of the world is, to put it mildly, strained. 
Environmental degradation, climate breakdown, mass extinction and loss of biodiversity 
are just some of the global crises widely attributed to human activity, and they are 
accelerating at an alarming rate. So rapidly is the Earth changing that it is said to have 
now entered a new geological epoch, commonly termed ‘the Anthropocene’ (Steffen et 
al., 2011), so named because of its association with damaging human behaviour. At the 
time of writing, we are warned that there are just 11 years left to act if we are to avoid an 
irreversible climate catastrophe (IPCC, 2018), and an enormous amount of energy is 
being expended on averting this outcome. 
Long recognised by ecologists, feminists and philosophers, and now suddenly much more 
urgent, is the need for critical reflection on how humans exist within a more-than-human 
world. With the rise of capitalism and neoliberalism has come a global intensifying of 
violence and consumption, and a rendering of all life, especially that of nonhumans, 
dispensable (Braidotti, 2013). Capitalist growth and its disregard for life is considered so 
central to the environmental crisis that some scholars have called for the term 
‘Anthropocene’ to be replaced with ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore, 2016). Currently bound up in 
an industrial complex of killing are some tens of billions of land animals worldwide, their 
deaths construed not as acts of violence but as standard processes in food production for 
the purposes of human consumption. For marine animals, the numbers are in the trillions. 
The quotation at the start of this chapter therefore represents a problem, in both senses of 
the word. Firstly, it is a problem in that it clearly represents a denial of the nature of 
2 
animal lives as well as a prioritising of human consumption – two arguably harmful ideas 
in the context of an ecological crisis augmented by capitalism. From the perspective of 
human-animal relations, this is indicative of a generalised attitude of human entitlement 
to animals’ bodies, in spite of the suffering that this is known to cause them. The 
representation of animals as anything other than the sentient individuals they are 
constitutes a form of ontological violence. Secondly, the quotation is a problem in the 
sense that it is a puzzle. How do ‘killing’ terms like kill, slaughter, butcher and harvest 
affect the construal of their arguments? What exactly is it about these terms that makes 
them different from one another? While human-animal relations are the subject of 
growing scholarly interest, and analyses of the discursive representations of power abuses 
are commonplace in Critical Discourse Studies, there is currently no work that takes a 
systematic, empirical approach to the analysis of ‘killing’ terms and how their meanings 
change when applied to different entities. In order to be able to comment authoritatively 
on the nature of word meanings, we need a robust methodological framework that is 
suited to profiling lexical items, in this case verbs, as well as access to a sufficient amount 
of appropriate linguistic data.  
 
1.2 What Is This Thesis (Not) About? 
 
This thesis takes an empirical approach to the study of ‘killing’ verbs in contemporary 
British English, with a particular focus on how those verbs, or terms, are applied to 
animals. It seeks to comment not only on the way killing is written and spoken about, and 
what this might say about attitudes towards animals, but also on the suitability of a corpus-
lexicographical approach to discourse analysis. Hanks’ (2013) Corpus Pattern Analysis 
(CPA), a relatively new technique in corpus lexicography, is trialled in this project as an 
empirical basis for discourse analysis on the grounds that it has a successful track record 
of producing data-driven lexicographical entries for verbs (namely in the Pattern 
Dictionary of English Verbs1). Verbs are especially fruitful areas of investigation; to 
analyse a verb is to uncover its arguments, in this case killers and those who are killed. 




criteria, and their CPA-derived patterns are examined critically in light of the literature 
surveyed.  
The thesis relies solely on corpora for data, namely an animal-themed corpus created as 
part of the ‘People’, ‘Products’, ‘Pests’ and ‘Pets’ project2, and the original British 
National Corpus, used as a reference corpus. The project does not utilise other forms of 
linguistic data such as surveys or specially-designed interviews, and it does not draw on 
psycholinguistics or cognitive linguistics to attempt to explain the psychological 
mechanisms behind certain language choices. While the project utilises some 
lexicographical methods, and shares some common concerns with Critical Lexicography, 
it is not a lexicographical project. Instead, it seeks to investigate the feasibility of CPA as 
a supplement to current (critical) discourse analytical methods. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The research is predominantly guided by the following overarching research question: 
RQ1. What can a discourse analysis assisted by Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
reveal about the ‘killing’ verbs selected in relation to the key themes identified in 
the literature? 
This question reflects the simultaneously methodological and substantive nature of the 
project, and entails a critical appraisal of CPA as much as the patterns it identifies. 
Supplementing this question are the following sub-questions: 
RQ2. How is the involvement in acts of killing, of humans and nonhumans 
respectively, typically represented in the extracts of discourse analysed?  
RQ2a. Are these representations stable across the different discourse domains 
represented in the corpus? 





Answering these questions requires first identifying the key themes in the (i) animal-
killing and (ii) discourse analysis literatures, and it is to this task that Chapters 2 and 3 




Before continuing, it is necessary to establish some definitions of the key concepts and 
terminology used in this thesis. These terms may seem simple, unambiguous and self-




By ‘humans’ or ‘human beings’ I refer simply to members of the species Homo sapiens. 
By means of comparison, note the definitions below of ‘human being’, taken from the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED)3 and Oxford Dictionaries (OD)4, respectively. 
 
(1.1) A man, woman, or child of the species Homo sapiens, distinguished from other 
animals by superior mental development, power of articulate speech, and upright 
stance. 
(1.2) A person, a member of the human race; a man, woman, or child. 
 
Definition (1.1) from the OED takes a similar line to the one I use, but additionally 
specifies that in order to be a human being one must be a man, woman or child, and in 
doing so implicitly excludes (i) persons of non-binary gender and (ii) the unborn human 
foetus. It also mentions the ‘superior’ abilities and ‘power’ that distinguish human beings 
from other animals. Note that it does not refer to the remarkable number of commonalities 
between humans and other animal species, nor the inferior abilities and lack of certain 
powers, senses and modes of communication that distinguish human beings from other 
 
3 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/89262?redirectedFrom=human+being#eid131448903  
4 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/human-being  
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animals, such as our natural inability to fly, see well in the dark, or use echolocation, to 
name a few examples. 
Definition (1.2) by OD baldly and uncritically conflates the terms ‘human being’ and 
‘person’, a somewhat problematic proposition. Section 2.3 discusses this problem in more 
detail, but in short, it is widely considered uncontroversial – in the ethics literature – to 
assert that not all humans are persons, and not all persons are humans (Singer, 2011). 
Evidently, anthropocentric perspectives and sentiments of human exceptionalism can be 
found even in supposedly ‘neutral’ sources of language, as has previously been 
established with regards to racism (Krishnamurthy, 1996; Visser’t Hooft, 1997), sexism 
(Treichler, 1997; Haraway, 2001) and ethnocentrism (Kachru and Kahane, 1995; Benson, 
2002). Critical and postcolonial approaches to lexicography, such as that of the emerging 
Critical Lexicographical Discourse Studies (Chen, 2019), offer promising approaches to 
tackling such ‘isms’ in dictionaries. However, even a critical approach to language cannot 
realistically expose and remove all anthropocentrism; human language is, after all, 
created by humans for human purposes. In this thesis I therefore endeavour to critically 
evaluate the anthropocentric language surrounding humans and other animals, with an 




At the recent Animal Liberation conference in Berkeley, California, audience members 
were asked whether they would consider themselves to be “an animal” (Dickstein, 2019). 
Almost all of the people in the audience raised their hand. When asked whether, in that 
case, they would like to be treated “like an animal”, hands swiftly dropped. The exercise 
demonstrated, with great effectiveness, the distinction to be made between biological and 
political understandings of the word ‘animal’, and the complications that can arise from 
it. 
Humans are animals, in the taxonomic sense, so it should be specified here that by the 
term ‘animals’ I generally refer to all animals other than humans. Increasingly, in an 
attempt to disrupt the political human/animal dichotomy, Animal Studies scholars are 
consciously referring to ‘nonhumans’, ‘non-human animals’ and ‘other-than-human 
animals’ rather than simply ‘animals’. However, as argued by Bourke (2011), such 
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language does not help to decentralise the human, in that the human is still prioritised 
over the animal ‘non-’ or ‘other’, and in addition these terms can be cumbersome to use 
(Bourke, 2011: 13). Other strategies include the use of ‘human animals’ in parallel with 
‘non-human animals’, which certainly helps to remind us of the animality of humans, but 
nonetheless reifies the human-animal divide. Dunayer (2001: 13) neatly summarises the 
problem: “With equal validity we could categorize all animals as giant squids and non-
giant-squids”.  
Kemmerer (2006) proposes the term ‘anymal’, a contraction of ‘any’ and ‘animal’, which 
means “any animal who does not happen to be the species that I am” (Kemmerer, 2006: 
10). While I welcome any anti-hegemonic interventions in language that serve to 
highlight or challenge institutionalised prejudices, particularly those towards animals, I 
do not see the merit in adopting a new term whose meaning cannot be immediately 
understood and which means, by default, ‘any animal who is not human’, i.e. ‘a non-
human animal’. For these reasons, I reluctantly use the terms ‘humans’ and ‘animals’, 
unless the context requires a more specific distinction. Sometimes I will use ‘nonhuman’, 
‘nonhuman animal’, or ‘humans and other animals’ to draw attention to a specific point. 
I acknowledge that this policy has its own problems, but I cannot currently offer a solution 
to this “linguistic conundrum” (DeMello, 2012: 15).  
The OED5 and OD6 provide some illuminating definitions for ‘animal’. 
 
1. a. A living organism which feeds on organic matter, typically having specialized 
sense organs and a nervous system and able to respond rapidly to stimuli; any living 
creature, including man. 
b. In ordinary or non-technical use: any such living organism other than a human 
being. 
c. The living body or soft fleshy part of a mollusc, crustacean, etc., as distinguished 
from its shell or other hard part. 
2. a. A person viewed as or likened to an animal; (in non-pejorative sense) a human 
being, an individual, a ‘creature’ (now rare); (with negative connotations) a person 
without human attributes or civilizing influences; one who is very cruel, violent, or 
repulsive. 
b. With the. The animal nature in a person. 
 
5 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/273779  
6 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/animal  
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c. colloq. A person or (in later use) thing of a particular type, esp. as distinguished 
from others. 
3. In pl., with the. Short for animal spirits: see animal spirit n. Obs. rare. 
(OED) 
1. A living organism which feeds on organic matter, typically having specialized 
sense organs and nervous system and able to respond rapidly to stimuli 
1.1 Any such living organism other than a human being 
1.2 A mammal, as opposed to a bird, reptile, fish, or insect 
1.3 A person without human attributes or civilizing influences, especially someone 
who is very cruel, violent, or repulsive 




Both sources feature a general definition of ‘animal’, very similar to the one adopted here, 
that is 1.b in the OED and 1.1 in OD. Other senses are very specific, such as 1.a in the 
OED, which presumably mentions a rapid response to stimuli in order to exclude plants 
from this definition (though the meaning of ‘rapidly’ is open to debate), and 1.c which 
refers specifically to the non-shell part of a mollusc. More telling are definitions 2.a in 




The meaning of ‘killing’ ought to be fairly straightforward and unambiguous. Certainly, 
the definitions in the OED7 and OD8 are much shorter than those for ‘human being’ and 
‘animal’. However, they are not necessarily clear-cut. 
 
1. a. The action of kill v., in various senses. 
b. The act of killing game; a number of animals killed by sportsmen.  
c. The prevention of the evolution of gas in the steel during its manufacture. 
d. Bridge. The severe defeat of a contract. 
 
7 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/103382  
8 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/killing  
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 An act of causing death, especially deliberately. 
(OD) 
 
The OED entry is notable in that it specifically mentions the killing of “game”, i.e. 
animals forced to participate in a human-initiated hunt, with the agents of the killing 
referred to as “sportsmen”. This (now outdated) choice of language places them in the 
same category as tennis players and those who show grace in losing, as opposed to agents 
whose behaviour is widely frowned upon9, i.e. those who kill animals for pleasure.  
The OD entry, though brief and to the point, claims a specificity that is open to debate. 
The act of killing may often be deliberate, but it could be argued that there is nothing 
intrinsically deliberate about killing, nor is it solely the causing of death which might be 
construed as killing. Take, for example, the ‘equivalence thesis’ (Rachels, 2001), the 
notion that permitting death is equivalent to causing it. Knowingly allowing someone to, 
for instance, starve to death could defensibly be considered ‘killing’ by some (Rachels, 
1979), even though this is not “an act of causing death, especially deliberately”. Killing, 
letting die and withdrawing aid are complex and interlinked concepts, whose morality 
can be evaluated in similar terms (McMahan, 1993). 
For the purposes of this thesis, ‘killing’ is defined as an act of causing death, though not 
necessarily deliberately; to kill a human or animal in a motor accident, for instance, could 
not be construed as “deliberate”. Killing is also distinguished here from dying, which, 




9 A poll of attitudes in Britain towards hunting found that 85% of the population are opposed to a repealing 
of the Hunting Act: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/attitudes-hunting-2017 
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1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
In this chapter, I have provided some background context as well as a brief rationale for 
the study. I have demarcated the scope of the thesis, stated the research questions, and 
clarified definitions of some of the key concepts investigated in the project. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the mass killing of animals and how it is achieved through use of 
distance and concealment, as well as a long history of the ontologising of animals as 
products and legal property. Posthumanist and new-materialist scholarship is drawn on 
for inspiration in the search for alternative ontologies. 
Chapter 3 brings a discursive dimension to the issues raised in Chapter 2. Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics are discussed as complementary analytical 
approaches, and the Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) technique is introduced in the context 
of event conceptualisation and the analysis of verbs. 
Chapter 4 details the data and methods, and explains how the 15 candidate terms were 
selected and analysed. CPA is discussed in greater depth, and the CPA-assisted discourse-
analytic method, together with the Ontology created in the course of this project, are 
compared with the standard lexicographic CPA method and Ontology. The data 
annotation process and the results of an interannotator agreement test are also presented.  
In Chapter 5, the recurring themes of distance and concealment are addressed by way of 
an analysis of Referential Distance and grammatical voice. The features are examined 
across verbs and text types, and a small selection of verbs are analysed in the context of 
their CPA patterns. 
Chapter 6 takes a bird’s-eye view of the data and presents all instances across nine 
Context ‘zones’ in order to examine the influence of place, space and circumstances on 
the construal of events. The ‘killing’ terms are represented by their verb patterns, as found 
using CPA, and mapped across text types. 
Chapter 7 takes a closer look at (de)individuation strategies in the data and presents six 
verb case studies using the proposed corpus-lexicographical discourse analysis method.  
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising and evaluating the key findings 
in the project, both methodological and substantive. It considers the limitations of the 
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study and offers recommendations for future work in corpus-driven critical discourse 
analysis.   
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The global level of animal-killing today is “without precedent” (Animal Studies Group, 
2006), and the human exploitation of animals is a subject of growing interest among broad 
sections of the public and also across a wide range of academic disciplines. This chapter 
critically examines the current state of human-animal relations, with particular emphasis 
on acts of killing. First, I give a brief overview of the industrialised killing of animals in 
the UK and how such an operation is aided by the strategies of distance and concealment. 
Section 2.3 provides some historical context for the moral justifications of animal-killing, 
including an account of what it means to be a ‘person’, and a summary of the ethics of 
killing. Section 2.4 is dedicated to the ontologising of animals, or in other words how they 
are conceptually managed, and introduces alternative modes of thinking that might be 
used in analyses of human-animal interactions. Finally, I conclude that the material and 
the discursive are analytically inextricable, and that the way we think and talk about 




The current state of human-animal relations has been described as a “war”, in which 
animals are not combatants but civilians (Wadiwel, 2015). The scale of killing has been 
likened to a “holocaust” (Davis, 2005), and animal imprisonment to human slavery 
(Spiegel, 1996). In the UK, at the time of writing, there are 1,674 intensive factory farms, 
and around 1.5 billion land animals are killed every year to be made into food products. 
Taken together with the number of marine animals also killed for food – calculated based 
on weight, as their deaths are measured in tonnes – the total number of land and sea 
animals slaughtered each year to support the UK food supply is estimated to be 6.4 billion 
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(Animal Clock, 2019)10. After food products, the next largest animal-killing industry in 
the UK is animal experimentation, which in 2017 involved 3.3 million animals, some of 
them subjected to several procedures before being killed (Home Office, 2018). Though 
this figure is significant, it is still dwarfed by the number of animals slaughtered as part 
of animal agriculture. 
It seems only fitting to include some details of how such animals are killed. Fish and 
shellfish, for instance, must undergo a number of processes. They are first graded 
(grouped by size), fasted (deprived of food), and, if they are to be killed elsewhere, lifted 
by nets into a specialised boat to be taken to a central killing site. They are then ‘crowded’ 
(forced into a small space) and may be killed using a number of methods: by being 
removed from water; by being exposed to extreme cold; by being gassed with carbon 
dioxide; by being bled to death; or by being stunned and/or killed using electricity, 
anaesthesia, or a blow to the head (Humane Slaughter Association, 2016b). Birds, such 
as chickens and turkeys, are usually stunned and then cut at the neck until they bleed to 
death, but they may also be gassed, decapitated, shot with a bullet or have their necks 
dislocated. Stunning can be carried out individually with a handheld stunner, or, in larger 
operations, by hoisting the birds by their feet and submerging their heads into a water 
bath which is then electrified, stunning many at once (Humane Slaughter Association, 
2016c). Pigs are also stunned before they are killed, either individually after being penned 
in groups, or by being mechanically lowered into a carbon dioxide gas chamber. They are 
then shackled, hoisted by their feet, and bled to death by being cut at the neck (Humane 
Slaughter Association, 2016a).  
For sheep and cows, the procedure is effectively the same: stunning followed by killing. 
In his ethnography of slaughterhouse workers, Pachirat (2011) describes the full process 
in detail. The first stage is the ‘knocking box’, a space into which animals are guided and 
prodded by a worker with an electric prod. With the animal restrained, another worker – 
the ‘knocker’ – fires a captive-bolt gun into the animal’s skull, rendering them 
unconscious. Once stunned, they are then shackled and hoisted away on an overhead line, 
taken out of the knocker’s line of sight. Two more workers, the ‘pre-sticker’ and ‘sticker’, 
then sever the carotid arteries and jugular veins of the unconscious animal, who bleeds to 
death as their body is carried further along the line to be dismembered and further 
 
10 Animal Clock draws on a range of sources to produce these figures, predominantly reports by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the UN. Sea animal counts are based on an average of the results of two 
estimation approaches, outlined at https://animalclock.org/uk/#section-considerations. 
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processed by other slaughterhouse workers. Pachirat describes a “mythologizing” of the 
knocker among the others, as it is the knocker who “begins the irreversible process of 
turning the live creatures into dead ones” (Pachirat, 2011: 159-160). By detailing the 
killing process and the mechanisms of the slaughterhouse, Pachirat engages in what he 
calls a “politics of sight”, directly resisting the efforts of animal industries to maintain 
concealment around industrialised killing. His account, corroborated by Wilkie’s (2010) 
Livestock/Deadstock, draws our attention to that which is typically absent from animal-
killing statistics and other ‘official’ government- or industry-driven literature: the 
widespread use and integral roles of distance and concealment. 
One might ask whether we ought to be consulting literature from non-academic sources, 
such as pressure groups, given that they have a specific agenda and are more likely to 
highlight the most extreme cases in the interests of their cause. Mitchell (2007) addresses 
this argument: 
First, any pressure group which publishes information which is inaccurate has a lot 
to lose politically and risks having all of its published information tainted, thus 
giving ammunition to its political competitors. Secondly, specialist documents from 
established groups … give full sets of references, the majority of which are from 
academic journals and publications by such bodies as the United Nations. However, 
they may also publish first hand investigative information, which is simply not 
available elsewhere and the critical importance of using sources from such 
“pressure groups” is that they document what many journals and official reports are 
silent about. (Mitchell, 2007: 7). 
To this defence I would add that all other such literature also has a specific agenda, and 
the decision to simply report numerical facts alone is not an altogether objective one. The 
choice to be “apolitical” is, itself, a political decision (van Dijk, 2008). Describing animal 
deaths in terms of such huge, almost unfathomable, numbers also “helps us turn animals 
into objects that we can then kill” (Buller, 2013: 163).  
 
2.2.1 Killing in plain sight 
 
Slaughtering has become an “invisible, exiled, almost clandestine activity” (Vialles, 
1994: 5). In nineteenth-century Britain, slaughterhouses were largely unregulated, and 
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could take the form of a butcher’s shop or even a butcher’s own home (Otter, 2005). They 
were, in many cases, highly visible, with slaughter carried out in the streets or at public 
markets. London’s Smithfield Market had been famous for its open-air animal slaughter 
– along with its floggings, executions and bear-baiting – since the Middle Ages, but 
Victorian sensibilities led to it being removed from the centre of the city and reinstated 
as a “dead meat” market almost three miles away, in Islington (Metcalfe, 2015). It was 
found that public sites of slaughter “infected and barbarized those around them, 
mysteriously stimulating drinking, fighting, and prostitution” (Otter, 2005: 91). In 1857, 
a bill to “Amend the Acts for the More Effectual Prevention of Cruelty to Animals” meant 
that not only must slaughter be carried out in licensed, out-of-town ‘abattoirs’, away from 
the public, but also that children under the age of fourteen be forbidden from witnessing 
acts of slaughter (Burt, 2004). The same bill ordered that any stray dogs seen to be in an 
emaciated or starving state be ‘destroyed’, in another attempt to control the visibility of 
animals in public places. Further evidence of public morality concerns are seen in the 
legislation that followed: in 1876, public vivisection lectures were banned, and in 1911 
the witnessing of the cutting up of carcasses was limited to those aged sixteen and above. 
Today, the distance between animal products and their origins is greater than ever. The 
shift towards a more urban society has meant that humans have less contact with animals 
who are bred to be slaughtered (Cupp, 2016), and there is a concerted effort to maintain 
that separation in the name of profits (Adams, 1990; Pollan, 2006; Safran Foer, 2010). 
Slaughtering practices are concealed by a variety of means: the geography and 
architecture of slaughterhouses; the use of advertising and media; and the discourse and 
laws that surround animal industries (Calarco, 2015; see also Chapter 3). Vegans and 
animal-rights activists are successfully portrayed by some members of the ‘meat’ industry 
as “terrorists” (Best and Nocella, 2004; Safran Foer, 2010), and specific “ag gag” laws 
are in place which criminalise undercover investigations and whistleblowing within 
animal agriculture (Lin, 2015) – something of an “agricultural iron curtain” (Kingery, 
2012).  
The point of slaughter marks a division between those who are responsible and those who 
are not, with slaughtering seen as the “dirty work” (Thompson, 2003: 313); to some 
farmers, slaughterers are “little more than ‘animals’” (Wilkie, 2010: 173). For non-
slaughter workers in animal agriculture, there is a “moral haven” in which they can take 
refuge and experience a separateness from this less desirable position (Birke et al., 2007: 
158). Even within the walls of the slaughterhouse, mechanisms are set in place to maintain 
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this division. This is done partly for reasons of hygiene and efficiency, but also – as found 
by Pachirat – for control of visibility; via a system of screens, doors, and dividing walls, 
the many stages in the process of rendering an animal into ‘meat’ are obscured, concealed 
from the other slaughterhouse workers and the animals yet to be killed (Franklin, 1999: 
158). In fact, in a plant of 121 workers, Pachirat found that only one was seen as 
responsible for the killing of the animals – something he named “the 120 + 1 argument” 
(Pachirat, 2011: 160). By means of concealment, distance and isolation, it seems a ‘moral 
haven’ can be found even inside a busy slaughterhouse. 
 
2.3 The Ethics of Killing 
 
Broadly speaking, and in normal situations, killing is considered a wrongful act when the 
victim of the killing is a person (Tooley, 2011). But what constitutes a ‘person’ – and 
precisely why killing a person is (normally) considered intrinsically wrong – is hotly 
debated, and the lines can be drawn in many different ways. The lay understanding of the 
term ‘person’ is typically as one that can be used interchangeably with ‘human’ (Singer, 
2011: 74), which perhaps explains why the killing of humans is universally held to be 
(normally) wrong, and why the killing of animals is (normally) held to be less wrong 
(McMahan, 2002: 189-190). Entailed in this assumption about humans and other animals 
is another assumption: that the wrongness of killing is not black and white, but a matter 
of degree. In this section I examine some of the historical factors in these perceived 
degrees of wrongness, followed by a discussion of the concept of personhood and a closer 
look at the ethics of killing. 
 
2.3.1 The natural order 
 
The relationship between species membership and moral value has a long and well-
documented history, and, despite there being empirical evidence of innumerable 
biological (and, increasingly, social) similarities between humans and other animals, 
there is still an enduring, taken-for-granted notion of the exceptionalism of human beings. 
Folk beliefs of evolution, for instance, revolve around concepts such as ‘the missing link’ 
between humans and their evolutionary predecessors, as though evolution is a linear, 
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progressive and inevitable process – rather than a messy and “accidental” one (H. Gee, 
2013) – and one which ultimately places humans at “the top”. Such ideas can be traced 
back to influential thinkers, notably Darwin and his “Tree of Life” (Fig. 2.1), which, 
though now understood to be a misleading oversimplification (Tripp et al., 2017; Bapteste 




Fig. 2.1: Darwin’s “Tree of Life” sketch from his “B” notebook on Transmutation of Species (Darwin 
Correspondence Project, 2018) 
 
Much earlier than Darwin, however, and far more influential, was the religious doctrine 
of the ‘Great Chain of Being’, a hierarchy which attributes to different living entities – 
including different groups of humans – varying levels of complexity, thus placing them 
in particular positions of importance (Fig. 2.2). This type of ranking of organisms dates 
back to the classifications of Plato and Aristotle, but it was more fully developed into the 
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Great Chain when appropriated by Christians during the Middle Ages. That all forms of 
life on Earth can be arranged into a natural order, “from the Supreme God down to the 
last dregs of things, mutually linked together without a break” (Lovejoy, 1964: 63), had 
by the Elizabethan era become a commonplace assumption (Tillyard, 2011: 26). The 
notion of a divine order of beings, with God at the apex, followed by the angels, the 
aristocracy, peasants, nonhuman animals, plants and minerals may sound absurd in a 
modern context, but this hierarchy continues to be “a fundamental guiding assumption of 
our culture” (Kaufman, 2016: 26). Carl Linnaeus, whose system of categorising plants 
and animals is still employed by biologists today, albeit in a modified form, was heavily 
influenced by the Great Chain of Being. 
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Fig. 2.2: The “Great Chain of Being” depicted in Diego Valadés’ (1579) Rhetorica Christiana, provided 
by Brock University Digital History (2016). Property of the Newberry Library, Chicago.  
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A modern-day version of the Great Chain might be what Arluke and Sanders (1996) term 
the “Sociozoologic Scale”, which differs from one culture to another. All societies, they 
claim, rank living beings on a “ladder of worth” very similar to the Great Chain of Being 
and the Tree of Life, with the worthiest humans at the pinnacle and less-than-human 
organisms relegated to the bottom (Arluke and Sanders, 1996: 168-169). The 
sociozoologic scale is not based solely on biological differences, but primarily on how 
well each being “fits in” with society. As a result, not all humans rank equally, and these 
systems of unequal privilege come to be considered natural and normal.  
Those who land at the bottom, because they are in some inferior category, can 
justifiably be exploited and oppressed. Our ability to rank-order animals – and the 
inconsistencies that follow – may be a useful form of thinking for systems of social 
control that seek to justify inconsistent treatment of humans. (Arluke and Sanders, 
1996: 168) 
Below the humans on the scale are the animals, ranked by their perceived value. ‘Good’ 
animals, such as pets and farm animals, accept their place in society, or at least appear to 
accept it as they cannot do anything about it. These animals have a use to humans – as 
companions, resources – and therefore occupy a more privileged position. ‘Bad’ animals 
are “freaks that confuse their place, vermin that stray from their place, or demons that 
reject their place” (Arluke and Sanders, 1996: 175). Failure to comply with the societal 
norms dictated by (elite) humans results in a lower placing on the scale, granting total 
power over those beings.  
There is a spatial element to this ordering of beings – “the centre of the circle, the top of 
the hierarchy” (Sealey, 2018: 228), ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ animals – and the themes of 
space and place are consistent in the literature. The place in which an animal exists – or 
is kept – can determine their status and lived experience. A rabbit in a laboratory becomes 
a different animal to a rabbit in a human’s home, or a rabbit in ‘the wild’. Sealey finds 
that a dog “can simultaneously occupy different places in a notional hierarchy of 
characteristics: mechanistic brute, useful tool, loyal companion, loving family member 
and intelligent agent” (Sealey, 2018: 243). To be “out of place”, like the ‘bad’ animals 
described above, is considered unacceptable. This is the case for ‘stray’ dogs in the UK 
and other countries, for example (DeMello, 2012: 13). 
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2.3.2 Enlightened thinkers 
 
Dominant ideas, such as that of the Great Chain of Being, can remain unchallenged for 
many centuries. Particularly influential – and damaging, as we now realise – were the 
writings of Descartes in the 17th century. His assertion that all animals other than humans 
are mere biological automata, whose cries of pain are “no different from a whining gear 
that needs oil” (Francione, 2009: 29), contributed to centuries of unimaginable animal 
cruelty. More pervasive than this idea, however, is the Cartesian notion of dualism. The 
long-standing conceptualisation of body and soul as separate entities has further 
contributed to the ‘evidence’ of the superiority of human beings. Humans see themselves 
as both “biological and cultural beings, organisms with bodies and persons with minds” 
(Ingold, 1994: 4), while nonhuman animals are still, to some degree, treated as “matter 
without spirit” (Adams, 1990: 57), as physical beings whose cognitive and emotional 
capacities are massively inferior to our own. The oppression and harming of animals 
poses no great moral dilemma to proponents of this view, as discussed in Section 2.3.4.  
Further ‘proof’ of human exceptionalism was proposed by Kant. In his view, humans are 
unique in that they possess rationality, specifically “substantive rationality”, the ability to 
pursue the ends of one’s own choosing (Louden, 2011: xxi). Humans therefore have 
“dignity”, and animals do not. For Kant, animals are means to an end, while humans are 
ends in themselves. This distinction has been used to justify the classification of humans 
as ‘persons’ and all other beings as ‘things’: 
Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, 
if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called 
things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their 
nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. (Kant, 1785: 428, cited in 
Wuerth, 2014 2014: 308)  
Elsewhere, Kant writes: 
The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely 
above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person....that is, a being altogether 
different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one 
may deal and dispose at one's discretion. (Kant, 1798: 7, 127, cited in Gruen, 2011: 
57) 
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Though there have been attempts to reinterpret Kant in favour of animal rights (e.g. 
Korsgaard, 2015), his stance here is clear, and the effects of such thinking can still be 
seen in our ethics and legal systems (see Section 2.4). 
It is not simply that humans and animals differ; it is that animals are deficient in values 
that humans possess. The human ability for language, for instance, has long been cited as 
justification for the superior status of our species, bolstered by the long-standing idea that 
“language” is a pre-requisite for thinking and self-consciousness (Singer, 2011: 96). That 
other animals possess a wide range of more-than-human abilities – the ability to fly, for 
instance, or to use senses and modes of communication that are unavailable to us – does 
not appear to threaten the dominant view of human exceptionalism. As noted by DeMello 
(2012: 42), “we keep redefining the criteria we use to differentiate humans from other 
animals as we discover bit by bit that animals are a lot cleverer, and a lot more human, 
than we thought.” 
Animals’ inability to use (our) language is the cause of a great disadvantage to them, in 
that it leaves humans free to construct the narratives of human-animal relations. In the 
case of nonhuman advocacy, humans speak out on behalf of animals and petition for their 
freedom or improved living standards. However, humans have also been successful in 
creating stories for the benefit of our own species, and to assuage concerns over animal 
harm: “our denial of the voices of other animals … enables us to exclude them ethically” 
(Morgan and Cole, 2011: 128). A long-standing and cross-cultural trope is that of 
animals’ complicity in their own exploitation. There is a belief among the Cree Indians 
in northern Canada, for example, that animals “intentionally present themselves to the 
hunter to be killed”, and that hunting is a “rite of regeneration” which benefits the animal, 
whose soul is released to be reincarnated in another body (Ingold, 1994: 9). This idea 
might sound irrelevant and far-fetched, but a more modern equivalent is found in the folk 
story of animal husbandry. This is summarised in Safran Foer’s Eating Animals: 
Basically, humans struck a deal with the animals we have named chickens, cows, 
pigs, and so forth: we’ll protect you, arrange food for you, etc., and in turn, your 
labor will be harnessed, your milk and eggs taken, and, at times you will be killed 
and eaten. (Safran Foer, 2010: 99) 
The arrangement is portrayed not as a human decision to rear and use animals for human 
ends, but as an agreement between both parties, and even today it continues to be 
discussed in mutualistic terms (e.g. Zeder, 2015). While it is not unreasonable to suggest, 
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from an evolutionary perspective, that animal domestication has been advantageous for 
the species involved, it is a projection of anthropomorphism and intentionality to describe 
it as a “bargain with humanity”, and a fiction to declare it a “tremendous success” from 
“the animals’ point of view”, as does Pollan in The Omnivore’s Dilemma (Pollan, 2006: 
320). Human monopoly on the discourse surrounding animals plays a major role in the 




While many contemporary philosophers now agree that membership of the species Homo 
sapiens is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for personhood, there are others 
who hold that (some) humans are persons while all other animals are not, or at least are 
not likely to be. McMahan, for example, whose The Ethics of Killing (2002) constitutes 
a leading work in this field, concedes that “people”, or “persons”, “could conceivably 
include some nonhuman individuals”, but chooses nonetheless to use the terms ‘people’ 
and ‘animals’ in the conventional sense, i.e. as “categories that do not overlap” 
(McMahan, 2002: 190). Thousands of years of philosophy precede this supposition, 
which cannot be dealt with sufficiently within the scope of this chapter. What follows is 
therefore a very brief overview of only the most pertinent aspects of the personhood 
debate.  
Personhood is a moral concept; to be a ‘person’ is to be a member of the moral 
community, someone worthy of moral consideration. The word ‘person’ itself derives 
from the Latin persona ‘a mask worn in a classical drama, a character in a play’, which 
later came to mean “one who plays a role in life, one who is an agent” (Singer, 2011: 74). 
Agency is therefore widely considered a key element of personhood. Other criteria, 
however, vary wildly. From the very early discussions of personhood (e.g. Aristotle, 
Plato) through to those of the Enlightenment (e.g. Locke, Hume, Kant), emphasis was 
placed on rationality, reason, autonomy, intelligence, dignity, language, reflectiveness, 
and (unity with) a soul (Gruen, 2011; Torchia, 2007). Later ‘performance-based’ theories 
of personhood have placed value on, for example, consciousness (Midgley, 1985), self-
awareness (Singer, 2011), ‘second-order’ desires (Frankfurt, 1971), the ability to treat 
other persons appropriately (White, 2010), a biographical sense of self (Varner, 2012), 
the capacity for deliberate action in a “dramaturgical pattern” (Ossorio, 2013), and the 
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ability to remember past events and hold expectations for the future (Tooley, 2011). 
Alternatives to these function-based criteria include, amongst others: ‘significance’, that 
persons are those to whom things matter (Taylor, 1985); ‘essence’, that personhood is 
inherent to certain ‘natural kinds’ (Beckwith, 2007; Moreland, 1988); and 
‘intersubjectivity’, that personhood exists through interpersonal relationships 
(Kompridis, 2009).  
Apart from the inconsistency and “continual shifting” of criteria (Bourke, 2011: 175), 
there are three glaring problems with the concept of personhood. First, it is rooted in the 
early Greek philosophical works which were not inquiries into ‘personhood’, per se, but 
rather observations and thoughts on what makes humans distinct from other beings, or in 
other words, what it means to be ‘human’ (LaGrandeur, 2014; Torchia, 2007). This has 
resulted in a deeply anthropocentric understanding of ‘personhood’ which makes any 
attempt to extend it beyond the human an uncomfortable exercise in anthropomorphism. 
Second, the literature is overwhelmingly unempirical, based predominantly on 
introspective assumptions of: i) what Others experience and what their lives entail; ii) 
what matters to Others personally; and, consequently, iii) the value Others attach to their 
own lives. Third, metaphysical understandings of personhood – i.e. as conferred by a set 
of psychological and/or biological properties, or other such ‘observed’ properties – are 
often conflated with moral personhood, which entails ethical concepts such as moral 
agency and moral standing, thus “placing metaphysics in the service of ethics” 
(Beauchamp, 1999: 59) and ascribing moral relevance to purely metaphysical properties.  
To do personhood philosophy therefore typically involves three steps: i) taking the 
(‘normal’, adult) human as a starting point, either explicitly or otherwise implicitly by 
drawing on the long history of normative, human-centred personhood theory; ii) drawing 
conclusions on the mental states of Others, often via informed guesswork rather than any 
real empirical investigation; and then iii) using these ‘findings’ to defend a particular 
moral viewpoint. Historically, this has been used to exclude Others from moral 
consideration and to justify their use, from as early as Aristotle – to whom non-Greeks 
were evidently not persons but “natural” slaves (Garnsey, 1996: 107) – to the modern-
day exploitation of nonhumans and other entities deemed ‘subhuman’ or otherwise non-
personal. Equally controversial is the use of personhood philosophy to defend, or try to 
extend moral consideration to, individuals. This is because the criteria are typically 
performance-based, which privilege (human notions of) ability over any intrinsic value 
the entity may have (cf. Regan, 1987; Vilkka, 1997), and because the inescapably human 
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nature of the concept of personhood also reinforces the narcissistic idea that the lives of 
nonhuman Others only have value inasmuch as their mental states and capacities are, 
from what we can gather, similar to ours.  
A consequence of a capacity-based approach to personhood (and, by proxy, moral value) 
is that it can result in some human beings being placed outside of the circle of moral 
consideration (such as early-stage human foetuses and adult humans in a permanently 
vegetative state) and some nonhumans inside it (such as dolphins, apes and chimpanzees), 
thus challenging the entrenched view that moral value can be determined by species, i.e., 
speciesism (Ryder, 2010; Singer, 2011). It also entails that personhood can exist in 
varying degrees, as in the cases of ‘potential persons’ (e.g. human babies), ‘former 
persons’ (e.g. severely brain-damaged adult humans) and ‘near-persons’ (those who meet 
many, but not all, of the personhood criteria) (Tooley, 2011; Varner, 2012). However, 
given that it still operates within a normative, anthropocentric discourse of ‘personhood’, 
a concept centred around typical, human-like properties, this approach does not challenge 
the overall paradigm of human exceptionalism (and can have a real and negative impact 
on the treatment of certain humans). In the scale of worth, the human remains at the top 
and a few select nonhumans simply move up the ranks. While the result may not be 
considered particularly controversial, the means by which it has been reached betray an 
unwillingness, or more likely an inability, to conceive of the value of nonhuman entities 
on their own terms, rather than against the yardstick of the human. 
 
2.3.4 (When) is killing wrong? 
 
Just as personhood is dependent on varying sets of criteria, each with their own moral 
priorities, killing is an act whose morality cannot be agreed upon by ethicists. The 
wrongness of killing can be accounted for from a range of perspectives and by considering 
a number of factors. A harm-based account, for example, attributes wrongness to killing 
– where the killing is, in theory, painless – on the basis that (untimely) death is harmful 
to the individual. Taking this line of reasoning, it follows that killing someone and 
allowing someone to die are morally equivalent (Rachels, 1986, 2001) and that, 
depending on the amount of harm that death will cause to the individual, the wrongness 
of the killing can be considered in degrees. A more specific harm-based account is that 
of deprivation, by which it would be considered, for example, more wrong to kill an infant 
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or even an insentient foetus than to kill an adult member of that species, on the basis that 
they are being deprived of a greater amount of potential future life (Marquis, 1989). It 
could also be claimed that the wrongness of killing resides in the value of that which it 
destroys (Frey, 1988), where value can either be extrinsic (i.e. as a means to an end) or 
intrinsic (as an end in itself) (Vilkka, 1997: 16). From this perspective, it might be argued 
that to kill an individual who has intrinsic value is more wrong than to kill an individual 
with only extrinsic value, though both acts might still be considered wrong. Of course, 
what counts as ‘valuable’ is highly debatable and constitutes a field in itself. In the context 
of killing, however, ‘value’ is conventionally construed in terms of ‘richness’ of life, 
which is dependent upon a certain capacity for wellbeing (cf. Nussbaum, 2011).  
On whether we might consider animals’ lives to potentially be as ‘rich’ as those of 
humans, Frey asks, “But why should I do this? Nothing I observe and experience leads 
me to assume it” (1988: 195). Frey chooses not to draw on nor pursue empirical evidence 
of the actual nature of animal lives, calling instead on his intuition that (most) humans 
have greater cognitive capacities than animals and therefore have lives of greater 
‘richness’. His conclusion, that it would be morally permissible to use some humans, as 
well as animals, as experimental test subjects (1988: 201), represents a leap from 
metaphysics (observations or assumptions of cognitive capacity) to practical ethics 
(recommendations on how to treat humans and animals) via anthropocentric notions of 
value (‘richness’ of life). Singer, a fellow utilitarian, argues that we ought to give animals 
the benefit of the doubt, and that all animal-killing requires justification (2011: 103). He 
criticises philosophers for “reaching conclusions from the armchair on a topic that 
demands investigation in the real world” (2011: 97), but, in the same text, makes 
unsubstantiated assertions about the desires of snails (2011: 77), for example. Discussions 
of desires in relation to moral value are consistently anthropocentric, both in terms of 
which desires are considered morally relevant and how strong and complex the desires of 
Others are perceived to be. Morally superior desires are long in range: to “bring 
longstanding projects to fruition” (McMahan, 2002: 197), “to live a good story” (Varner, 
2012: 172),  “to travel to Nepal next year” (Singer, 2011: 83), for instance. Since animals 
cannot (satisfactorily demonstrate a desire to) do such things, it is generally considered 
less wrong to kill them than it is to kill humans; their interests in continued existence are 
evidently less complex, and in losing their lives they “lose goods that are of a lower 
quality” (McMahan, 2002: 196).  
26 
To Singer, the “father of the modern animal rights movement” (Varner, 2012: 4), most 
animals are in fact replaceable. If they have lived pleasant lives and are to be replaced 
with another animal who is bred to enjoy an equally pleasant life, then their (painless) 
killing is morally permissible, since there is no loss of important future plans on their part 
and in replacing them the world is no better or worse a place, using a utilitarian calculation 
of aggregation (Singer, 1979, 2011). His ‘replaceability’ view has been met with 
opposition (Kagan, 2015; Stephens, 2003; Višak, 2015), most notably by Regan (1987), 
on the basis that animals are not merely ‘receptacles’ of value, but are individuals with 
intrinsic value. However, this persistent notion of a narrative, a human-like diachronicity 
of life, is consistently cited as an important – if not the most important – source of ‘value’ 
in an individual’s life (Tooley, 2011; Varner, 2012). In the absence of evidence of this, 
nonhumans are unlikely to be afforded serious moral consideration: “This is the major 
difference between persons and non-persons … persons are storytellers” (Varner, 2012: 
172). 
While it is now evident that animals can suffer, and that this is morally relevant (cf. 
Bentham, 1789; Singer, 1975), the lives of animals themselves are argued – via the types 
of reasoning outlined above – to be of comparatively little value, though not of no value 
at all. Combined with proposed definitions of personhood, it is possible to draw 
boundaries of moral consideration that include or exclude certain types of individuals. 
Whether the wrongness of killing is measured in terms of the harm it causes, the value of 
that which it destroys, or the unfulfilled future interests of the victim, human lives are 
consistently attributed far greater value than those of animals, and the killing of 
nonhumans is generally held to be significantly less controversial. 
 
2.4 Ontologising Animals 
 
Having considered how animals are physically treated, and how such treatment has 
historically been rationalised, I turn now more explicitly to how animals are ontologised. 
By ‘ontology’ I refer here not to the countable ‘taxonomy’ or ‘inventory’ kind – discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4 – but something closer to the philosophical variety, i.e. “the study of 
being” or “the study of what there is” (Hofweber, 2018). Here, when I use ‘ontology’ in 
its countable form, as in “an ontology”, I therefore invoke an approximation of the 
definitions, “a theory of being” (Seuren, 2013), “a view of reality” (Maruska, 2017), and 
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“a formal specification of a perspective” (Smith, 2004). When discussing how animals 
are ‘ontologised’, then, I refer to where animals fit in this “theory of reality”, or rather, 
how they are treated conceptually.  
First, I describe two interrelated ways in which our ontologising of animals has a direct 
impact on their lived experiences: through their coerced status as producers and products 
under capitalism (Section 2.4.1), and through their subjugation as legal property (2.4.2). 
I then introduce the concepts of posthumanist ontology (2.4.3) and assemblage (2.4.4), 
which offer alternative ways of approaching the human/animal divide.  
 
2.4.1 Animals under capitalism 
 
For humans, the vast majority of animals exist as products, resources, “living tools” 
(Shipman, 2011: 276), labourers, and test subjects, and the nature of this relationship has 
dramatically intensified with the rise of capitalism (DeMello, 2012; Nibert, 2013). 
Braidotti describes capitalism as “the opportunistic trans-species commodification of 
Life” (2013: 60), with “Life” inclusive of all types: humans, animals and the Earth and 
its ecology as a whole (cf. Foster et al., 2011; Stibbe, 2015). The position of animals in 
capitalism is unique, in that they are not like paid human workers, nor quite like human 
slaves; as producers of commodities who also constitute products in themselves, they are 
“superexploited living commodities” (Torres, 2007: 58). Animals reared for the purposes 
of slaughter are often treated more like plants, vegetables and other “biological resources” 
(Stibbe, 2012: 126), and commonly referred to as stock to be later harvested, in keeping 
with this “vegetalizing” metaphor (Vialles, 1994: xiv). Vialles reminds us that the word 
abattoir is itself a euphemism, derived from the French abattre ‘to fell’ (1994: 46). 
Similarly, the word cattle, which has no singular, i.e. individuated, form (cf. Section 
3.6.3), was not used to refer to bovine animals until the 16th Century; before then it was 
a term for ‘movable property’ – as in a chattel mortgage – via the Anglo-Norman catel, 
or chatel, meaning simply ‘property’, a descendant of the Latin capitale (Wilkie, 2010: 
115). 
Capitalism is defined by Torres (2007: 11) as “an alienating, exploitative force that puts 
the production of capital above all else”. When profits are a priority, the exploitation of a 
supposedly inferior and voiceless social group is easily justified. Nibert’s Theory of 
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Oppression, inspired by Noel’s (1968) theory of the origins of ethnic stratification, 
operates on the premise that “oppression of humans and other animals is entangled and 
that such exploitation is motivated primarily by economic interests” (Nibert, 2002: 15). 
This theory is not at odds with the abovementioned explanations for oppression – the 
God-given hierarchy of beings, the perceived inferiority of the Other – but stresses the 
significance of the economic system in supporting these power relations. It consists of 
three ‘prongs’, or three factors in the oppression of animals by humans: firstly, animals 
represent competition for economic resources, such as land; secondly, the exploitation of 
animals is economically beneficial to humans; and thirdly, humans use ideological 
manipulation to create prejudiced attitudes that reinforce the established economic order 
(Nibert, 2002). I would add to this a fourth prong: that humans maintain a position of 
dominance in a politics of sight. That is, animals – and indeed other oppressed groups – 
continue to be exploited on a massive scale partly due to the fact that certain practices are 
(able to be) kept largely concealed and obfuscated by those with an economic interest in 
their continuation. The mass slaughtering of animals in Western societies is a prime 
example of this, and the slaughterhouse (or ‘abattoir’) an emblem of the (in)visibility of 
animal suffering. 
 
2.4.2 Animals under the law 
 
Working in conjunction with capitalism, legal systems are “primary culprits in facilitating 
the exploitation of non-humans” (Francione, 1996: ii). The interests of humans are 
systemically privileged over the interests of animals in our laws (Peters, 2016a), even in 
cases when the human’s interest is trivial and the animal’s is a matter of life and death 
(Torres, 2007: 67). Despite legal recognition of their sentient status in a number of 
countries, including the UK (Ares, 2018), animals still do not have rights as legal subjects; 
they are “sentient commodities” (Wilkie, 2017). Rights can only be held by legal 
‘persons’, namely humans, corporations, and, rarely, some natural landscape features 
such as rivers (Hutchison, 2014; O’Donnell, 2017). Legally, animals are classed as 
property, specifically personal property (Cupp, 2016), and as legal objects they cannot 
hold rights.  
There have been some recent attempts by animal-rights lawyers to file writs of habeas 
corpus – a recourse in law that can be used to petition for the releasing of an unlawfully 
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detained individual – on behalf of animals they consider to be legal persons. Most of these 
petitions, namely by the Nonhuman Rights Project11 on behalf of chimpanzees in the US 
(Wise, 2017), have been denied or later overturned by the courts. However, at the time of 
writing, there have since been two successful cases of captive animals being granted 
‘legal personhood’ and consequently liberated from their enclosures: that of Celia, a 
chimpanzee in Argentina; and that of Chucho, a bear in Colombia. In both cases, the 
judges’ decisions are reported to have been influenced by “Amerindian perspectivism”, a 
worldview which attributes subjectivity and personhood to (certain) animals 
(Fraundorfer, 2018). Specifically, in the case of Celia (Poder Judicial Mendoza, 2016), 
the judge referred explicitly in her decision to the concepts of Gaia, Pachamama and 
indigenous thought, all of which emphasise the interrelatedness of life and the respect that 
is owed by humans to other living beings (Fraundorfer, 2018: 23). Though cases such as 
these are ground-breaking and represent significant steps towards better legal rights for 
animals, they do not bestow the animal with the same legal rights as humans; they simply 
recognise those animals as legal subjects, rather than objects. These cases are also 
extremely rare, and as yet have only been successful in South America and for highly-
prized, ‘symbolic’ animals. 
For all other animals, there are animal welfare laws. Early developments in animal 
welfare laws were inextricably linked with industrialisation, urbanisation and the growing 
visibility of ‘working’ animals in society (S. White, 2016: 117), and today’s laws are, in 
principle, the same. Animals receive protection not in and of themselves but via regulation 
of their use, and laws are often passed to appease the concerns of the viewing public. 
Harrison’s (1964) factory farming exposé, Animal Machines, led to the commissioning 
of the 1965 “Brambell report” (Brambell, 1965), which drew up the ‘five freedoms’ of 
domesticated animals. These ‘freedoms’, such as freedom from hunger and freedom from 
pain, were formalised in 1979 and are still referred to in today’s welfare legislation 
(Kasperbauer and Sandøe, 2015: 18). Until the Amsterdam Summit in 1996, however, the 
status of farmed animals in the UK was still technically “the same as that of other 
agricultural foodstuffs, such as potatoes” (Wilkie, 2017: 5). The most recent UK Public 
General Act on animals is the Animal Welfare Act 2006, which defines an “animal” as 
“a vertebrate other than man”, and a “protected animal” as one who is “commonly 
domesticated”, “under the control of man”, and “not living in a wild state” (Animal 
 
11 https://www.nonhumanrights.org/  
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Welfare Act 2006 , ss 1-2), which leaves many animals unaccounted for. Section 4 of the 
Act, which relates to the prevention of “unnecessary suffering”, excludes “suffering 
caused under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986”12, and concludes with the 
caveat, “Nothing in this section applies to the destruction of an animal in an appropriate 
and humane manner” (s 4(4)). 
That the words “destruction”, “appropriate” and “humane” appear in the same sentence 
gives an idea of what to expect from the UK’s current animal-killing legislation, namely 
the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995 (WASK) and the Welfare 
of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 (WATOK). To contravene 
these slaughter regulations is potentially punishable by imprisonment for a maximum 
term of three months, or by a fine, whichever is considered more appropriate. In WATOK, 
the legislation that applies to England, the option of imprisonment is included only as part 
of EU provisions and the fine is unspecified.13 In WASK, the potential fine is one that is 
“not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”, for which the default fine is £5,000 
(Criminal Justice Act 1982). To provide some perspective, other offences punishable by 
a level-5 fine include: installing a non-compliant intruder alarm (Noise and Statutory 
Nuisance Act 1993); selling a football ticket without authorisation (Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994); and splashing a pedestrian by driving one’s car through a puddle 
(Road Traffic Act 1988; Crown Prosecution Service, 2018).  
Ultimately, animal welfare is a trade issue (Rushen, 2008), and UK animal laws read as 
more of a gesture towards animal protection than a sincere commitment to avoiding harm. 
They legislate against “unnecessary” cruelty towards animals – even though “we 
routinely use animals in all sorts of contexts that could never be considered as involving 
any coherent notion of necessity” (Francione, 1996: i) – while preserving their ‘property’ 
status. Animals receive protection depending not on who they are, but on how they are 
used by humans. This means that some animals have the right not to suffer, sometimes, 
but they do not have the right to life. To change this would involve bestowing legal 
personhood on animals, which would prove “very costly” (Bourke, 2011: 179). More 
significantly, it would result in an official “unmasking” of the perceived animal-human 
divide (Peters, 2016b: 53). Since Western legal systems traditionally entail just two 
 
12 Explanatory Notes to the Animal Welfare Act 2006, para 18 
13 At the time of writing, the UK is preparing to leave the EU, and the legal protection animals will receive 
‘post-Brexit’ is unclear (Ares, 2018). 
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primary entities, ‘persons’ and ‘things’, it is a matter of course that animals be classed not 
as fellow persons but as the Other, i.e. as things. 
The epistemological and ontological problems described in this chapter therefore matter 
a great deal to animals, because their ramifications extend beyond the realm of 
introspective philosophy and into the fields of law and practical ethics. Theoretical and 
introspective writings on the (assumed) possession of arbitrary, anthropocentric and – 
often morally irrelevant – properties can translate into actual legal and cultural 
(dis)advantages for certain individuals. Animals may be considered valuable, as 
companions and commodities, but they are nonetheless ontologised as “killable” (cf. 
Haraway, 2008). It is no coincidence that animals are ‘protected’ as property but are 
denied the fundamental right to life; their lives are purported to be of so little value that 
death, for an animal, is considered a lesser misfortune than suffering (McMahan, 2002: 
202).  
 
2.4.3 Posthumanist ontology 
 
The long history of anthropocentrist, humanist thinking, which “has narcissistically 
privileged humans as the center of all significance” (Weitzenfeld and Joy, 2014: 3), is 
beginning to be challenged across a wide range of disciplines. The human-nonhuman 
divide has been exposed, notably by poststructuralists, (eco)feminists, and critical 
theorists, as a political – rather than biological – dichotomy (Agamben, 2004). Ironically, 
it is by such humanist values as reason, egalitarianism and scientific inquiry that this 
divide has come to be undermined. Each attempt to draw this ontological distinction 
between humans and other animals inevitably results in an “excision within human being 
itself” (Weitzenfeld and Joy, 2014: 8), with a great number of human beings finding that 
they have not been invited to “the exclusive Party of the Anthropocene” (Ferrando, 2016: 
165), depending on which version of the human “falsely occupies the space of the 
universal” (Calarco, 2008: 10; cf. Agamben’s (2004) “anthropological machine”). 
Whether motivated by these reasons – in the spirit of liberal humanism – or by a 
posthumanist, anti-speciesist desire to decentre the human, an increasing amount of 
energy is being expended on pursuing a posthumanist ontology. As emphasised by Wolfe 
(2003: 7), such a project  
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… has nothing to do with whether you like animals. We all, human and nonhuman 
alike, have a stake in the discourse and institution of speciesism; it is by no means 
limited to its overwhelmingly direct and disproportionate effects on animals. 
Before continuing, it is necessary to define what is meant here by ‘posthumanist’. 
Posthumanism can be understood by analogy to – and in conjunction with – 
poststructuralism and postmodernism, where the ‘post’ signifies a critique, or more 
typically a rejection, of those values. ‘Posthumanism’ has therefore come to be seen by 
many as a general umbrella term to refer to any departure from the traditional 
understanding of ‘humanism’, i.e. an anthropocentric – especially androcentric – view of 
the world, which operates on Cartesian, hierarchical dualisms (e.g. human/animal, 
man/woman) and which promulgates the notion of an autonomous, rational subject 
(‘Man’). In all varieties of posthumanism, then, there is at the very least “a refusal to take 
humanism for granted” (Badmington, 2000: 10). Perhaps the most visible variety is that 
of transhumanism – as seen in science fiction – which problematises the boundaries of 
‘the human’ in light of scientific and technological developments (Ferrando, 2013: 27). 
Far from being anti-humanist, this so-called “bad” posthumanism (Wolfe, 2010: xvii) is 
rooted in Enlightenment values and is in fact an extension of traditional humanism, an 
“ultra-humanism” (Onishi, 2011) that, taken to its logical conclusion, ontologises humans 
as disembodied, technologically-enhanced avatars. This is not the posthumanism to which 
I refer in this thesis. Instead, I draw broadly on the posthumanist theories of Wolfe 
(Wolfe, 2003, 2010), Haraway (1985, 1991) and Braidotti (2006, 2013), all of which – 
despite their different aims and provenances – place a common emphasis on the 
embodied, material and relational aspects of the posthuman. They call for an eschewing 
of taken-for-granted notions of (non)human qualities and the dualistic, hierarchical 
organisation of life itself, also described as “the socio-cultural onto-epistemological 
assumptions which gave rise to the era of the Anthropocene” (Ferrando, 2016: 164). Most 
importantly, they are committed to the displacement of “the human” as the atomistic 
centre of interest. 
If we are to practise posthumanism, Wolfe says, we “must take another step, another  
post-, and realize that the nature of thought itself must change if it is to be posthumanist” 
(2010: xvi). For this we may turn to alternative modes of thinking, other theories of being, 
that facilitate a more relational understanding of the world. Many writers have converged 
on this issue, perhaps most notably Deleuze and Guattari, whose ideas laid out in A 
Thousand Plateaus (1988) have led to the development of several influential ontologies 
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in the traditions of poststructuralism and new materialism, namely Assemblage Theory 
(DeLanda, 2006, 2016), Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2005; Law and Hassard, 1999), 
and Object-Oriented Ontology (Harman, 2015). Needless to say, these are all rich, 
complex and nuanced accounts of reality and there is neither scope nor call in this chapter 
to describe them all in detail, including the many ways in which they overlap and diverge. 
Instead, I summarise some of the key propositions that characterise most, if not all, of 
these ontologies, and how such concepts might bear upon a posthumanist analysis of 
human-animal relations. 
 
2.4.4 Assemblage thinking 
 
Integral to all of the aforementioned modes of thinking is the concept of the ‘assemblage’ 
(or ‘arrangement’), derived from Deleuze and Guattari’s original agencement, which – as 
argued by DeLanda – does not satisfactorily reflect the processual nature of agencer, 
“matching or fitting together a set of components” (DeLanda, 2016: 1), and rather 
presents the assemblage as a sort of finished product. On the contrary, an assemblage is 
“a temporary gathering of influences” (Elder-Vass, 2015: 105), an arrangement of 
heterogeneous components which appears stable only as a result of being continuously 
reproduced. This view of the world is dynamic: all entities are in an endless state of flux 
and ‘becoming’, closer in nature to processes or events than our traditional understanding 
of entities. An assemblage is at once ‘macro’ and ‘micro’, and is irreducible to its parts; 
it “can become a component part of a larger one … while its own components can also 
be treated as assemblages” (DeLanda, 2016: 4). Assemblages connect with one another 
via reciprocal, rhizomatic networks, rather than being organised in hierarchical, unilinear, 
tree-like structures. “We should stop believing in trees, roots and radicles,” write Deleuze 
and Guattari (1988: 15); “They’ve made us suffer too much. All of arborescent culture is 
founded on them, from biology to linguistics.” Rhizomes, based on the botanical kind 
pictured in Figure 2.3, are not diametrically opposed to trees, however; Deleuze and 
Guattari consider dualisms “the enemy” (1988: 21) and acknowledge that there are “knots 




Figure 2.3: The structure of a plant rhizome (Sherman, no date) 
 
Central to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome are the ideas that any point of a 
rhizome “can be connected to anything other, and must be”, i.e. that everything is 
interconnected in some way, and that a rhizome “ceaselessly establishes connections 
between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, 
sciences, and social struggles” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 7-8). Several attempts have 
been made to visualise such sprawling, multifarious structures, with results ranging from 
web-like clusters of networks and neurons, as in Fig. 2.4, to three-dimensional shapes 
connected by lines, as in Fig. 2.5, which emphasises the influence of rhizomes on 
understandings of discourse. The legend in the top-right hand corner of Fig. 2.5, labelling 
each side of the cuboids rendered in blue, reads: “1 – semiotic chains; 2 – organizations 
of power; 3 – circumstances relevant to the arts; 4 – circumstances relevant to the 
sciences; 5 – circumstances relevant to social struggles; 6 – everything else”. A green line 
represents a “rhizomatic link”. For Deleuze and Guattari, rhizomes have no beginning 




Fig. 2.4: A computer-rendered visualisation of Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome (Eaton, 2015) 
 
 
Fig. 2.5: A visualisation of some of the ideas presented in Chapter 1 of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) A 
Thousand Plateaus. Artist: Marc Ngui. Taken from Connor (2013). 
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Latour incorporated the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari into his “actor-network theory” 
(ANT) which, by his own admission, could have been named “actant-rhizome ontology” 
(Latour, 1999); it is not so much a theory as a method or perspective. ANT, like Harman’s 
(2015) object-oriented ontology (OOO), asks that we suspend any a priori assumptions 
of human primacy over nonhuman entities. Inanimate objects, abstract entities and states 
of affairs are all considered to be on the same ontological footing as animate beings, 
where analysis is concerned, and as such, nonhumans are afforded a kind of agency of 
their own. In ANT, agency is always distributed across actors (or ‘actants’), rather than 
belonging solely to the traditional ‘subject’ or ‘agent’ of the event. ‘Agency’ is used here 
in a very loose sense, however: to have agency in ANT is not necessarily to possess 
intentionality or causal power in the traditional sense, but simply to have the ability to 
make a difference to a course of action (Sayes, 2014; Latour, 2005). Though ANT’s 
commitment to decentring the human is impressive, it has also come under criticism for 
erasing important differences between actors, as well as “projecting onto the object a form 
of anthropomorphic agency” (Leach, 2016: 348), and “[letting] humans off the ethical 
hook” (Diprose, 2009: 9). Taking these challenges into account, the ability to conceive of 
an event as a co-constructed assemblage, a gathering of critical elements, nonetheless has 
the potential to entirely reconfigure our conception of human-nonhuman interactions. 
The approaches discussed in this section can be described as ‘material-semiotic’, in that 
they stress the simultaneously material (embodied, consisting of matter) and semiotic 
(signalling, discursive) nature of everything; the two aspects cannot be separated. Such 
approaches could also be classed as part of the expanding literature of ‘new materialisms’, 
described by Sencindiver (2017) as “a growing mesh … whose budding fibers are opening 
new lines of inquiry mushrooming in and across the fields of the human and social 
sciences and life and physical sciences as well as the literary, visual, and performance 
arts.” This transdisciplinarity is echoed by Coole and Frost (2010: 15), who emphasise a 
growing recognition of the intermeshed, rhizomatic nature of the material, both in the arts 
and humanities and, concurrently, in the ‘hard’ sciences: 
In the life sciences as well as in physics, material phenomena are increasingly being 
conceptualized not as discrete entities or closed systems but rather as open, complex 
systems with porous boundaries. 
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Recognition that entities are not as static as they may appear (cf. Nicholson and Dupré, 
2018) – now empirically provable through scientific methods, such as analyses of 
subatomic structures (Levitin, 2004; Barad, 2007) – contributes to the challenging of 
previously established ontologies and bridges a conceptual gap between traditionally 
scientific research and that of new materialists in radically different fields. Deleuzian 
thought, though not explicitly ‘materialist’, is decidedly vitalist (Marks, 1998) and places 
importance on embodiment in specific environments. Such threads have continued via 
the posthumanist, neo-materialist works of Haraway, Braidotti, Barad and Despret, 
amongst others.  
What does this have to do with (an analysis of the discourse surrounding) the killing of 
animals? First, a poststructuralist, neo-materialist outlook, while not explicitly 
posthumanist, anti-speciesist or for the benefit of nonhumans, directly targets the political 
boundaries that separate ‘the human’ from all others. As demonstrated through the course 
of this chapter, a great deal of the misfortune suffered by animals at the hands of humans 
comes as a direct consequence of Cartesian dualisms as well as constructed hierarchies 
of moral value, a model of worth through which some humans will also inevitably be 
excluded from moral consideration. A priority of (post)humanities researchers, then, 
should be an aggressive dismantling of the human-animal dichotomy. Second, the killing 
of animals is facilitated, justified and legalised through their systematic objectification. 
A vitalist, object-orientated ontology, in which matter is considered agentic and agency 
is distributed across all actants, will help to disrupt the normative representation of animal 
subjectivity. We need to be mindful, however, of attributing undue intentionality or 
somehow construing victims as being culpable in their own killing. Finally, an 
appreciation of the material – or ‘machinic assemblages’ – is essential to a holistic 
account of human-animal relations, which has a strong material component as well as 




Animals are killed in their billions to be made into consumable products for humans. Such 
an operation is made possible only through strategic use of distance and concealment and 
an appeal to long-standing folk beliefs on the nature of animal lives. The moral value of 
(non)humans is established via modes of ethics informed by outdated humanist thinking, 
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the ramifications of which can still be seen in modern, Western legal systems. Meanwhile, 
capitalism renders all beings – human and nonhuman – expendable and exploitable, and 
a radical shift in thinking is required if we are to renegotiate these power structures. A 
posthumanist, anti-speciesist, material-semiotic analysis of human-animal interactions, 
namely killing events, represents an ideal starting point. How we think and talk about 
animals evidently matters a great deal; if we are to bring about real change, we must reject 
speciesist ontologies and narratives and construct new ones. In particular, we should pay 
attention to the effects of place, space and distance, and engage in a critical politics of 
sight. 
This chapter has reviewed key concepts relating to the substantive topic of the data 
analysed in this project. The next chapter focuses on the linguistic mechanisms associated 
with these material practices as well as the means of analysing such language.  
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In the previous chapter I focused mainly on the material aspects of animal-killing: who is 
killed, where, in what ways, via which legislative mechanisms and in relation to which 
moral and ethical considerations. In this chapter, I turn my attention to the more 
‘discursive’ side of this material-discursive account of killing, with particular emphasis 
on the method trialled in this project: a corpus-lexicographical (critical) discourse 
analysis. This entails, first, a brief unpacking of the fundamental concepts involved, from 
the ‘critical’ in Critical Discourse Analysis through to the ‘material’ in ‘material-
discursive’. Next, I discuss some of the literature that has examined language surrounding 
animals and killing – regarding both humans and nonhumans – as well as the rise in eco-
centric discourse analysis. In the second half of the chapter, I introduce corpus methods 
and their role in (critical) discourse analysis, including Hanks’ Corpus Pattern Analysis 
(CPA) technique, which until now has not been considered as a basis for discourse 
analysis. I discuss CPA in the context of related concepts in lexical semantics and 
argument realisation, including valency, agency, animacy and thematic roles, and 
consider the resulting corpus-lexicographical discourse analysis method with regard to 
some of the philosophical problems discussed thus far in the thesis. 
 
3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Since the 1970s, Critical Linguists have explored the ways in which language can be used 
to further a particular ideology, particularly through means of linguistic foregrounding, 
backgrounding and suppression. In his 1979 analysis of newspaper reports on the 
shooting of civilians by police in Zimbabwe, Trew found that the events were presented 
in consistently different ways by different newspapers, and were even reinterpreted in 
different ways over time. The differences were grammatical – for example through the 
use of active and passive voice – and lexical, notably the variety of terms used for 
referring to the event participants. Through this analysis, Trew (1979) exposes the often 
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implicit link between language and ideology, as well as the varying ways in which 
responsibility can be attributed, or denied, through the use of linguistic structures. Such 
analyses are now commonplace, under the rubric of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
sometimes referred to as Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), which seeks “to uncover and 
de-mystify certain social processes in this and other societies, to make mechanisms of 
manipulation, discrimination, demagogy and propaganda explicit and transparent” 
(Wodak, 1989: xiv). CDA is drawn upon in this thesis as a guide to the analysis of ‘killing’ 
language, and as such it is necessary to clarify the definitions of some key terms and 
concepts referred to and relied upon in this thesis. 
 




‘Critical’, in the sense of Critical Discourse Analysis, does not refer to negativity or 
criticism per se, but rather a kind of scepticism. Being ‘critical’ involves “having distance 
to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and a 
focus on self-reflection” (Wodak, 2001: 9). Doing discourse analysis critically, then, 
requires careful consideration of the social, historical and political contexts of the research 
topic, and explicit mention of the researcher’s own stance. A declaration of the 
researcher’s own position need not invalidate their findings in critical research (Burr, 
2015); rather, it is strongly encouraged. In the words of van Dijk (2001: 96), “CDA is 




Not only does language reflect ideology, but it also mediates it (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 
185-186). Fairclough (2010: 8) defines ideologies as “ways of representing aspects of the 
world … that contribute to establishing or sustaining unequal relations of power”. For 
Simpson (2003: 5), they are “ways in which what we say and think interacts with society”, 
and according to Knight (2006: 619), “the way a system – a single individual or even a 
whole society – rationalizes itself”. The sense invoked in this thesis is somewhere 
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between Fairclough’s “ways of representing” and that of Hart, who simply defines an 
ideology as a “world view”, adding that “ideologies are seen as normalized patterns of 
belief and value” (2014: 3). This last point is important, as the persuasive power of an 
ideology lies in its ability to remain hidden and latent, and in its perception as normal and 
natural, or “common sense”, in Gramscian terms (Fairclough, 2010: 67; Daldal, 2014). It 
has also been noted that ideology typically has negative connotations, despite some 





Like many concepts central to social science research, the notion of power “is as complex 
as it is fuzzy” (van Dijk, 2008: 1). Rather than being concerned with ‘power’ in the 
interpersonal sense, i.e. the dominance of an individual over another in the context of 
interpersonal communication, CDA is particularly interested in social power relations. 
These can be understood in terms of control: a social group can be said to have power 
over another “if it is able to control (specific) actions of (the members of)” said group 
(van Dijk, 2014: 132). Of course, if language mediates ideology, then it can safely be 
considered a mechanism of social power relations and a site of power struggles.  
Wodak (2006: 187) argues that while power is indexed and expressed through language, 
it does not derive directly from language itself. However, this claim is contradicted by 
much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Not only have humans historically been 
granted greater moral worth and consequently many more freedoms than nonhumans 
purely by virtue of possessing (human) language, but this access to language also grants 
humans total control over the discourse surrounding the affairs of nonhumans, whose 
voices are effectively excluded. Van Dijk (2014: 132) makes this argument with regard 
to journalists, politicians and academics, who have access to the production of news texts, 
parliamentary debates and scholarly discourse, respectively, and who, as a result, enjoy a 
certain degree of social power that other members of society do not. Similarly, there are 
text types that may be considered more ‘powerful’ than others, in the sense that they have 
the potential to influence more people (e.g. national newspapers as opposed to local 
newspapers), or to influence people in a more serious way (e.g. policy reports as opposed 
to blog posts). 
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‘Discourse’ is a notoriously slippery term, and has a wide range of interpretations. In its 
more general sense, it may be used interchangeably with ‘text’, ‘discussion’, or ‘language 
in use’. For Blommaert (2005: 3), discourse includes ‘non-linguistic’ action and 
“comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with 
social, cultural and historical patterns and developments of use”. In critical discourse 
studies, ‘discourse(s)’ might refer to ‘conventional practice’, ‘a form of social action’, or 
even “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 
49). These two broad conceptualisations of discourse might be considered to refer to 
discursive manifestations at the micro and macro levels, respectively. Gee (2015) refers 
to these as ‘little d’ and ‘big D’ discourses; ‘little d’ discourse constitutes the ‘big D’ 
Discourse(s), and by analysing the former it is possible to deconstruct the latter. In this 
thesis, little distinction is made between the two. ‘Discourse’, with a “little d”, is used 
when referring to all kinds of ‘discourse’. Sometimes it features as a countable noun, as 
in ‘a discourse’ or ‘discourses’, in which case it signifies a set of socially-constitutive 
discourse practices shared by a community, such as ‘legal discourse’, ‘welfarist 
discourse’, and so on. Typically, however, it is used in this thesis in its non-countable 
form to invoke the simple definition offered by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: vii): 
“language but also other forms of semiosis, such as visual images”. My vagueness here 
is intentional, in line with Wierzbicka (1985: 15):  
An adequate definition of a vague concept must aim not at precision but at 
vagueness: it must aim at precisely that level of vagueness which characterizes the 
concept itself. 
All discourse is social. It “enters into and influences all social practices” (Hall, 1992: 
202), and “is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” (Blommaert, 2005: 25; 
cf. Hart and Cap, 2014). As such, it has the ability to construct our knowledge of concepts; 
social phenomena can be “talked into being” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 4). 
Discourse, we are reminded, is also is a primary vehicle and producer of ideology (van 
Dijk, 2013). Critical discourse analysts, therefore, might approach discourse as “a major 
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instrument of power and control” (Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard 2013: xi). However, 
care should also be taken not to overstate the role of language in determining power 
relations, nor other realities. Discourse is just one part of a larger assemblage – in the 
Deleuzian sense – that is co-constituted by extra-discursive elements.  
With this in mind, the present research takes an approach to discourse that might be 
considered compatible with critical realism. It recognises that discourses contribute to 
the construction of social realities, but do not determine it. From a critical realist 
perspective, language is bound to but does not take precedence over the material world: 
For critical realists, material practices are given an ontological status that is 
independent of, but in relation with, discursive practices. Furthermore, material 
practices are understood as accommodating, although not determining, the discourses 
that arise within these material conditions. (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007: 102) 
Critical realism rejects the subordination of the non-discursive to the discursive (under 
the relativist logic that non-discursive practices are generated by discourse), as well as 
the notion that there can be no meaningful interpretation of experience without discourse. 
In terms of this thesis, a critical realist stance means that there are different ways of 
discursively ‘constructing’ animals, but that they have inherent and ‘real’ properties 
independent of how our language construes them (Sealey, 2014; Atran et al. 2004). 
Relativist positions, on the other hand, have been criticised for their anthropocentrism, in 
that they suggest that the world is somehow constructed by us or even “made for us” 
(Cruickshank, 2003: 7).  
I should acknowledge here that there are several competing and sometimes overlapping 
strands of realism with which one might align, and indeed could be useful here, including 
social realism (Sealey and Carter, 2004), speculative realism (Harman, 2018; 
Meillassoux, 2008) and critical social realism (Haslanger, 2012). Pennycook’s (2017) 
critical posthumanist realism, which at first glance seems an ideal fit for the present 
research, appears to be an unfortunate example of the “new systems of thought with 
clunky titles” criticised by Gratton (2014: 1), rather than the fully-fledged strand of 
realism that posthumanists have been waiting for. Similarly, the proposition by Elder-
Vass (2014) that there are “seven ways to be a realist about language” is a promising one, 
but is ultimately muddled by conflations of the senses of the word “language” (Sealey 
and Carter, 2014), making it difficult to rely on.  
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3.2.2.2 Critical Analysis of Discourse 
 
Just as Actor-Network Theory is not really a theory (see Section 2.4.4), Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) “is not … a method of discourse analysis” (van Dijk, 2008: 2). The 
methods employed under CDA – now more often referred to as Critical Discourse Studies 
(CDS), in an attempt to be more felicitous – are as varied as those found in any other 
branch of linguistic study. CDA (or CDS; I use them interchangeably) may be realised 
… in terms of grammatical (phonological, morphological, syntactic), semantic, 
pragmatic, interactional rhetorical, stylistic, narrative or genre analyses, among 
others, on the one hand, and through experiments, ethnography, interviewing, life 
stories, focus groups, participant observation, and so on, on the other hand. (van 
Dijk, 2013) 
There are no set ways, then, of ‘doing’ CDA; it “adopts any method that is adequate to 
realize the aims of specific CDA-inspired research” (Baker et al., 2008: 273). However, 
there are certain tenets that unite all CDA/CDS research: a commitment to a critical 
outlook; a focus on a particular (societal) problem; an inter- or transdisciplinary approach; 
a transparency with regard to researcher stance and political bias; and a recognition of 
discourse (written, spoken, visual) as a repository or reflector of ideology and power 
(Wodak and Meyer, 2016). CDS places emphasis on context; discourses are analysed 
with reference to social and historical factors, perhaps most notably in the Discourse 
Historical Approach (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). 
Discourse, then, is a form of social action, and CDA is conducted in the spirit of social 
scientific inquiry. CDA is an opportunity for “bringing a variety of theories into dialogue, 
especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other, so that its 
theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 16). 
In this thesis, the critical discourse analysis moves from a text analysis of verbs and their 
arguments (Section 3.6), via corpus analysis, including Corpus Pattern Analysis (Section 
3.7), to a material-discursive understanding of discourse as part of a larger, social 
assemblage of material events and meaning events (Section 3.7.3). Quantitative results 
are considered in light of findings in the literature in an attempt to make sense of the 
implications of language choices. Materiality, introduced briefly at the end of Chapter 2, 






Materiality is a recurring theme in this research. The material is that which is comprised 
of matter, and traditionally this has been juxtaposed with language, as in phrases such as 
‘the material and the discursive’. Following from the posthumanist, new materialist 
modes of thinking described in the previous chapter, a material-discursive approach to 
discourse posits that the discursive and the material are inextricable from one another, as 
described by Barad (2003: 822, emphasis added): 
The relationship between the material and the discursive is one of mutual 
entailment. Neither is articulated/articulable in the absence of the other; matter and 
meaning are mutually articulated. Neither discursive practices nor material 
phenomena are ontologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained 
in terms of the other. Neither has privileged status in determining the other. 
In this sense, the approach taken in the present research might also be considered in 
alignment with Barad’s (2003, 2007) agential realism. The ‘realism’ here is not the same 
as the realism referenced by e.g. critical realism; it is less a rejection of relativism than it 
is of representationalism, which “separates the world into the ontologically disjoint 
domains of words and things” (Barad, 2003: 811). A material-discursive ontology rejects 
the notion that language ‘reflects’ or ‘represents’ material practices. Instead, consistent 
with the processual, assemblage-orientated ontology of material semiotics, e.g. Actor-
Network Theory and the work of Deleuze and Guattari, it would claim that the material 
and the discursive are bound up in a dynamic, material-discursive assemblage made up 
of heterogeneous parts, none of which is ontologically privileged over any other. The 
material and the discursive “make a difference to each other: they make each other be … 
they enact each other” (Law and Mol, 2008: 58). 
Taking this one step further, we can in fact say that all discourse is itself material, given 
that it “must be materialized in some form and in specific times and places in order to 
exist” (Orlikowski and Scott, 2015: 4). Spoken language is material in that it consists of 
sounds, vibrations in the air; written language is material in that resides in markings on a 
page or screen; and gestures are material in their use of physical, bodily motion (Beetz, 
2016: 82). All discourse is therefore a trace, “an already-happened” (Jameson, 1974: 175); 
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all observable linguistic signifiers are material evidence of semiosis that has previously 
taken place. Discourse analysis “is essentially a retrospective enterprise … always bitterly 
but literally ‘systematically’ lagging behind events” (van Eeden, 2017: 9). 
 
3.3 More-than-Human Discourse Analysis 
 
Traditionally, CDA has been used to investigate uneven power relations, and to examine 
how discourse plays a role in sustaining these oppressive and exploitative systems. 
However, this style of discourse analysis is typically applied to the oppression of human 
groups only (Stibbe, 2001: 146). Fairclough’s CDA, for example, is concerned with 
“human matters” (1985: 747), specifically “human well-being and flourishing” (2010: 2), 
and seeks to demystify how “language contributes to the domination of some people by 
others” (2001: 193). Wodak stresses that CDA should not end at the point of critique, but 
practical steps should also be taken by “the people who are most involved”, and she cites 
Labov (1982: 195-6), who concludes that “[t]he only permanent advance in the condition 
of life in any field occurs when people take their own affairs into their own hands” 
(Wodak, 1989: xiv). Even the most reflexive strands of critical discourse studies, such as 
the emerging ‘Critical Lexicographical Discourse Studies’ mentioned in Chapter 1, 
proudly “adheres to the research ethics that consider human emancipation” (Chen, 2019: 
13). 
Concern for the environment, particularly the climate, has prompted researchers to 
address the more-than-human world more earnestly. There has been a dramatic increase 
in climate-related discourse analysis, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1: between 2000 and 2017, 
the number of academic books and papers published yearly that mention both discourse 
analysis and climate change increased 50-fold. For comparison, the number of papers that 
mention both discourse analysis and any form of the lemma NONHUMAN – i.e. non-
human(s), nonhuman(s) or non human(s) – also increased during that period, but only 
eight-fold.14 Of course, these two topics – climate change and nonhumans – are related 
 
14 Source: http://scholar.google.com. Search terms: “discourse analysis” “climate change” and “discourse 
analysis” nonhuman*. Number of papers published in 2000 are 103 and 354, respectively. Number of hits 
published in 2017 are 5,200 and 2,910, respectively. Last accessed 10th June 2019. 
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and have the potential to overlap, but evidently there has been a far greater academic 
interest in the breakdown of the climate and its related discourses.  
 
 
Fig. 3.1: The number of academic books and articles published yearly, according to Google Scholar, that 
mention both “discourse analysis” and “climate change” (in blue) and both “discourse analysis” and 
nonhuman* (in orange), from 2000 to 2017 
 
Many of these studies are metalinguistic, carried out in response to the growing number 
of debates, discussions and campaigns surrounding the issue of climate change (e.g. 
Boykoff, 2008; R. Alexander, 2009; Grundman and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Nehrlich and 
Koteyko, 2009; Nehrlich et al., 2010; Koteyko et al., 2010; Koteyko et al., 2013). Others 
are in the ecolinguistic tradition of e.g. Arran Stibbe, whose ‘positive’ critical discourse 
analysis seeks to expose and redress the language that encourages (or fails to challenge) 
the ideologies that allow the destruction of the more-than-human world. Stibbe (2015) 
follows the example of Naess (1995) in devising an ‘ecosophy’ – an ecological 
philosophy, a set of principles – against which potentially beneficial or harmful 
discourses can be evaluated.  
Nonhuman animals are gradually being incorporated into emancipatory discourse studies, 
thanks in part to the scholarly “animal turn” (Weil, 2010). One of the earliest examples is 
Carol Adams’ (1990) The Sexual Politics of Meat, now an iconic work of ecofeminism, 
which argues that a major instrument in the oppression of animals is the language used to 
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Animals are rendered being-less not only by technology, but by innocuous phrases 
such as “food-producing unit”, “protein harvester”, “converting machine”, “crops” and 
“biomachines”. The meat-producing industry views an animal as consisting of 
“edible” and “inedible” parts … (Adams, 1990: 58) 
One of Adams’ best-known contributions is the ‘absent referent’, the notion that in 
referring to animals – and women – as ‘meat’, the speaker ontologises them as objects 
and thus legitimises violence towards them (Adams, 1999: 249). Similar parallels 
between animals and women were found by Kheel (1995) in her analysis of the discourse 
of hunting, and by Dunayer (1995) and Lopez Rodriguez (2009) in their respective studies 
of animal- and woman-related metaphors.  
Stibbe has written extensively on the effects of harmful discourses with regard to animals 
as well as the environment. Like Adams, he finds multiple linguistic strategies which 
serve to objectify other animals and justify their commodification (Stibbe, 2001, 2003, 
2012, 2015). In Language, Power, and the Social Construction of Animals (2001), he 
summarises a variety of ways in which the oppression of animals is concealed and 
maintained through the use of figurative language, count/mass nouns, nominalisation of 
processes, pronoun choices, and other subtle linguistic devices. In a similar vein, Mitchell 
(2007) establishes ways in which animal farming discourses negatively impact on animals 
by constructing them as objects and slaves, while Glenn (2004) identifies corporate 
discursive strategies which support the processes involved in factory farming, and 
simultaneously present animals as complicit in their exploitation. Kahn’s study of 
vivisection discourse describes a “passive, soulless voice” that excludes any mention of 
the ‘doer’ of the deeds, instead awarding the “traditional position of responsibility, the 
head of the sentence”, to the animals (2006: 242). 
Animal metaphors, applied to humans, have been found to be overwhelmingly negative 
in connotation (Haslam et al., 2011; Palmatier, 1995; Sommer and Sommer, 2011; 
Goatly, 2006; Santa Ana, 1999; Fernandez Fontecha and Jimenez Catalan, 2003), and to 
have high comparability across several languages (Talebinejad and Dastjerdi, 2005; 
Lopez Rodriguez, 2009; Hsieh, 2006). Gupta (2006) and Gilquin and Jacobs (2006) have 
examined the ways in which human-like status is bestowed upon, or denied to, animals 
through use of pronouns. Bastian et al. (2012) found that when animals are depicted as 
similar to humans, there is less outgroup bias against them than when this analogy is 
reversed, and Sealey and Oakley (2013) have investigated anthropomorphism in 
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descriptions of animal behaviour, finding that choice of pronouns and clause connectives 
can subtly impose human-like qualities onto animals. Morris, Fidler and Costall (2000) 
discovered high levels of consistency in ways that different people described animal 
behaviour, which provides some support for a moderate realist approach. Crist 
(1999/2000: 10) concludes, from her extensive study of scientific discourse representing 
animal actions and behaviour, that “in the depiction of animals language is never a neutral 
medium”. 
In The Discursive Representation of Animals, a timely review of animal-orientated 
discourse studies published in The Routledge Handbook of Ecolinguistics, Cook and 
Sealey (2017) categorise such research into three groups, conceptualised as a Venn 
diagram of two overlapping circles. Type 1, the first circle, consists of linguistic work 
whose focus is on language and whose references to animals and animal-related language 
is purely incidental. Type 2 scholarship, found in the second circle, is focused on the study 
of animals and human-animal relations, and any linguistic comments are incidental. Type 
3, occupying the intersection of these two circles, is research whose focus is both 
language and animals. The present research is therefore an example of Type 3. That 
discourse analysis related to the treatment of nonhuman animals should be categorised 
primarily as a form of “eco-” scholarship, rather than as socio-political commentary akin 
to feminist discourse analysis or other studies on the treatment of marginalised social 
groups, is indicative of a largely unchallenged view of animals as a kind of ‘natural’ 
feature, a fixture of our environment, rather than as social actors. A case in point is the 
recent rejection of an animal-orientated Special Issue from the Journal of Language and 
Politics, on the grounds that the editors did not find it to be a sufficiently political subject. 
 
3.4 Killing Humans, Killing Animals 
 
In his provocatively-titled essay, How to Kill People, theologian Denys Turner draws our 
attention to the pivotal role of language in legitimising acts of killing: 
Let me tell you how to kill people efficiently … if we propose to kill a fellow human 
being and justify it, we have to redescribe him in such a way that he no longer 
belongs to us, becomes an alien being … we will allow ourselves to kill only those 
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whom we have set at a maximum distance from ourselves by means of that most 
powerful of human tools, the power of misdescription. (Turner, 2002: 60-61) 
Such observations have been borne out in numerous analyses of killing-related discourse. 
The dehumanisation of Jews, for example, whether to the point of being nonhuman 
animals (Bolinger, 1980: 119), diseases (Savage, 2007: 417) or inanimate objects, gave 
Nazi workers “a discourse in which killing was no longer killing” (Lifton, 2000: 460), 
one which “renders murder non-murderous” (Savage, 2007: 425). Similarly, the Khmer 
Rouge referred to their enemies using the pronoun intended for subordinates, animals and 
inanimate objects (Savage, 2007: 429). Even in today’s mainstream ‘war on terror’ 
discourse, the enemy is dehumanised “through a consistent framing of animal, vermin, 
pest and disease” (Steuter and Wills, 2010: 163), describing terrorist hide-outs as animal 
habitats (“lair”, “den”, “breeding ground”), drawing on hunting vocabulary (“hunt”, 
“trap”, “snare”) and using verbs associated with killing ‘pests’ (“exterminate”, “wipe 
out”, “eradicate”) (Steuter and Wills, 2010). Disease is another recurring theme in 
‘Otherising’ language; Islam, for example, has been likened to a disease in the British 
press through its collocation with ‘spread’ (Baker et al., 2013: 47). The outcome of 
dehumanising language such as this is the perpetuation of the ideology of the Other as 
‘other-than-human’, and importantly as a threat, thereby “legitimising their destruction” 
(Savage, 2007: 405). An “artificial distance” is placed between the speaker and the victim, 
much like the ontological distance placed between humans and other types of animals 
(Linzey, 2006: 68) and the geographical distance placed between animal consumption 
and sites of animal killing (Chapter 2). 
Linguistic distance can also be created in other ways. Discourse may be structured so as 
to foreground or background particular aspects of an event (cf. van Leeuwen, 1996), such 
as the actors involved, the cause, the agent, and the means, so as to either emphasise or 
minimise a sense of culpability. The decision whether to use the active or passive voice 
when describing an act of killing, for example, is often given little thought (Bolinger, 
1980), and is arguably driven by phraseological norms as much as it is by latent ideology, 
though the degree to which ideology informs and is informed by phraseology is difficult 
to determine (cf. Sinclair’s (1991) open-choice vs. idiom principles, and Hoey’s (2004, 
2005) theory of priming). While Bolinger claims that the passive is technically “no more 
open to bias than the active”, he concedes that the passive “is a handy way of serving up 
prejudices as if they were universal truths” (1980: 85-86). That is, the concealment of the 
agent by use of a truncated passive construction may well be a cause for suspicion and, 
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in the case of ‘killing’ discourse, an attempt to divert responsibility away from the 
perpetrator (Trew, 1979). In the same way, the use of the active voice is argued to attribute 
a greater sense of agency and responsibility; news reports of the death of Princess Diana, 
for example, were found to consistently attribute blame to the paparazzi through the 
application of grammatical agency (Macmillan and Edwards, 1999). 
In a study of the use of the active and passive voice when reporting violence, social 
psychologists Henley, Miller and Beazley (1995) concluded that the passive voice “is 
used for violent crimes because it offers psychological distance from their extreme 
negativity” (1995: 70). More troubling, however, are their findings that the passive leads 
to “lower attributed harm and perpetrator responsibility for violence against women”, and 
“more acceptance of rape, battering of women and rape myths” (1995: 79). They also 
found, in support of previous studies, that the passive voice attributes greater causality to 
the object than the subject of an argument (1995: 62), and that the rate of use of the passive 
is even greater for nonsexual violence than for sexual violence (1995: 69). These findings 
suggest that not only is there a systemic and widespread use of the passive voice in an 
attempt to make the unpalatable less so (and perhaps, in this case, to attribute more 
causality to the victim), but that this also has an effect on how the reader or hearer 
perceives the act of violence. Several works on this theme have since reported similar 
results (e.g. Bohner, 2001; Ehrlich, 2001; Coates and Wade, 2004). Coates and Wade, in 
developing a framework for understanding personalised violence, identify four discursive 
operations that typically feature in accounts: the “concealing of violence”, the 
“obfuscating of perpetrators’ responsibility”, the “concealing of victims’ resistance”, and 
the “blaming and pathologizing of victims” (Coates and Wade, 2007).  
Ultimately, writes Dalla Bernardina (1991: 35), all slaughter requires that the victim be 
“relegated to the rank of object”15. While human Others are dehumanised, nonhuman 
Others are “deanimalised” (cf. Rémy, 2009) and “de-ontologised” (Adams, 1997). Figure 
3.2, reproduced from Morgan and Cole (2011), demonstrates the relationship between 
subjectivity/objectification and visibility of animal experiences. On the far left-hand side 
of the diagram are humans, ascribed the most subjectivity, followed by pets, ‘working’ 
animals, and ‘wild’ animals, distinguished in terms of their diets. Carnivorous ‘wild’ 
animals, they find, are described with more subjectivity than their non-carnivorous 
 
15 Translated from the original French: “Mais tout abattage, au bout du compte, requiert que la victime soit 
préalablement reléguée au rang d'objet.” 
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counterparts. On the right-hand side are animals used for entertainment and 
experimentation, farmed animals, ‘vermin’, and ‘Dead-Meat’ animals. The animals killed 
for ‘meat’, they argue, are “culturally invisible” (2011: 116) compared with the abuses 
inflicted upon ‘companion’ animals. Such invisibility is not only discursive, but, as 
indicated here, material too (cf. the isolation of slaughterhouses and obfuscation of 
slaughter practices, Chapter 2). When animals are objectified to the point of being 
ontologised as ‘meat’, a kind of ‘stuff’, the violent nature of their deaths is effectively 
erased (Adams, 1990, 2018). Many animals are also “desingularised”, their deaths 
measured by weight rather than by number (Despret, 2016: 82). 
 
 
Fig. 3.2: “The material and discursive positioning of nonhuman animals” (Morgan and Cole, 2011: 113) 
 
In Murdering Animals, a direct challenge of speciesist representations of animal-killing, 
Beirne reflects that 
The variety of ways that we kill animals seems without limit. Animals can be boiled, 
cooked, crushed, drowned, electrocuted, ensnared, exterminated, harpooned, 
hooked, hunted, injected with chemicals, netted, poached, poisoned, run over, shot, 
slit, speared, stoned, strangled, stuck, suffocated, trapped, and vivisected. However, 
operating in tandem with the strategic invisibility of animals in slaughterhouses is 
the increasing elusiveness of their deaths in various discourses of lethality. (Beirne, 
2018: 21). 
These “discourses of lethality” are, for example: hunting discourses, in which animals 
are described as “catch”, “game”, or “yield”; laboratory discourses, which construe 
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animals as “sacrifices”, “subjects” and “products”; and “conservationist” discourses, 
which generate euphemisms like “cull”, “harvest”, and “wildlife management” 
(Beirne, 2018: 21). Beirne’s argument – that animals are owed a fair and honest 
representation in language – is one that has been promulgated by a number of pro-
animal scholars in recent years (e.g. Dunayer, 2001, 2004; Freeman, Bekoff and 
Bexell, 2011; Freeman, 2014; Almiron, Cole and Freeman, 2016; Stibbe, 2012, 2015; 
Trampe, 2017) and is gaining traction within mainstream animal justice organisations, 
such as the Vegan Society (Cook, 2015) and People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA, 2018). 
While there is a growing interest in the representation of animals and animal-killing, 
Jepson’s (2008) A Linguistic Analysis of Discourse on the Killing of Nonhuman Animals 
is the only work identified that focuses directly on ‘killing’ verbs, and specifically the 
ways that these verbs are used for animals and humans, and the effects these lexical 
choices have. Jepson finds that humans, unlike animals, are afforded “highly specific” 
killing terms, and that to extend ‘human’ killing terms to nonhumans adds sentimentality, 
while the reverse connotes brutality. She analyses seven verbs, noting the agents and 
patients in different constructions, along with the perceived motivation for killing and the 
‘emotional content’. Although her findings raise interesting questions, the approach taken 
is somewhat vague and unsystematic. Jepson selects verbs of interest on the basis that 
they are “nontechnical and frequently used”, without giving any indication of how 
frequently they are used. Her data consists of “a collection of references to the killing of 
human and nonhuman animals”, gathered from “electronic, print, and broadcast media 
and from conversations” (2008: 131), but no information on the size, composition or 
nature of the dataset is given. This analysis provides a useful starting point but, as it 
stands, is unreliable and incomplete. Similarly, Trampe’s (2017) Euphemisms for Killing 
Animals and for Other Forms of Their Use gives general, anecdotal observations about 
the fact that a wide range of euphemistic terms are employed in descriptions of animal-
killing, but does not take any kind of systematic or empirical approach to the analysis of 





3.5 Empirical Approaches 
 
Much of the work in Human-Animal Studies, Critical Animal Studies and indeed Critical 
Discourse Studies is lacking in empirical methods. This is not to say that “empiricism” is 
preferred or more valuable, in a “scientistic” way (Williams and Robinson, 2016), but 
that there are some studies, such as those of Jepson (2008) and Trampe (2017), which 
would greatly benefit from taking a more systematic and empirical approach to discourse. 
The ‘People’, ‘Products’, ‘Pests’ and ‘Pets’ (PPPP) project16, which explored the 
different ways in which animals are “discursively represented”, is an example of a large-
scale, data-driven linguistic project on human-animal relations. It employed a corpus-
assisted discourse analytic methodology, making use of a specialist, animal-themed 
corpus of just under 9 million words, with texts ranging from newspaper texts and 
scientific journal articles to transcripts from focus groups, interviews and documentaries 
(Sealey and Pak, 2018). The texts were selected so as to represent a diverse range of 
perspectives on animals, including ‘meat’ industry discourse, scientific experimentation 
discourse, and the opinions of vegans and animal-rights proponents, making the corpus 
ideal for investigating the discursive representation of different attitudes towards animals. 
The creators of the corpus were kind enough to share it with me, and it forms the basis of 
the findings in this project. 
 
3.5.1 Corpus Linguistics 
 
Corpus linguistics represents an empirical way of carrying out linguistic analysis. There 
is an accountability in corpus methods which cannot be found in introspective approaches 
to linguistic data, though corpus linguistics itself is not immune to “cherry-picking” 
(Baker, 2015) or “fishing” (Hanks, 2013: 375) for examples. Corpora allow for easy 
access to vast amounts of data, enabling the researcher to process and analyse far more 
text than would be possible to read in a traditional close-reading manner. This means that 
widespread, patterned linguistic features can be identified and satisfactorily generalised, 





domain or genre as a whole. Corpora also make it possible for theories of language to be 
induced from the bottom up, rather than taking a hypothesis and trying to prove it in a 
top-down way. However, no research is totally objective, and traces of researcher bias 
can be found at every step: the research questions, the selection of data, the choice of 
method (or corpus software), the features analysed, and so on.  
Nevertheless, and crucially, corpora provide the researcher with authentic language data. 
A collection of authentic texts created by a researcher – a corpus – is indeed contrived, 
but, as Gledhill reminds us, 
… the linguistic behaviour used to produce authentic texts is uninhibited, 
unselfconscious and natural. The same can not be said for invented examples or 
examples created to prove some grammatical point. (Gledhill, 2000: 89) 
Though invented examples can be useful for illuminating differences in grammatical 
structure, e.g. in syntactic alternations, corpus linguistics has consistently demonstrated 
the fallibility of human intuition and the importance of relying on natural language, 
especially in determining the most frequent, typical and normal uses of words and phrases 
(Sinclair, 1991; Hanks, 2013). 
Corpus linguistics, like any other analytical approach, is subject to criticisms. What it 
gains in terms of scope and scale – the capacity to survey millions of words of text at once 
– it loses in terms of diversity of data. While multimodal corpora are certainly on the rise 
(André and Martin, 2014), there are arguably many instances of communication that will 
be excluded from corpus analysis (Baker, 2006), and there may be a temptation on the 
part of the researcher to select only the texts that are the most easily converted into corpora 
(Taylor and Marchi, 2018: 9). And while corpora are processed using unemotional corpus 
software, the analyst of this output is a human who is susceptible to their own kinds of 
bias and personal research interests. Given the same corpus data and the same research 
questions, for example, analysts will not necessarily reach the same conclusions (Marchi 
and Taylor, 2009; Baker, 2015; Baker and Egbert, 2016). I should add to this list the 
charge that corpus linguistics abstracts language from its original context, and in doing 
so commits an act of violence upon the text (Widdowson, 2000). While we can accept 
that a certain amount of bias is unavoidable (and healthy), we must acknowledge and 
account for these stumbling blocks as and when we encounter them, and supplement 
corpus analysis in other ways so as to try and avoid such pitfalls.  
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3.5.2 ‘Corpus-Assisted’ Discourse Analysis (CADA) 
 
Corpus-linguistic approaches to (critical) discourse analysis are now well established: 
there are a growing number of texts and volumes on the application of corpus methods to 
discourse analysis (e.g. Baker, 2006, 2012; Fairclough et al., 2007; Baker et al., 2008; 
Mautner, 2009, 2016; Partington et al., 2013; Baker and McEnery, 2015; Taylor and 
Marchi, 2018; Handford, forthcoming), as well as an international Corpora and 
Discourse conference series and, as of 2017, a dedicated Journal of Corpora and 
Discourse Studies (Taylor and Marchi, 2018: 1). Corpus linguistics, with its strong 
empirical basis, resistance to certain types of bias, and capacity for large-scale linguistic 
analysis, “makes a good ally for CDA” (Mautner, 2016: 155), traditionally criticised for 
its potential for researcher bias, questionable selection criteria and small data samples 
(Fowler, 1996; Stubbs, 1997; Widdowson, 1995; Koller and Mautner, 2004; Koteyko, 
2006). As highlighted by Baker et al. (2008), the synergy between corpus linguistics and 
CDA can be considered a mutually beneficial one, rather than the somewhat “subservient” 
one implied by the use of ‘corpus-assisted’ (Baker et al., 2008: 274). Corpus analysis 
output requires critical interpretation and explanation, for which CDA is well-placed, and 
conversely the rigorous and empirical methods employed in a corpus analysis have the 
potential to significantly bolster work in CDA (Orpin, 2005). One of the most significant 
benefits corpus linguistics can offer CDA, claims Stubbs (1997), is the comparison of 
features found in texts with attestable language norms (Orpin, 2005). 
Just as there is no set way of ‘doing’ CDA, there is no template for corpus analysis, nor 
indeed a corpus-assisted (or -based, or -driven17) discourse analysis. CADA involves 
“integrating whatever insights corpus linguistic techniques provide into the wider 
interpretive framework that underpins the analysis” (Mautner, 2009: 37). The analyst is 
therefore free to decide upon the discourse analytic framework, if applicable, and pair this 
with a suitable corpus analysis method of their choosing. In the case of this study, the 
corpus element is constituted – in part – by Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA), described in 
Section 3.8. 
 
17 I choose not to delve into ‘corpus-based’ and ‘corpus-driven’ labels in this study; ‘corpus-assisted’ is an 
imperfect descriptor chosen on the basis that it conveys the minimum required meaning (i.e. involving the 
use of a corpus) without invoking any of the contestable issues around the differences between ‘corpus-
based’ and ‘corpus-driven’ research (cf. Tognini-Bonelli, 2001; Partington et al., 2013; Meyer, 2015). 
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3.6 Event Conceptualisation and Argument Realisation 
 
Given that this research is concerned with the analysis of real-life (killing) events as 
construed through language, there is a direct focus on processes, the participants involved, 
and how they relate to one another. This translates to an analysis of predicators, or verbs, 
and the arguments, typically noun phrases, they associate with. It also means examining 
how the presence of certain arguments affects the meanings of others. This section 
therefore provides a brief overview of some of the key elements of event structure and 




The notion of valency originates in chemistry, where ‘valency’ describes the number of 
atoms to which a chemical element can bind itself, to form a complex molecule (Hilpert, 
2014: 26). Responsible for introducing this analogy to linguistics is Lucien Tesnière 
(2015 [1959]), who also sought to replace binary approaches in syntax with one that 
recognised the verb as the nucleus of the clause (the origin of Dependency Grammar). In 
linguistics, valency refers to the number and type of arguments that are ‘taken’ (or 
‘governed’ or ‘attracted’ or ‘controlled’ or ‘selected’, cf. Section 3.7.3) by a predicator. 
The valency of a predicator can be described as: avalent, as in the impersonal verb (or 
‘dummy subject’) construction, it’s snowing; monovalent, as in intransitive constructions 
such as (he)₁ is sleeping; divalent, as in transitive constructions such as (I)₁ saw (her)₂ 
yesterday); trivalent, as in ditransitive constructions such as (she)₁ cooked (me)₂ (dinner)₃; 
and even quadrivalent, as in rare tritransitive constructions such as (John)₁ bet (me)₂ (five 
dollars)₃ (that Bill would win)₄ (Mita, 2009). As such, the valency of a verb can be 
increased or reduced in different ways: converting an active construction into a truncated 
passive one, for example, has the effect of removing the agent argument and thus reducing 
the valency by 1; conversely, introducing a causative construction is a common way of 
increasing valency. Cross-linguistic studies have found that constructions that increase 
the valency of verbs in different languages tend to have similar kinds of meanings 
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(Hilpert, 2014: 31), providing support for the view that a verb’s meaning and its valency 
are related and should be examined together. 
 
3.6.2 Case and thematic roles 
 
The study of the lexical semantics of verbs dates back to the 6th century BC, when Pānini 
developed his Kāraka Theory, or “theory of participants in an action or event” (Butt, 
2005: 16), in a very early attempt to relate semantic regularities with morphological case. 
Verbs were placed in verb classes, each of which had particular features which help to 
determine how Kāraka roles should be assigned to their arguments (participants). Butt 
(2006: 17) illustrates the correlation between Pānini’s Kāraka roles and modern, Western 
thematic roles, such as karana ‘the most effective means’, which is likened to 
‘instrument’, and kardr ‘the independent one’, or ‘agent’.  
Following this work was a period of around 2,500 years in which the dominant ideas on 
case followed the Greek and Roman traditions, and did not place the same emphasis on 
semantic value (Kasper, 2008: 17). Only since Frank R. Blake’s (1930) A Semantic 
Analysis of Case has the relationship between form and meaning been given proper 
attention. Following Blake, Charles Fillmore (1968) proposed that each verb selects a 
certain number of cases, forming a “case frame”. Fillmore’s later work on Frame 
Semantics (1982) built on Case Grammar, and posited that meaning exists in frames as 
opposed to individual lexical items, with ‘frame’ defined as “any system of concepts 
related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole 
structure in which it fits” (Fillmore, 1982: 111).  
For the purposes of this research, thematic roles such as those identified by Blake (1930), 
Fillmore (1968) and – perhaps best-known – Gruber (1965), are not considered the central 
focus of the analysis, since this work does not seek to comment on conceptual frames 
(only the ‘frame’ of killing, if that can be considered a well-delimited frame), nor does it 
deal with a wide range of event types or participants (only the killer, the killed, and the 
means by which the killing takes place). However, thematic roles provide a useful context 
in which to understand event participants and their relationships to predicators, or verbs. 
Work undertaken by Dowty (1991), Tenny (1992), Levin and Rappaport-Hovav (2005) 
and Jackendoff (1992, 1996) on the relationship between thematic roles and 
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argumentation also lends richness to a verbal analysis, but this is not the focus of the 
present work. It is perhaps simply worth mentioning here the thematic roles that tend to 
consistently feature in studies of thematic relations. These are summarised in Table 3.1, 
adapted from Hilpert (2014) to include some (invented) examples inspired by the data 
used in this study. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Thematic roles and their definitions, adapted from Hilpert (2014). 
 
The twelve thematic roles given in Table 3.1 are the standard set that most thematic 
analyses rely on or refer to in some way. There is, however, a lack of real consensus on 
the number and nature of thematic roles, and no reliable diagnostic criteria for identifying 
them. Dowty (1991) proposes, in place of this system of discrete roles, a scalar theory of 
‘proto-roles’ which sorts all arguments into just two cluster-concepts: the Proto-Agent 
and the Proto-Patient. Rather than trying to choose a pre-determined, fine-grained 
thematic role from the set available, Dowty’s approach involves assessing the argument 
against a checklist of ‘contributing properties’ for both the Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient 
and deciding to which one it is most aligned, based on how many of the criteria it satisfies. 
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The two proto-roles are in opposition to one another; an argument may have elements of 
one or both of these proto-roles, but will inevitably lend itself more to one than the other. 
This conceptualisation of thematic roles more accurately reflects the fuzzy nature of 
semantic distinctions, and recognises the fact that linguistic events are always bound up 
in an event “out there” (Dowty, 1991: 575). 
 
3.6.3 Agency, animacy and individuation 
 
Much like personhood, discussed in Chapter 2, agency is a hotly debated and contestable 
concept and the subject of thousands of years’ worth of thinking and writing. In short, we 
can summarise much of what has been said with the observation that agency is 
traditionally associated with volition, action, animacy and intentionality (Yamamoto, 
1999, 2006). Referring to Dowty’s (1991) proto-roles, one might say that an ‘agent’ is: 
more likely to be volitionally involved, be sentient, cause a change of state in another 
event participant, be moving, and exist independently of the event in question (the 
contributing properties for the Proto-Agent role); and less likely to undergo a change of 
state, be an incremental theme (a participant whose wholeness reflects the degree of 
completeness of a telic verb process), be affected by another participant, be stationary, 
and not exist outside of the event (the contributing properties for the Proto-Patient role) 
(Dowty, 1991: 572). Taking a “purely linguistic” position, Cruse (1973) considers agency 
to be attributable to any participant that (discursively) performs an action, meaning that 
inanimate, abstract and insentient entities can be considered agents, too. Most accounts, 
however, consider agency to presuppose animacy at the very least. All of these are at odds 
with the material-semiotic (‘actant’) understanding of agency, which posits that all 
participants, ‘doers’ or not, have some degree of agency.  
The concept of animacy has received much attention, particularly in typological and 
cross-linguistic studies. Unlike agency, which mainly reflects what an entity is ‘doing’, 
animacy is concerned with the “intrinsic features and ontological status of the entities 
themselves” (Yamamoto, 1999: 149). It is understood not as a simple binary distinction 
between animate and inanimate entities, but as a complicated gradient. The General 
Animacy Scale, reported for many languages, is an anthropocentric cognitive construct 
which holds humans to be the most animate entities and inanimate objects to be the least 
animate, with different types of nonhuman entities at various points in-between. 
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Yamamoto’s (1999) visualisation of the General Animacy Scale, drawing on Comrie 
(1989), is not linear but radial; at the centre are individual human beings, followed by 
human organisations, supernatural beings, human-like machines, anthropomorphised 
animals, other animals, plants, and so on, with abstract entities and physical objects at the 
furthest points from the centre. Animacy is not as simple as having the quality of being 
alive or the capacity for movement, but is also influenced by issues of empathy, from a 
conceptual point of view (Langacker, 1991) and individuation, from a linguistic point of 
view (Dahl and Fraurud, 1996).  
Like both animacy and agency, individuation – the propensity for an entity to be construed 
as an independent individual – is considered from a scalar perspective, rather than as a 
binary distinction (Grimm, 2018). This concept of individuation translates, 
lexicogrammatically, into countability, i.e. the ability to be encoded as singular, plural, 
mass or collective nouns. Although individuation can often appear fairly intuitive, from 
a cognitive perspective – larger, more visible entities with clearly defined boundaries are 
more likely to be construed as individuals, for example (Wierzbicka, 1988) – cross- and 
intra-linguistic studies have highlighted the fact that there are many material entities for 
which there is a lack of consensus on grammatical number and countability. Take, for 
instance, the English noun hair (mass) and the French equivalent cheveux (countable, 
plural), or the fact that in English we can take two countability approaches to what are 
essentially the same real-world concepts, e.g. leaves vs. foliage and letters vs. mail 
(Clausen et al., 2010; Grimm, 2018). Berries and berry-sized fruits are encoded as 
countable nouns in English but as mass nouns in Russian, while in Polish, berries are 
encoded as countable nouns by those who eat them, but as mass nouns by the farmers 
who produce them (Wierzbicka, 1988; Kwak, 2014). Grimm (2018) demonstrates, with 
convincing cross- and intra-linguistic evidence, that individuation and countability are 
neither ontologically based nor totally arbitrary, but instead are influenced by multiple 
interacting factors, including semantic properties, the grammatical number system of the 
language, and the ways the real-world entities are experienced and construed by the 
language users (cf. Prasada et al., 2002; Middleton et al., 2004). 
Although individuation, animacy and agency are separate concepts, they closely interact 
with and influence one another (Yamamoto, 1999: 4). Animacy, a prerequisite for agency 
in the traditional sense, is linguistically encoded through a variety of means, but 
particularly through grammatical number and countability (cf. Stibbe, 2006; Sealey, 
2018). Animacy “favours overt marking of number” (Dahl and Fraurud, 1996: 56), and 
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“higher-level” animates such as mammals, and especially dogs, are typically unmarked 
in the singular, while those lower down in the animacy scale are typically unmarked in 
the plural or as mass (Grimm, 2018; Corbett, 2000). It makes sense that the entities we 
conceive as being well-individuated – i.e. individuals – are also likely to be considered 
animate agents. 
Animacy and agency have also been linked with topicality and subjecthood. In a 
canonical, active, transitive clause in English, the topic – i.e. the unifying theme of a 
stretch of discourse – is likely to also be the grammatical subject, the agent, and an entity 
that ranks highly on the animacy scale (Yamamoto, 1999; Croft, 1991; Givón, 1983). 
(When the clause is in the passive voice, the topic is generally still the grammatical 
subject but is no longer the agent and is also less likely to be animate.) Givón and 
colleagues (1983), who used referential distance – the number of clauses between 
references to entities – to measure topic continuity across a number of languages, found 
animacy, particularly human animacy, to be a significant predictor of topicality in 
discourse. In written English, human/animate references were also found to have lower 
referential distance (a shorter distance between coreferential noun phrases), higher topic 
persistence (longer coreferential chains) and lower ‘ambiguity’ (less potential 
interference from other candidate references in the surrounding clauses) than non-
human/inanimate references. The differences between human and nonhuman construal 
are described as “huge”, but “not surprising”, since “humans are what we talk about” 
(Brown, 1983: 323-324). The lower ambiguity score was attributed to the fact that 
nonhuman entities outnumber human entities in almost any setting, as well as the fact that 
the English pronoun system renders all nonhumans more ambiguous under the pronoun 
of “it” (Brown, 1983: 324). As there are so many cooccurring features – subjecthood, 
topicality, animacy, agency, individuation – it is difficult to determine the direction of 
causation, i.e. how these factors influence one another. As noted by Brown (1983), these 
results may be influenced by other factors, such as case. Yamamoto reminds us that 
linguistic attribution of animacy and agency can be seen not only in the noun phrases used 
to refer to entities, but also in “the nature of verb phrases characterising their actions” 
(Yamamoto, 1999: 150). Verbs are central to the event and its participants, and it is to 
verbs that I turn in the next section. 
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3.6.4 Verbs and their alternations 
 
Beth Levin’s (1993) English Verb Classes and Alternations classifies more than 3,000 
English verbs according to their shared meanings and syntactic behaviour. Verbs are 
organised into 57 classes, many of these with subclasses, ranging from ‘verbs of putting’ 
and ‘verbs of communication’ to ‘verbs of grooming and bodily care’. Evidence for these 
classes is given in the form of selected examples of verbs in context, along with their 
alternations. These diathesis alternations are “alternations in the expressions of 
arguments, sometimes accompanied by changes of meaning” (Levin, 1993: 2). Levin’s 
list of verb alternations is extensive, and includes transitivity alternations, “oblique” 
subject alternations, and reflexive diathesis alternations, amongst others. In studying 
these alternations, Levin argues that it is possible to identify the specific linguistic 
components which determine a verb’s behaviour. Although such work had been 
undertaken before (e.g. Guerssel, 1986; Hale and Keyser, 1986, 1987), this was the first 
large-scale, semantically-driven classification of English verbs and their alternations, and 
it provides a rich source of insights on the relationship between verbs, argument structure 
and meaning.  
As this study focuses on ‘killing’ verbs, Levin’s classifications of verbs that she considers 
to be ‘verbs of killing’ are of particular interest. She identifies two such classes: ‘murder’ 
verbs (class 42.1), and ‘poison’ verbs (class 42.2). These two classes are included in the 
census of ‘killing’ terms undertaken in this study, detailed in Chapter 4. The class 
members of 42.1 are assassinate, butcher, dispatch, eliminate, execute, immolate, kill, 
liquidate, massacre, murder, slaughter and slay. Levin notes that, of these verbs, 
The verb kill is the class member with the least specific meaning: it lexicalizes 
nothing about the specific means, manner, or purpose involved in bringing about 
death; it also differs from other class members in its behaviour. Unlike kill, the other 
verbs in this class lexicalize something about the purpose or manner of killing. None 
of the verbs in this class lexicalize a means component. (Levin, 1993: 231) 
Levin also provides a list of alternations that are not permitted for verbs of this class, 
including the causative alternation (i.e. we can say that Brutus murdered Julius Caesar, 
but not that Julius Caesar murdered); the middle alternation (i.e. we can say that The 
bandits murdered innocent victims, but not that Innocent victims murder easily); and the 
instrument subject alternation, with the exception of kill (i.e. we can say that Brutus 
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murdered Julius Caesar with a dagger, or that The dagger killed Julius Caesar, but not 
that The dagger murdered Julius Caesar) (Levin, 1993: 231). 
Levin has similar comments for the ‘poison’ class of verbs, 42.2, which are asphyxiate, 
crucify, drown, electrocute, garrotte, hang, knife, poison, shoot, smother, stab, strangle 
and suffocate. She adds: 
Few members of this class are found with instrumental phrases, probably because 
they already lexicalize a means. Those that are in fact found with an instrumental 
phrase typically take what might be described as a “cognate” instrumental phrase 
(e.g., poison with rat poison) or an instrumental phrase involving a hyponym of 
poison. Fewer still allow instrumental subjects; their absence might reflect the fact 
that most of the allowable instruments are merely so-called “enabling” or 
“facilitating” instruments. (Levin, 1993: 233) 
However, in their systematic review of Levin’s ‘poison’ verb class, using Corpus Pattern 
Analysis (CPA), Bradbury and El Maarouf (2013) found that none of these hypotheses 
are satisfactorily corroborated by evidence. They also found little evidence to support 
Levin’s decision on verb class boundaries and discovered missing or misclassified entries 
in Levin (1993) due to the lack of empiricism and systematicity in its construction. Levin 
does not use corpus data to derive these verb classes, and instead relies on introspection. 
In doing so, “Levin proposes many plausible but sometimes unsafe generalizations” 
(Hanks, 2013: 187).  
Another contestable aspect of Levin’s approach is her assumption that “the behavior of a 
verb, particularly with respect to the expression and interpretation of its arguments, is to 
a large extent determined by its meaning” (1993: 1). This is, in the words of Hanks, “a 
chicken-or-egg question”: 
It might equally well be claimed that the meaning of a verb is to a large extent 
determined by its behavior. The two aspects, word behavior and word meaning, are 
undoubtedly interdependent, but it does not seem safe to assign priority to either … 
(Hanks, 2013: 186) 
It must be said, then, that although Levin’s classifications of verbs are useful in that they 
feature many illustrative examples of verb alternations to which analysts can refer, 
caution must be used when relying on these results or attempting to use them to make 
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generalisations. Generalisations must be based on data, rather than introspection, and I 
maintain that an empirical approach to the study of meaning is therefore non-negotiable. 
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3.7 Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
 
3.7.1 Theoretical background 
 
Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA), developed by lexicographer Patrick Hanks, seeks “[to 
elucidate] the relationship between syntagmatic patterns and activated meanings” (Hanks, 
2004: 92). Following the work of John Sinclair, and previously J. R. Firth, CPA uses 
corpus data to examine the behaviour of words in their contexts, and in doing so 
establishes the linguistic patterns with which they are associated. Words, Hanks argues, 
do not have meaning but ‘meaning potential’; their meanings are only activated by the 
lexical patterns in which they exist (Hanks, 2004), and, like Sinclair, Hanks finds meaning 
to be inextricably linked to form (cf. Sinclair, 1991). So far, CPA has mostly been 
employed in computational lexicography, namely the Pattern Dictionary of English 
Verbs (PDEV)18, under the Disambiguation of Verbs by Collocation (DVC) project19, on 
which I was trained in CPA and worked as an annotator. CPA has the potential to be 
integrated in automated, Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks (e.g. El Maarouf et 
al., 2014; Hanks and Pustejovsky, 2005), but its potential in many other areas is yet to be 
explored. 
CPA is underpinned by Hanks’ (2013) Theory of Norms and Exploitations (TNE), which 
is centred on the distinction of linguistic norms, or typical instances, from exploitations, 
or anomalous ones. Hanks conceptualises TNE as a “double helix” (Hanks, 2009) in 
reference to the two intertwined systems of norm and exploitation generation. The 
relationship between the two “is bidirectional, i.e. if on one hand norms are used to 
generate new semantic, figurative and syntactic exploitations, the latter can also turn into 
norms through frequent and continuous use over an extended period of time” (Hanks and 
Može, 2019: 12). Norms and exploitations therefore co-exist with varying degrees of 
distinguishability, and quite often a sizeable grey area in-between, which can be 
“disentangled” using large corpora and statistical evidence (Hanks and Može, 2019).  
 
18 http://pdev.org.uk  
19 http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/projects?ref=AH/J005940/1  
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TNE originated in “a marriage between lexicography and corpus linguistics” (Hanks, 
2013: 410), and as such has the following main characteristics: 
• It relies on evidence of usage. Introspection is not considered a valid method of 
data gathering and intuition should only be used as a means of explaining patterns 
found in authentic language data. 
• It is concerned with conventionality. For a norm to be considered so, there must 
be repeated and reinforced evidence of its usage in authentic language. That a 
construction is possible in a language is not of relevance to this task; the question 
is, “is it typical?” 
• It is lexicocentric; emphasis is placed on lexical sets and semantic types. 
Like Sinclair, Hanks works on the assumption that form and meaning are closely related, 
and that a difference in surface representation signals some difference in meaning, even 
if the difference is only very subtle. Sinclair’s observation that collocational analysis can 
reveal the “semantic prosody” (Sinclair, 1996; cf. Stubbs, 1996; Partington, 1998) of a 
word is also of relevance to the Corpus Pattern Analysis exercise. Hanks argues, however, 
that Sinclair’s approach “did not fully integrate the notion of lexical semantics” and “did 
not introduce criteria for distinguishing systematically between normal patterns of 
collocation and creative uses of these patterns” (2013: 6). Nonetheless, CPA is highly 
compatible with the work of Sinclair and other Neo-Firthian linguists, particularly in its 
insistence on using actual language data rather than invented examples. 
Similarities can also be drawn between CPA and the work of Charles Fillmore, namely 
Case Grammar, and later Frame Semantics and FrameNet. Fillmore’s work is more 
concerned with the cases, or clause roles, that must somehow be present in language, 
explicitly or not, while Hanks’ TNE and CPA are concerned with the intrinsic properties 
of the lexical items that tend to appear in such roles. FrameNet, an inexhaustive inventory 
of ‘frames’, or cognitive constructs consisting of frame elements (participants) and lexical 
units (pairings of words with meanings), is essentially cognitive linguistics applied to 
lexicography. Rather than beginning with a word or multiword unit and examining its 
various behaviours in a corpus, the FrameNet analyst will begin with a frame, such as the 
“buying and selling” frame, which involves frame elements labelled as e.g., Buyer, Seller, 
Goods, Money, and so on, and then find examples in a corpus to map onto this frame. So 
Fillmore’s “frames” are conceptual, rather than lexical, and Frame Semantics does not 
distinguish between a concept and the meaning of a word in context (Hanks, 2013: 385). 
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While TNE and CPA are concerned with patterns of word use, Frame Semantics and 
FrameNet deal in conceptual relations. Hanks describes TNE and Frame Semantics as 
“fellow travelers toward the goal of a ‘semantics of understanding’” (2013: 386), but with 
different starting points and different means of analysis. FrameNet, Hanks concludes, is 
not based on a systematic form of lexical analysis.  
Construction Grammar (CG), another product of Fillmore’s (1982) work, further 
developed by his student, Adele Goldberg (1995, 2003), might also be compared with 
CPA and the work undertaken in this project. ‘Constructions’, in the CG sense, can be 
anything from a morpheme to a phrase, and for construction grammarians there is a need 
for not only a lexicon but also a ‘constructicon’, given how much meaning resides in 
constructions as opposed to single lexical items. CG accounts of meaning make little 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and no distinction is made between the 
lexicon and grammatical rules, unlike generative approaches. The main difference 
between CG and TNE is that the former is based predominantly on constructions created 
through introspection, sometimes corroborated using corpus evidence, and the latter is 
thoroughly committed to a data-driven theory of meaning. Both TNE and CG agree, 
however, on the primacy of patterns or ‘constructions’, as opposed to individual words, 
as producers of meaning. 
The procedure of CPA is comparable with the approaches taken in the COBUILD project 
(Sinclair, 1987; Francis et al., 1996), the Hector project (Atkins, 1993) and Pattern 
Grammar (Hunston and Francis, 2000), in that it consults large amounts of linguistic data 
and identifies patterns in form which relate to patterns in meaning. However, CPA is more 
concerned with lexical patterns than syntactic or grammatical ones. On Pattern Grammar, 
which deals in constructions made up of parts of speech and collocating particles such as 
prepositions, Hanks remarks that “no distinction is made between firing a gun and firing 
an employee, since they are both transitive uses of the verb fire, with the pattern V n” 
(2013: 6). As a result, Pattern Grammar is insufficient for the syntagmatic profiling of a 
word. Hunston and Francis summarise the difference in approach: 
… our patterns involve a fairly high degree of generalisation. … In this respect, our 
work is not entirely in step with that of Sinclair, who stresses the idiosyncratic 
behaviour of individual word forms and the phraseological patterning of particular 
lexical items. (Hunston and Francis, 2000: 77) 
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The present work is therefore more in line with Hanks (2004, 2013) and Sinclair (1966, 
1991, 2004) in terms of the means and granularity of pattern distinction. Shared by both 
Pattern Grammar and CPA, however, is the recognition that language patterns do not 
necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence with senses; one sense can be realised by 
several patterns, and vice versa. 
 
3.7.2 Features of CPA 
 
CPA is a straightforward and fairly intuitive method of analysing lexical patterns. It 
makes use of a simple syntactic framework based on the kind of systemic grammar used 
by Quirk, Halliday, Sinclair and others, as opposed to using generative syntactic trees. 
Verb analysis, according to Halliday’s ‘rank scale’ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), 
must be done at the rank ‘clause’. Following systemic grammar, CPA identifies the five 
basic ‘SPOCA’ elements that can feature in a clause: the subject, i.e. a noun phrase (S); 
the predicator, i.e. a verb group (P); an object, i.e. a noun phrase (O); a complement, i.e. 
an adjective or noun phrase that is coreferential with either the subject or the object (C); 
and an adverbial (A), also known as an ‘adjunct’ in systemic grammar (Hanks, 2013: 94). 
These clause roles, described at length in Young (1980), are simple but robust enough for 
analysing the valency of predicators, i.e. verbs. 
It is important to note here some of the different ways in which CPA uses familiar 
terminology. A pattern, in the CPA sense, “consists of a valency structure … together 
with sets of preferred collocations” (Hanks, 2013: 92). Patterns are identified by taking a 
sample concordance of a key word in context (KWIC) and grouping similar concordance 
lines together based on their lexical, semantic and syntactic patterning. Hanks has two 
questions that are necessary, but not sufficient, for determining whether the pattern is the 
same for several concordance lines: “Do these uses all have the same meaning?” and “Do 
these uses all have the same valency?” (Hanks, 2013: 95). All examples of a pattern must 
have the same meaning and the same valency. What counts as ‘the same’ can vary slightly 
depending on how fine-grained a meaning distinction is, or whether there are optional 
arguments that can affect the valency of a construction, for instance. For most verbs, there 
will be one or two patterns that dominate the sample, and a few others that constitute a 
much smaller percentage. 
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Patterns can be norms (patterns of normal, conventional, everyday usage) or exploitations 
(creative patterns of language use), though, as noted above, the distinction between the 
two is not an absolute one (Hanks, 2013: 4). Rather than being considered as binary 
opposites, they should be understood as two ends of a cline:  
Some norms are more normal than others; some exploitations are more outrageous 
than others. And in the middle are alternations: lexical alternations, where one word 
can be substituted for another without change of meaning (e.g., the idiom grasping 
at straws alternates with clutching at straws); syntactic alternations (e.g., active vs. 
passive); and semantic-type alternations, which are devices for selecting a different 
focus when talking about what is basically the same event type (you can talk about 
calming someone or alternatively, with a slightly different focus, about calming 
someone’s anxiety; you can talk about repairing a car or you can focus on the 
presupposition and talk about repairing the damage). (Hanks, 2013: 411) 
Most lines in a concordance sample will be norms. Exploitations are marked as such 
precisely because they are rare and because they flout the ‘rules’ of a normal pattern. 
When exploitations recur consistently, as is common for metaphorical language, they can 
become naturalised over time and themselves become norms, as suggested by the ‘double 
helix’ analogy of TNE. 
In Lexical Analysis, Hanks provides a typology of exploitations (2013: 215-226):  
• Ellipsis, a syntactic alternation that becomes an exploitation when the omission 
of an argument, such as a direct object, changes the meaning of a construction; 
• Metaphors and similes, the most common kind of exploitation and the main form 
of semantic change; 
• Anomalous collocates, which are simply abnormal lexical choices used for a 
particular purpose; 
• Construction exploitation, i.e. exploitation that goes beyond phraseology to affect 
the entire construction; and  
• Semantic-type coercion, in which arguments are coerced by the context into 
having a different meaning from usual. 
Hanks also explores the ways in which rhetorical tropes, such as metonymy, puns and 
euphemism, can be put to use as creative exploitations of norms. 
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Semantic types are logical constructs for groups of lexical items, derived from 
Pustejovsky’s (1995) Generative Lexicon theory and described in Hanks and Pustejovsky 
(2005). These semantic types are arranged in a hierarchical semantic Ontology, an 
inventory of all concepts, both abstract and concrete, expressed in a language. (I capitalise 
the ‘O’ in this kind of Ontology to distinguish it from the philosophical “world view” 
kind of ontology discussed in Chapter 2.) Semantic types, in PDEV, are designated by 
double square brackets. To illustrate with an example: the verb sip selects as its object 
lexical items such as beer, water, whiskey, drink, and tea, which form a lexical set 
represented in the CPA Ontology20 by the semantic type of [[Beverage]]. In the Ontology, 
a [[Beverage]] is a [[Liquid]] is a [[Fluid]] is [[Stuff]] is [[Inanimate]] is a [[Physical 
Object]], and so on. The CPA Ontology is unique, in that it was not devised a priori, but 
instead was progressively built and altered during the course of the project, and can be 
considered to be data-driven and specific to the corpus upon which it is based (the original 
British National Corpus). Hanks and Jezek (2008) are critical of ‘speculative’ Ontologies, 
and assert that, as well as being empirical, a CPA Ontology should be “statistically based” 
and consisting of “shimmering lexical sets” (2008: 393). By ‘shimmering’, they refer to 
the tendency for certain semantic types to be activated (or deactivated) by particular 
verbs, and for this reason they stress that the nodes of an Ontology should represent 
typical, canonical, and empirically founded members of a lexical set, rather than all 
possible members. They also concede that a hierarchical, IS-A (e.g. a beverage is a type 
of liquid is a type of fluid is a type of stuff) Ontology structure is problematic when 
dealing with natural language, but note its usefulness in making generalisations and 
predicting the lexical items associated with a particular verb. Verbs may be applied 
differently, in patterned ways, to members of different lexical sets (or semantic types), 
for example. 
A major problem for linguistic categorisation, other than the fact that natural language 
does not “map neatly onto conceptual categories” (Jezek and Hanks, 2010: 8), is that 
ordinary language does not tend to correspond to existing Ontologies, least of all scientific 
ones (Dupré, 2002). Whereas scientific (e.g. Linnaean) taxonomy classifies organisms 
based on their shared biological characteristics (morphology, genes, etc.), ‘ordinary 
language’ Ontologies are more anthropocentric, and are organised based on the various 
functions that organisms can serve, e.g. their social and economic importance for humans 
 
20 http://pdev.org.uk/#onto  
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(Dupré, 2002: 31). This is what sets the CPA Ontology apart from existing semantic 
inventories, such as WordNet21, which is not data-driven and which features many 
scientific concepts rather than focusing on the folk concepts that form the foundation of 
meaning in natural language (Bradbury and El Maarouf, 2013: 71). An ordinary-language 
Ontology of animals, then, will reflect not only the specificities of the corpus being used, 
but also the multiplicity of animals in society and discourse. Rather than listing 
‘mammals’ and ‘amphibians’, it might list ‘domesticated animals’, ‘farmed animals’, 
‘wild animals’, and so on. The Animals in Context Ontology, for example, was developed 
in order to represent animals “in practical use”, for purposes such as “drug labels, gene 
set mapping, species preservation, and veterinary medical records” (Santamaria et al., 
2012). Animals are classified by their dispositions (e.g. “disposition to ruminate”), roles 
(e.g. “produces milk for human food”) and other characteristics relevant to human uses.  
The semantic types from the CPA Ontology occupy the argument slots in CPA, for 
example, the subject, object and prepositional object slots. CPA patterns are anchored to 
implicatures, which form an integral part of a word’s “syntagmatic profile” (Hanks, 2013: 
117), and which describe the entailment of a particular pattern. For example, the most 
common pattern associated with the verb eat is listed in PDEV22 as 
(3.1) [[Human]] or [[Animal]] or [[Animate]] eats ( [[Physical Object]] or [[Stuff]] ) 
with the primary implicature  
(3.2) [[Human]] or [[Animal]] or [[Animate]] puts [[Physical Object]] or [[Stuff = 
Food]] into his/her mouth, and swallows it (usually after chewing it).  
The round brackets in this pattern (3.1) denote optionality; in this instance, a direct object 
is not always present. The use of the equals sign in (3.2), as in [[Stuff = Food]], denotes 
a semantic role, not to be confused with ‘semantic roles’ such as ‘agent’, ‘patient’ and 
‘instrument’, which are instead referred to in this thesis as ‘thematic roles’ (see Section 
3.7.3). ‘Semantic roles’23 in the CPA sense are roles imposed on noun phrases by virtue 
of the context. Hanks uses the example of the verb sentence, which has a very limited 
choice of arguments. Where [[Human 1]] sentences [[Human 2]], as in Mr. Woods 
sentenced Bailey to three years, there is nothing intrinsic to the expression of Mr. Woods 
 
21 https://wordnet.princeton.edu/ 
22 http://pdev.org.uk/#browse?q=eat;f=A;v=eat  
23 Hanks now refers to these as ‘contextual roles’ to avoid confusion. 
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to say that he is a judge nor to Bailey to say that he or she is a criminal; these roles are 
instead imposed by the context (Hanks, 2013: 285-286). In the case of a human who 
slaughters animals for a living, as in Here, we slaughter pigs relatively young and 
shorthaired (taken from a broadcast transcript in the PPPP corpus), the semantic role, or 
contextual role, of the subject might be [[Human = Slaughterer]]. It should be noted that 
patterns can also have secondary implicatures, though this is relatively uncommon (see 
the example of drink presented in Chapter 4).  
 
3.7.3 Meaning as event, pattern as assemblage 
 
Hanks makes the case for an evental understanding of meaning. Meanings, he says, 
… are constructs, but ephemeral; they are to be seen as events involving interaction 
between two or more participants. The invention of writing and (even more so) 
printing has made meanings seem more permanent than they really are. Texts may 
be permanent, but meanings are transitory. A reader’s attribution of a meaning to a 
fragment of text is a displaced participatory event. (Hanks, 2013: 409) 
Hanks builds on the ideas of Firth (1957) – namely that meaning is to be viewed 
holistically and cannot be separated from context – as well as Grice’s maxims (1975) 
and his theories of cooperation. In this instance, Hanks is talking about events at the 
level of human participants, i.e. how humans interact with each other and with text or 
speech to make meaning. It is not a huge leap to extend this statement to include, as is 
standard in argument realisation discourse, clause constituents such as subject and 
object, or thematic roles such as agent and patient, under the rubric of “participant”. 
Whether we are discussing patterns in the style of Hanks, frames in the tradition of 
Fillmore, constructions of the kind described by Goldberg, or the molecular-bond-
inspired valencies proposed by Tesnière, we are essentially considering the 
components of meaning in arrangements or assemblages (Section 2.4.4). While Firth 
would say that we know a word “by the company it keeps” (Firth, 1957: 11), Deleuze 
and Guattari would say that all meaning is external, that concepts vary “according to 
their neighborhood” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 20). Firth also claimed, as do 
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integrationists24, that “each word when used in a new context is a new word” (Firth, 
1957: 190), and for Deleuze and Guattari, the same can be said for an assemblage. 
Each assemblage is unique, an event that only happens once. When it stops being 
reproduced, it no longer exists. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, assemblages are composed of heterogeneous elements and 
are at once both micro and macro, themselves parts of a larger assemblage as well as 
being constituted by smaller assemblages arranged in a rhizomatic network. We might 
talk of lexical patterns as themselves assemblages, but we can just as easily describe 
their components as assemblages: phrases are arrangements of words, which are 
arrangements of morphemes, and so on. Meaning, like all other events, is emergent 
and immanent: it is bound up in the particular mixture of its constituents, and is greater 
than the sum of its parts. Language, we are reminded by Hanks and colleagues, “is not 
a Lego set”25; we do not simply make meaning by joining lexical items together like 
building blocks. The relationship between words and phrases, between grammar and 
lexis, is fuzzy and complex. As expressed by Goldberg, 
The totality of our knowledge of language is captured by a network of 
constructions: a ‘construct-i-con’. (Goldberg, 2003: 219) 
A major failing of generative grammar – along with its rejection of authentic language 
data – is its conception of language as catenative chains of atomistic units of meaning, 
rather than as a complex mesh of discursive and extra-discursive elements that, when 
brought together, give rise to meaning. Although language is patterned, predictable 
and regular in many senses, it is also dynamic and multiple. It is for this reason that 
Natural Language Processing struggles to disambiguate word senses, for example, 
especially via traditional rule-based systems. The recent wave of non-linear Deep 
Learning and Neural Network approaches, inspired by biological networks of the brain 
(Marblestone et al., 2016), represents a general shift towards more relational, 
rhizomatic thinking in Computational Linguistics and related fields. This trend is 
concurrent with the new-materialist turn seen in a range of other disciplines on both 
sides of the arts-science divide (see Chapter 2). 
 
24 A comprehensive overview of integrationist approaches to language can be found in Pablé and Hutton 
(2015). Relevant to this discussion is the claim of integrationist theory that all meaning in communication 
is emergent and context-bound. 
25 http://rgcl.wlv.ac.uk/research/dvc-disambiguation-of-verbs-by-collocation/ 
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Although discussions of language as patterns and other arrangements are not new, and 
although we are now seeing empirically well-founded, context-sensitive approaches to 
the study of meaning, such as Corpus Pattern Analysis and the more computational 
Distributional Semantics, there remain some problems which lend themselves to a 
material semiotic reading of assemblages, rhizomes and actor-networks. One of these 
is the tension between the signified and signifier, between states of affairs and 
propositions: are semanticists, for example, analysing language, or the event construed 
by the language? Deleuze describes the intersection of these two series – the material 
and the discursive – as the point of the event: “Everything happens at the boundary 
between things and propositions” (Deleuze, 1990: 8). This boundary Deleuze calls 
‘sense’: 
Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute 
of the state of affairs. It turns one side toward things and the other side toward 
propositions. But it does not merge with the proposition which expresses it any 
more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes. It is 
exactly the boundary between propositions and things (Deleuze, 1990: 22) 
Butler elaborates on this, describing the moment of the proposition as a sliding back 
and forth between the material and the discursive ‘sides’, as if Deleuze’s ‘sense’ were 
a Möbius strip: “It is to move from one side to the other without leaping across any 
gap or void” (Butler, 2005: 134). Taking this line of thinking, then, we can recognise 
that semantic analysis is not purely linguistic, nor is it a comment on the material, but 
it lies somewhere in-between these two ‘sides’. It is simultaneously material and 
discursive. 
Another problem for which we might turn to assemblage thinking for a solution is that of 
how to deal with agency and causality. I refer here not only to the kind of ‘agency’ 
discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. the material-semiotic notion of distributed agency, as opposed 
to traditional ideas of human-like agency and intentionality, but also the difficulties 
linguists face in describing relationships between components of language and their 
meanings. It is quite common, for example, to describe predicators as ‘taking’, ‘selecting’, 
‘controlling’ or ‘governing’ their arguments, or to claim, as did Levin (1993), that the 
behaviour of a word is “determined by” its meaning. As argued by Hanks and others (cf. 
Leech, 1981; Lyons, 1977; Gabrielatos, forthcoming), this is a circular issue. Rather than 
attributing agency or causality in this way, we could accept meaning to be an event, which 
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both co-constructs and is also co-constructed by a web of interrelated meaning events or 
assemblages. An event, according to Žižek, is “a manifestation of a circular structure in 
which the evental effect retroactively determines its causes or reasons … an effect which 
exceeds its causes” (Žižek, 2015: 2-5). Taking this view, it is unhelpful to attempt to draw 
a linear course of causality. Verbs may be central to a clause, but instead of construing 
them as agentic, for example, we might describe them using such terms as ‘participate’, 
as in Hanks (2013: 288): “Light verbs in languages such as English and German 
participate in several hundred patterns each” (emphasis added). Meaning, as per the 
original ‘valency’ analogy, might also be understood in the same way as a chemical 
reaction: words, phrases, spaces and interlocutors meet, form alliances, and produce new 




This chapter has located the role of (critical) discourse analysis in recognising – and thus 
potentially dismantling – less obvious systems of oppression. Approaches to discourse 
analysis vary widely, but there is an argument for paying explicit attention to the social 
context of the problem, as is done in CDA, and for drawing only on authentic, actual 
language data, as is done in corpus linguistics. Despite fast-growing interest in discourse 
surrounding the more-than-human world, there is still a lack of emancipatory discourse 
analysis for the benefit of nonhumans, which this thesis aims to redress in some small 
way. Corpus Pattern Analysis, a technique used in corpus lexicography, is shown to have 
the potential for methodically and empirically classifying instances of ‘killing’ 
constructions in English, something that many other approaches have failed to do. 
Integrated into a broader analysis that takes other verb features into account, we might 
term this a ‘corpus-lexicographical discourse analysis’. Borrowing some concepts from 
material semiotics, namely the multiplicity and interconnectedness of events in the form 
of assemblages and rhizomes, it is possible to not only reconfigure understandings of 
agency and event dynamics, but also perspectives on language and meaning. Central to 
studies of language, such as this one, is the recognition that the ‘material’ and the 
‘discursive’ are two sides of the same coin, always enmeshed in a larger assemblage, a 
‘mixture’ of heterogeneous elements in a constant state of flux. 
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Having set the scene in this and previous chapters, I now introduce my empirical study, 
which draws on the theories and concepts presented. I begin with a description of the data 
and methods employed in Chapter 4, which also includes the methods and results of a 








This chapter describes the data and methodological approach used in this project, and 
gives the rationale for all major decisions taken in the development of this new 
methodology. As this project is concerned with the adaptation of Corpus Pattern Analysis 
(CPA) for a discourse analysis task, special attention is given to the steps taken in the 
analysis, and how this method differs from the conventional use of CPA.   
In the remainder of this introductory section, the research questions from Chapter 1 are 
revisited, along with a brief account of the stance taken in this research. In Section 4.2, 
the data sources are explained, along with the procedure used for identifying ‘killing’ 
terms and for shortlisting candidates for analysis. The theoretical underpinnings of CPA 
are then revisited briefly in Section 4.3, followed by an example of CPA as used in 
lexicography and a description of how CPA is adapted for the purposes of this project. 
The full data annotation procedure is laid out in detail, including the construction of the 
PPPP Killing Ontology and the evaluation of the annotation procedure using an inter-
annotator agreement test. Finally, the statistical methods employed in this research are 
explained, and Section 4.4 summarises the nature of the final data set and the main 
analytical steps taken. 
 
4.1.1 Research questions 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the research questions (RQs) guiding this project are as follows: 
RQ1. What can a discourse analysis assisted by Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
reveal about the ‘killing’ verbs selected in relation to the key themes identified in 
the literature? 
Having surveyed the literature, it is now possible to be more specific about RQ1.  Key 
themes that emerged from the animal studies literature were those of distance, 
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concealment, space and visibility, e.g. a politics of sight. The ‘property’ status of 
animals was also found to be widely discussed, as well as their position in longstanding 
hierarchies of worth. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the language of violent acts is 
characterised by discursive operations that effectively conceal or somehow justify 
these acts of violence, mirroring the material themes in Chapter 2. Finally, the 
material-semiotic ideas of assemblage, becoming and event were found to be recurrent 
critical concepts, closely related to the posthumanist ontologies previously discussed. 
All of these themes are therefore given explicit attention in the analysis. 
RQ1 is supported by three further questions: 
RQ2. How is the involvement in acts of killing, of humans and nonhumans 
respectively, typically represented in the extracts of discourse analysed?  
RQ2a. Are these representations stable across the different discourse domains 
represented in the corpus? 
RQ3. What does CPA contribute to the task of discourse analysis? 
All of the research questions are answered explicitly in Chapter 8. 
 
4.1.2 Research philosophy 
 
In the spirit of Berman (2006), I feel it is important that I situate myself in this research. 
As well as being a linguist, I am also a woman, a vegan, and an outspoken animal 
advocate; my motivation for conducting this research came partly from a deep sense of 
injustice and a wish to alleviate, and bear witness to, the suffering of nonhuman animals. 
I am white, British, able-bodied, atheistic, childless, and sufficiently educated – and 
privileged – to be pursuing a doctoral degree. These are not insignificant details and each 
aspect of my identity lends itself to a particular flavour of bias. I may well have more 
interest in, or sympathy for, issues that affect women and nonhuman animals than other 
researchers in my field. My social circumstances and cultural background will dictate, to 
some degree, my capacity to consider different worldviews and conceptual categories. I 
make connections within this research that my biologist colleagues perhaps would not, 
and I have undoubtedly missed details to which a mother, a farmer, or a theologian, for 
instance, would be more attuned. Above all, I am – like anyone reading this – a human. 
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There is no way of measuring the extent to which our status as humans affects our ability 
to critically evaluate human behaviour, and the language through which we communicate 
such ideas is inescapably anthropocentric. All of these factors are taken into consideration 
as powerful sources of potential bias in this research.  
The decision to take a corpus linguistic approach in this research is no doubt itself a result 
of bias, in the sense that I identify as a corpus linguist, but it is also defensible – even 
necessary – on several fronts. To revisit some of the key points established in Chapter 3, 
language is instrumental in supporting and reifying ideologies and relations of power and 
as such warrants close and detailed investigation. However, it is hard to comment on the 
validity and generalisability of linguistic findings without having surveyed large volumes 
of linguistic evidence, typically more language than a human can process without 
computational assistance. Furthermore, corpus software helps to mitigate human bias in 
that it helps identify salient language units to which a human analyst is likely to be 
desensitised, and it produces quantitative reports on word frequency and statistical 
significance to a degree of accuracy that is not realistically attainable without the use of 
computers. Corpus linguistic methods are by no means infallible, however, and those 
working with corpus data must still exercise their own judgement when interpreting 
results. It is therefore particularly important that corpus linguists – and other quantitative 
researchers – recognise and declare their own biases in relation to their research, and 
avoid presenting their results as though they are objective. This research therefore 
employs corpus methods critically, with a focus on the use of empirical data rather than 
‘objectivity’. To mitigate some of the pitfalls of corpus approaches discussed in Chapter 
3, namely the loss of textual context, this project involves extensive reading beyond the 
immediate node environment and annotation of a range of features (detailed in Section 
4.3.2) that requires a thorough understanding of each instance in the data.  
This research takes a straightforward and primarily descriptive approach to statistical 
methods, on the basis that natural language data is messy and open-ended, and in the case 
of several of the terms analysed here, too small in size to be submitted to such methods. 
I am also conscious that more complex, inferential statistics are still human-constructed 
measures of ‘truth’ and are not necessarily more empirical nor useful than their more 
basic, descriptive counterparts (Byrne, 2002). 
I purposely grasp the data loosely. Few attempts are made to control, isolate, or “torture” 
(Huff, 1954) the data, in favour of a more bottom-up, open-ended and data-led approach. 
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Rather than confronting my research interests head-on, e.g. by looking directly at ‘animal’ 
terms, or by looking exclusively at ‘killing’ instances, I endeavour to approach them 
“sideways” (Žižek, 2010). By starting with verbs and examining all of their potential 
senses, it is possible to locate the place of the animal and the nature of the killing in light 
of these possibilities. 
Finally, a concerted effort is made to incorporate material-semiotic, i.e. assemblage-
aware, actor-network-informed, thinking. This entails an appreciation of the fact that the 
material and the discursive – and everything in-between – is interdependent, as well as 
“an insistence on seeing each event as the outcome of a convergence of multiple 
interacting influences including those of material objects, all to be taken equally seriously 
by the investigator” (Elder-Vass, 2015: 101). Language is seen as just one part of a chaotic 
‘mixture’. While it is recognised that different text types have the potential to wield 
different kinds of power (see Section 3.2.1), this thesis does not seek to delineate nor 
analyse the effects of those different kinds of power, instead focusing on the lexical 




4.2.1 Corpora  
 
Two corpora are used as sources of data for this project. One is the original British 
National Corpus (BNC), used for establishing conventional patterns of language usage in 
general English. The other is the corpus from the ‘People’, ‘Products’, ‘Pests’ and ‘Pets’ 
(PPPP) project, henceforth referred to as ‘the PPPP corpus’. This corpus provides the 
language data for animal-themed discourse, and makes it possible to compare the use of 
‘killing’ constructions across different genres and as used by people with varying attitudes 





4.2.1.1 The British National Corpus 
 
The original British National Corpus (BNC) is a general-language corpus of roughly 100 
million words of late-twentieth-century British English. It is comprised of text samples 
of up to 45,000 words taken from a wide range of genres and domains, 90% of which are 
written texts, the remaining 10% being transcriptions of spoken language. The original 
creators of the BNC – a consortium with members in the publishing industry (Oxford 
University Press, Longman, Chambers Harrap), academia (Oxford University, Lancaster 
University) and the British Library – compiled the corpus between 1991 and 1994 
according to carefully considered design principles, with the aim of producing a large, 
balanced, representative sample of contemporary British English for (computational) 
linguistic purposes (Burnard, 1995; Leech et al. 2014). The basic composition details are 
given in Table 4.1.26 
 
 
Table 4.1: Basic composition details for the BNC, adapted from Burnard (1995) 
 
Each of the subcorpora of the written BNC consist of various subcategories, each 
purposefully chosen to be representative of a particular genre, domain or time period, and 
balanced to reflect the proportions of different types of books being published around that 
time (Leech et al., 2014). Written text types are predominantly samples from books (57%) 
and periodicals (33%), with domains ranging from natural science and world affairs to 
arts, leisure, and belief and thought; see Table 4.2. 
 




Table 4.2: Size and proportion information for the written domains represented in the BNC, adapted from 
Burnard (1995) 
 
The spoken part of the BNC is of a smaller proportion than would be ideal, but still 
provides linguistic evidence from a wide range of British English speakers representing 
a variety of regional backgrounds, age ranges and social groups. The ‘demographic’ 
portion of the spoken corpus consists of unstructured, ‘spontaneous’ conversation 
between recruited participants and their interlocutors. The rest of the spoken subcorpus 
consists of ‘context-governed’ speech, made up of monologues (40%) and dialogues 
(60%) selected based on a set of predefined, linguistically motivated topics. These are 
spread fairly evenly across four broad categories: educational, business, 
public/institutional, and leisure; Table 4.3 shows this distribution.  
 
 




As well as featuring extensive metadata relating to text type and domain, target audience, 
the place and year of publication (or recording), the number of authors (or speakers) and 
details of their gender, age range and regional identity, the BNC is annotated with 
structural tags denoting sections, words and parts of speech (POS). The BNC was POS-
tagged using the CLAWS4 automatic tagger (Garside and Smith, 1997) and then the 
Template Tagger (Fligelstone et al., 1996), achieving a final accuracy rate in the region 
of 98% (Leech et al. 2014: 15).  
As a large, freely available, carefully curated and comprehensively annotated corpus of 
British English, the BNC has been the (reference) corpus of choice for innumerable 
corpus linguistic investigations around the world with a diverse range of applications. 
Despite now being more than 20 years old, the BNC continues to play a central role in 
corpus linguistic theory and practice.  
The original BNC is no longer sufficient for studies of contemporary British English 
which seek to comment on neologisms or linguistic phenomena specific to 21st-century – 
particularly technology-related – language. Researchers with these priorities might 
instead turn to web-crawled corpora such as the ukWac corpus (Ferraresi et al. 2008) and 
enTenTen (Jakubíček et al., 2013), or, once it is available, the brand-new version of the 
BNC, BNC201427. For investigations into language change and general British English 
usage, however, the original BNC continues to be a robust and reliable source of linguistic 
data. It is for this reason that the Pattern Dictionary of English Verbs (PDEV) takes the 
BNC as its main source of data, and the BNC is used as the reference source of general 
British English in the present study. Using the BNC as a reference corpus also makes my 
results more comparable with those presented in the PDEV, whose entries I regularly 
refer to when doing CPA. In the rare absence of sufficient general-language data I refer, 
as per the policy in the PDEV project, to an enTenTen corpus. EnTenTen13 is a web-
crawled corpus of around 20 billion words, with subcorpora classified according to region 
(e.g. British English, American English and Australian English). Its size makes it an 
excellent source of linguistic evidence, but, as predicted by Thelwall (2005), it is not 
particularly representative of general written or spoken English due to being “Web 




(Hargraves, 2017). EnTenTen13 therefore serves as a last-resort, back-up corpus in which 
to search for evidence of specific language use.  
 
4.2.1.2 The ‘People’, ‘Products’, ‘Pests’ and ‘Pets’ (PPPP) corpus 
 
The PPPP corpus is a thematically-organised, specialised corpus of approximately nine 
million words consisting of texts related to animals, created for the purposes of the 
‘People’, ‘Products’, ‘Pests’ and ‘Pets’ project28. This was a cross-institutional research 
project between Kings College London and Lancaster University (initially University of 
Birmingham) from 2013 to 2016. The approach and aims of the project were similar to 
those of this research: to use corpus methods to create an overview of the ways in which 
animals feature in human society, as reflected in contemporary British English language. 
As such, it was necessary to build a corpus of animal-related discourse representing a 
variety of speakers, domains, text types, and – of course – animals.  
Discerning what counts as ‘animal-related discourse’ is not a straightforward task, as 
acknowledged by the makers of the corpus (Sealey and Pak, 2018), and begins with the 
question of “what is an animal?”. The creators decided, for the purposes of their project, 
that the ‘animals’ under consideration are only those visible to the human eye, thus 
excluding micro-organisms and imperceptibly small insects, for instance. The 
delimitation of what counts as an animal is more important in that project than in this one, 
as it seeks to comment on discourse related to animals as a whole, rather than on a specific 
phenomenon (e.g. killing) and how that affects a range of entities. As such, their analysis 
begins with the animal terms and then moves outwards. Nonetheless, that criterion is 
considered a useful and robust one, and does not create problems of exclusion in the data. 
As remarked by the authors, it has not prevented the less visible animals from being 
represented in the corpus: “[…] our searches for texts about animals visible to the eye 
often lead, especially in the scientific literature, to language about parts of such animals, 
as well as about invisible animals that co-exist with the visible, such as parasites” (Sealey 
and Pak, 2018). Naturally, this also resulted in the inclusion of texts that were not 
exclusively about animals. 
 
28 http://cass.lancs.ac.uk/?page_id=1560  
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The corpus was constructed by a variety of means: interviews and focus groups were 
carried out with a diverse range of people, such as hunters, vegans and wildlife 
broadcasters; text was downloaded from websites, news articles, legislative documents 
and scientific journal articles on the theme of animals; and additional linguistic data was 
successfully obtained from other research projects. The creators obtained nineteen 
transcripts of interviews carried out with dog owners, and were also given 103 written 
entries from a Mass Observation (MO) Project which included a directive on animals and 
humans (see Sealey and Charles (2013) for more information). The composition details 
of the PPPP corpus are given in Table 4.4. 
 
 
Table 4.4: The composition of the PPPP corpus, adapted from Sealey and Pak (2018) 
 
The written text part of the corpus, which is of a similar proportion to that of the BNC, 
comprises texts taken from the time frame 1995-2015. Almost two-thirds of this data 
comes from journal article texts due to their size and availability and the opportunistic 
approach taken to data collection. Potentially relevant journal articles were identified by 
searching within a corpus of 10,000 articles from 50 Elsevier journals for the presence of 
any of the ‘animal’ terms on the ‘master list’ drawn up by the PPPP researchers, and the 
results were checked manually for false hits (see Sealey and Pak (2018) for full details). 
This provided an extra 5.6 million words of relevant linguistic data from sources that were 
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not necessarily ‘animal-related’ (simply mentioned an animal somewhere in the text), 
which was important methodologically, but it also created a significant imbalance of 
genres in the corpus and this is taken into consideration in the analysis. Other sources of 
written data – the broadcasts, campaign literature and legislation, for instance – were more 
obviously animal-related, and they represent a range of attitudes to animals (e.g. as food, 
as property, as an oppressed and exploited group) as expressed in written English.  
The spoken text part of the corpus consists of elicited responses – as opposed to 
spontaneous conversation – on topics related to animals (though the ‘broadcast’ text type, 
in the written text part of the corpus, is another source of spoken language data in the 
form of transcripts). Seventeen metadiscursive interviews were carried out with producers 
of animal-related texts, such as broadcasters, academics, animal industry representatives, 
and high-ranking members of different organisations, including animal rights charities, 
pro- and anti-hunting groups, and societies involved in public engagement. Reflective 
focus group sessions were also conducted with respondents belonging to nine pre-defined 
categories, each category involving two focus group sessions of two hours each: 
participants aged 18-23, participants aged 60 and above, farmers, butchers, people with 
experience of hunting or fishing, people in support of animal rights, people (other than 
farmers) who work with animals, vegans, and people working in animal research.  
In both the interviews and the focus groups, the aim was to elicit participants’ views on 
communication strategies and use of language, and the questions reflected this research 
priority. Questions posed in the interviews ranged from “What does your role entail in 
terms of communicating about animals?” and “Do you have any guidelines relating to 
communication around animals?” to “Why do you use [term] instead of [term]?” and 
“Can you say a bit more about anthropomorphic language?”. In some cases, these 
questions prompted a discussion around the control of language, in a professional 
capacity, and in other cases they sought to uncover motivations and personal feelings 
towards certain language. In the focus groups, short stimulus texts29 were provided by the 
researchers in the first of the two sessions, along with questions about particular words 
and phrases that featured in those texts. In some of the focus groups, such as for those 
working with animals, or those who abstain from the eating of animals, these included 
both texts that supported and opposed what the participants of the focus groups were 
 
29 See Appendix F for examples of these stimulus texts, reproduced with the permission of the PPPP project 
team. 
88 
doing for a living or how they lived their lives, and these stimulus texts were also used in 
some of the interviews, depending on their relevance. In the second focus group sessions, 
participants were asked to bring brief instances of relevant language use that they found 
to be of interest, and these were used as stimulus texts. 
The fact that these discussions were elicited and were themed around animals and animal-
related discourse, sometimes via stimulus texts, means that some of the language is 
overtly metalinguistic and there are inevitably some cases where, in the absence of the 
stimuli used in the discussion, the transcript lacks sufficient context for the corpus analyst. 
These are rare instances, however, and represent a very minor issue with the spoken data 
which is otherwise a valuable source of insight on a broad spectrum of attitudes to 
animals. 
The PPPP corpus was POS-tagged using Anthony’s (2015) TagAnt software, built on the 
TreeTagger (Schmid, 1995), whose accuracy is reported to be between 95 and 98% 
(Giesbrecht and Evert, 2009). To meet their research needs, the creators of the corpus also 
opted to tag the corpus for the ‘animal’ terms from their ‘master list’ (see Sealey and Pak 
(2018) for details). This research does not make use of these ‘animal’ tags, useful though 
they are for other analytical purposes.  
The suitability of the PPPP corpus to this project is clear, and I was fortunate to be given 
access to it. Even taking into consideration the limitations of this corpus – its relatively 
small size, the imbalance of subcorpora and the elicited nature of the spoken data – it is 
nonetheless an ideal sample of contemporary British English representing animal-related 
discourse across a number of genres and from a diverse range of perspectives. 
 
4.2.2 Identification and selection of terms 
 
4.2.2.1 Why verbs? 
 
This study is limited to the analysis of verbs, or more accurately, predicators. There are 
several reasons for this: i) the exclusion of nouns and adjectives (including predicative 
adjectives) helps to narrow the research focus, which is otherwise in danger of becoming 
too broad and unsystematic; ii) verbs (predicators) act as the pivot of a clause, and so a 
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verb analysis will simultaneously uncover the arguments (subjects and objects; agents 
and patients) entailed by different verb senses; and iii) the analysis of verbs is proven to 
be an ideal application for CPA, as seen in the Pattern Dictionary of English Verbs 
(PDEV), and one of the main aims of this project is to determine whether CPA-derived 
entries can form a suitable basis for discourse analysis. Of course, with each of these 
justifications come potential challenges or rebuttals: i) that the exclusion of e.g. modifiers 
and nominalisations will undoubtedly exclude some of the more interesting or 
controversial ‘killing’ constructions; ii) that this approach assumes a conventional 
argument structure, and does not easily accommodate more unusual constructions; and 
iii) that lexicography has very different aims from (critical) discourse analysis. In 
response to these hypothetical criticisms, I would argue that this research aims to arrive 
at the interesting and the unusual via the typical, since we cannot say with certainty what 
is abnormal without first establishing a norm; and that a corpus-lexicographical discourse 
analysis is one which places a central emphasis on (evidence of) meaning and is therefore 
a defensible approach to analysing language in use.   
 
4.2.2.2 Census of ‘killing’ terms 
 
Prior to analysis, it was necessary to draw up a list of ‘killing’ verbs, and so I undertook 
a census of ‘killing’ terms. (Note that I use ‘terms’ and ‘verbs’ interchangeably in the 
context of this analysis.) As this study is concerned with British English, the census 
involved the use of a range of English language resources and an investigation of the 
terms using the BNC. 
In order to gather as many potential ‘killing’ terms as possible, and to establish which 
terms are consistently listed in popular lexicons, twenty lexical resources were consulted 
and a list of their ‘killing’ terms compiled. These included twelve ‘ordinary’ thesauri 
(some physical and some electronic, so as to keep the list up-to-date); six dictionaries of 
slang and euphemism, given the tendency of ‘killing’ language to be euphemistic (see 
Chapter 3); the concept-orientated WordNet; and Levin’s (1993) verb classes, discussed 




Source Citation Terms 
The Oxford Thesaurus  Urdang (1991) 78 
Oxford Dictionaries Thesaurus [online]  Oxford Dictionaries (2018) 43 
Collins Thesaurus [online]  Collins Dictionary (2018) 63 
Thesaurus.com [online]  Dictionary.com (2018) 106 
Bloomsbury Thesaurus F. Alexander (1997) 125 
Longman Synonym Dictionary  Urdang (1986) 109 
Roget's Thesaurus [online]  Roget.org (1999)30 27 





The Nuttall Dictionary of English Synonyms 
and Antonyms  
Elgie Christ (1943) 15 
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms  Merriam Webster (1973) 13 
The Macmillan Dictionary of Synonyms and 
Antonyms  
Urdang and Manser (1995) 11 
Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and 
Phrases  
Dutch (1962) 104 
Kind Words: a Thesaurus of Euphemisms  Neaman and Silver (1990) 17 
The Faber Dictionary of Euphemisms  Holder (1989) 99 
The Oxford Dictionary of Slang  Ayto (1998) 43 
The Wordsworth Thesaurus of Slang  Lewin and Lewin (1995) 90 
Stone the Crows: Oxford Dictionary of 
Modern Slang  
Ayto and Simpson (2008) 39 
Dictionary of Contemporary Slang  Thorne (2007) 35 
Beth Levin's Verb Classes: murder, poison, 
destroy 
Levin (1993) 33 
WordNet [online] Princeton University (2018) 70 
Unique ‘killing’ terms, after vetting 370 
 
Table 4.5: Resources used and number of terms extracted from each lexicon consulted 
 
For the first twelve resources, the term kill was located first and then its synonyms noted. 
Those synonyms which also had their own entries were then investigated and, where 
pertinent, their related lexical items were also recorded. As the terms moved gradually 
further away from killing, and more towards related concepts such as destruction, 
termination and elimination, lexical items were selected more cautiously, but with an 
open mind. Some were later found to fall outside of the semantic field of killing, and these 
were removed from the final inventory of terms; the original total of 420 lexical items 
was thus reduced to 370, as described below. The full, final list of terms is given in 
Appendix A. 
 
30 Roget.org is an online, hyperlinked version of the 1911 edition of Roget’s Thesaurus. The print version 
consulted is the 1962 edition which was the result of several major revisions and provides different terms. 
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For the six slang and euphemism dictionaries, the procedure depended on the format of 
the resource; in some cases, the terms were grouped conceptually, i.e. under the theme of 
‘killing’, while in other cases the euphemisms themselves formed the headwords of the 
dictionary, in which case it was necessary to manually find and compile all terms which 
denoted killing. This was an iterative process which involved cross-checking across all 
of the six dictionaries. 
WordNet, much like the traditional thesauri, provided synonyms of kill, but these are 
arranged into senses which made selection easier. Its ‘killing’ terms were noted in the 
same way as for the other resources. Finally, Levin’s (1993) inventory of verbs was 
consulted. From all of its conceptual categories, three were considered to be useful: 
‘murder’ verbs (class 42.1), ‘poison’ verbs (42.2), and ‘destroy’ verbs (44). All of the 
items in these categories were added to the list. 
Each verb was then checked for meaning to confirm that it was in fact a ‘killing’ term, 
including etymological investigations into each term. It was with this final step – and the 
cleaning of the data, including removing typos and standardising spelling variations – that 
the list of terms was reduced from 420 to 370. It should be noted that while spelling 
conventions were altered to avoid duplicates (e.g. despatch to dispatch, life-blood to 
lifeblood), phraseology was preserved (e.g. make an end of and make an end to were kept 
as distinct entries).  
 
4.2.2.3 Corpus evidence 
 
From the 370 ‘killing’ terms found, it was necessary to define a smaller set of salient 
terms for further investigation. In order to filter out terms that are not so strongly 
associated with killing (or at least are not widely agreed upon as being associated with 
killing), only those that featured in seven or more of the resources consulted were chosen 
for corpus examination. This resulted in the 48 terms listed in Table 4.6, the most 
‘popular’ being bump off and kill, present in fourteen of the twenty resources consulted. 
It became apparent at this point that euthanise (or euthanize, or euthanase) did not appear 




Table 4.6: The 48 most ‘popular’ terms 
 
Each of the terms was searched for in a POS-tagged version of the BNC via CQPweb31, 
specifying verb-only hits, and in the case of separable verbs (such as bump off) queries 
were formulated which could accommodate up to three words in between (as in bumped 
the old Pope off). A random sample of 100 lines – or as many as were available, if fewer 
than 100 – was then manually examined for relevant ‘killing’ senses of the verbs. If no 
‘killing’ senses were found in the first 100 lines, another 100 lines were added to the 
sample, and repeated if necessary up to 500 lines. The number of ‘killing’ senses was 
then divided by the sample size and multiplied by the total number of hits in the corpus. 
This provided a very rough estimate of how frequently each term features as a ‘killing’ 
term in the BNC, and can be referred to as a ‘salience’ score. Finally, this figure was 
multiplied by the number of sources in which the term could be found originally, forming 
an overall score which incorporates the ‘popularity’ of a term (the number of lexicons in 
which it features as a ‘killing’ term) as well as its salience as a ‘killing’ verb (roughly 
 
31 https://cqpweb.lancs.ac.uk/bncxmlweb/  
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how often it features in the corpus as a ‘killing’ term). Table 4.7, in Section 4.2.2.4, gives 




It was surprising to find that euthanise (or euthanize, or euthanase) did not appear once 
across any of the thesauri and lexicons. It can be found in dictionaries, including 
etymology dictionaries, but it does not appear to occur as a synonym of, or term related 
to, killing. Etymonline32 claims that euthanize was in use as early as 1915 in American 
English, and this is corroborated by Google’s Ngram Viewer33. A search for euthanize, 
euthanise and euthanase in British English books on Google Ngram Viewer shows that 
all three came into use in the late 1960s, and have steadily grown in frequency over time, 
as shown in Figure 4.1. They are still very low-frequency terms; in 2008 euthanize and 
its spelling variants (i.e. euthanize, euthanise and euthanase) appeared 0.018 times per 
million words in Google’s British English books, making it comparable in frequency with 
terms such as strangulate and cannibalise. Lemma forms of euthanise, euthanize and 
euthanase occur collectively 0.40 times per million words in the British English 
subcorpus of enTenTen1334, though it is not possible to know the time period for these 
usages as enTenTen’s texts are derived from the Web and do not include time metadata. 




32 http://etymonline.com/index.php  
33 http://books.google.com/ngrams  




Fig. 4.1: the use of euthanize (in red), euthanase (in green) and euthanise (in blue) in British English 
books, 1960-2008, according to Google Ngram Viewer 
 
Several of the thesauri consulted for ‘killing’ terms are from the 1980s and 1990s, which 
could explain why euthanise/euthanize/euthanase was not found in those books. The 
online dictionaries, however, should be more up-to-date. It is difficult to speculate as to 
why euthanise/euthanize/euthanase appears as headwords of dictionary entries, but is not 
synonymically linked to kill; perhaps it suggests that euthanasia is not typically 
conceptualised as a true act of killing, and it could be due in part to low usage and lack 
of (corpus) evidence. However, what can be concluded with certainty is that dictionaries 
and thesauri are not necessarily reliable resources for investigating language usage, and 
are at best a basic – though useful – starting point. 
 
4.2.2.4 Identification of more ‘killing’ terms 
 
Due to the fact that they were derived from human-compiled lexicons, the terms found so 
far were overwhelmingly anthropocentric; that is, with the exception of a few, they tended 
to be terms used for humans rather than for nonhumans. A second issue is that, although 
thesauri serve as a good starting point, their selections of entries are typically subjective 
rather than being empirically founded, and, as illustrated by the absence of euthanise†, 
are not necessarily reliable. For this reason, the PPPP corpus was taken as a source of 
data for more ‘killing’ terms, this time with a focus on animal-related terms.  
Informed by the observation that ‘killing’ terms are very often used in the passive voice 
– a finding corroborated by the literature on discourses of violence (e.g. Bolinger, 1980; 
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Henley et al., 1995; Trew, 1979; see Chapter 3) – a regular expression search was used 
to retrieve as many passive constructions as possible from a POS-tagged version of the 
PPPP corpus. This led to 186,148 hits, consisting of 2,871 unique past participles. These 
verbs were then manually examined and those pertinent to killing were identified, in some 
cases by checking their usage in the corpus. From the 2,871 verbs, 105 were found to 
refer to killing.  
Similar to the previous investigation into ‘killing’ terms, each of the verbs was searched 
for within the POS-tagged PPPP corpus. Random samples of 100 lines were taken – or as 
many lines as were available, if fewer than 100 – and manually checked for ‘killing’ 
senses. In some cases, this led to the original, single-word verb entry becoming a 
multiword expression (e.g. ‘kick’ becoming ‘kick to death’), or single-word entries 
representing more than one ‘killing’ term (e.g. ‘do’ representing ‘do the killing’, ‘do the 
shooting’ and ‘do pest control’, amongst others).  
As before, a metric was used for ranking the verbs in descending order of their potential 
relevance to the project. The number of ‘killing’ instances identified was divided by the 
sample size and multiplied by the number of hits for that term within the PPPP corpus, 
giving a rough idea of how many times it occurs in a ‘killing’ sense within the corpus. As 
there were no dictionaries or thesauri consulted for these animal-orientated killing terms, 
there was not a ‘popularity’ score by which this figure could be multiplied. This figure 
therefore constituted the final score. Table 4.7, below, gives the highest-ranking and 
therefore potentially most salient ‘killing’ terms as found by consulting lexicons and then 
searching in the BNC (on the left-hand side), and as found by manually identifying 
‘killing’ terms within the PPPP corpus (on the right-hand side). Raw frequencies are 
given, along with normalised frequencies (per million words). Italics denote terms that 
appear on both sides of the table.  
To reiterate, for the sake of clarity: the two rankings on each side of the table were 
calculated in slightly different ways due to the lack of dictionary evidence for the ‘animal’ 
terms. The left-hand side represents the ‘killing’ terms identified via the census of 
lexicons, top-sliced by number of resources in which they feature (minimum of seven) 
and this number multiplied by the ‘salience’ score described in Section 4.2.2.3 (the 
proportion of a random BNC sample in which the term features in a ‘killing’ sense, 
multiplied by the number of hits in the whole corpus for that term). The scores informing 
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the ranking of the right-hand side of the table is simply the ‘salience’ score for that term, 
except the figures are derived from the PPPP corpus rather than the BNC. 
 
 
Table 4.7: The highest-ranking ‘killing’ terms according to the census of lexicons, investigated using the 
BNC (left); and the highest-ranking terms according to the manual identification of ‘killing’ verbs within 
the PPPP corpus (right). All hits are those POS-tagged as verbs, and the normalised frequencies are per 
million words. †‘euthanise’ stands for all spelling forms. 
 
Due to the nature of the data sources – one being subjective, human-compiled lexicons of 
‘killing’ terms and one being a database of natural language on the theme of animals – it 
could be argued that the two columns of terms in Table 4.7 roughly correspond to ‘human’ 
terms on the left and ‘animal’ terms on the right, though it is of course more complicated 
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than that. Destroy, for example – when used to denote killing – refers only to the killing 
of animals in both corpora, as does put to sleep, and both sides feature terms (in italics) 
which apply to both humans and animals.  
Of these high-ranking terms, a much smaller number was selected for analysis. Fifteen 
terms were chosen so as to represent each of the high, medium and low ranks (in terms 
of the items in Table 4.7), i.e. five were taken from the top of the table, five from the 
middle, and five from the bottom. Terms were also considered in terms of their relevance 
to the literature, as well as other factors, such as the unexpected absence of euthanise 
from thesaurus entries. An equal number of terms was selected from each of the different 
categories, thus placing roughly equal emphasis on ‘human’ terms, ‘animal’ terms, and 
terms used for both humans and animals (denoted by italics in Table 4.7). The ‘high’ 
terms chosen are kill, murder, slaughter, assassinate and cull. The ‘medium’ terms are 
sacrifice, put down, wipe out, exterminate and destroy. The ‘low’ terms are dispatch, put 
to sleep, butcher, harvest and euthanise. Reasons for not selecting terms from outside this 
table are that: i) the ranking is taken as an imperfect but nonetheless empirically 
defensible approach to salient term selection, something not demonstrated by previous 
studies of ‘killing’ language; and ii) with around 9 million words the PPPP corpus is not 
especially large, so it is important to select higher-frequency terms for which there is 
likely to be sufficient evidence in the corpus. Given that some terms are chosen precisely 
due to the fact that they rank highly for ‘humans’ (left) and not for ‘animals’ (right), and 
vice versa, there will inevitably be some terms for which there is substantial evidence in 
one corpus but not necessarily in the other.  
 
4.3 Method of Data Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Doing Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the main application of CPA is currently in (computational) 
lexicography. It can be used to produce data-driven inventories of patterns associated with 
words – notably verbs, as in the Pattern Dictionary of English Verbs (PDEV) – and to 
illustrate the ways in which we use words to make meanings. CPA therefore lends itself 
to lexicographical endeavours, and as explored in this thesis, such a lexicographical 
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approach might be extended to other empirical investigations into language and meaning, 
such as corpus-assisted (critical) discourse analysis. As previously mentioned, I was 
employed as an annotator on the PDEV project and trained, in a lexicographic context, in 
the CPA technique.  
As also explained above, CPA has been shown to be effective for identifying typical 
language patterns and using these to distinguish norms from exploitations. One of the 
main aims of this project is to take CPA a step further: to test its effectiveness for 
discourse analysis by critically examining the significance of the patterns it uncovers, the 
boundaries of those patterns, and how the patterns feature across domains, genres and 
speakers. The standard CPA procedure is described below, with specific reference to the 
PDEV project, followed by an explanation of the proposed application of CPA to a 
corpus-lexicographical discourse analysis. 
 
4.3.1.1 CPA for lexicography 
 
CPA is geared towards lexicography, and, as explained in Chapter 3, it follows in the 
traditions of previous corpus-based lexicographical projects, such as the COBUILD 
dictionaries (Sinclair, 1987) and the Hector project (Atkins, 1993). Doing lexicography 
specifically with CPA involves the following steps: 
 
1. Taking a random sample of concordance lines for a node word, starting with 250 
and adding more later if necessary (see Step 4). In the interests of producing 
generalisable results, a large, general-language corpus is used as a source of data. 
2. Manually grouping lines together based on their shared syntagmatic properties; 
this involves identifying norms, or (proto)typical phraseologies, and deciding 
which concordance lines are likely to be exploitations. Establishing such patterns 
is by no means simple, and “calls for a great deal of lexicographic art”, especially 
when deciding on the appropriate level of generalisation (Hanks, 2004: 88). 
3. Sorting these grouped lines into patterns by tagging each line with a pattern 
number (and ‘lumping’ or ‘splitting’ these groups according to the judgement of 
the lexicographer), and then writing up the patterns and their implicatures. 
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4. Assessing the number of patterns. If more than twelve patterns are found during 
the analysis, it is recommended that the sample size is doubled and the tagging 
process repeated (Hanks, 2013: 95). 
 
CPA as used in the PDEV 
 
Figures 4.2 to 4.5, below, are used to illustrate the implementation of CPA in the creation 
of the PDEV, taking as an example a less emotive verb than those that are the main focus 
of this study, namely drink. 
Due to the nature of the data sources – one being subjective, human-compiled lexicons of 
‘killing’ terms and one being a database of natural language on the theme of animals – it 
could be argued that the two columns of terms in Table 4.7 roughly correspond to ‘human’ 
terms on the left and ‘animal’ terms on the right, though it is of course more complicated 
than that. Destroy, for example – when used to denote killing – refers only to the killing 
of animals in both corpora, as does put to sleep, and both sides feature terms (in italics) 
which apply to both humans and animals.  
 




Verbs analysed for the purposes of the PDEV are annotated using a modified version of 
the Sketch Engine35, shown in Fig. 4.2. Lines can be sorted by left and right contexts, 
node, file name and pattern number. Numbers are assigned using a drop-down menu box 
on the right-hand side of the node and multiple lines can be tagged in batches. This helps 
to streamline the sorting and tagging process, and for a straightforward verb with just one 
or two senses, the identification and labelling of syntagmatic patterns can take as little as 
half an hour. More complex verbs, especially those which require multiple extensions to 
the sample size due to a high number of patterns, can take several days or weeks to 
complete. Fig. 4.3 gives examples of tagged concordances for drink, this time zoomed in 
and demonstrating some non-standard notation: .a refers to an anomalous pattern 
realisation, .f is used for figurative instances, and .s (not shown here) for cases with 
unusual syntax, e.g. an elided object. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3: More concordance lines for the verb drink within the CPA tagging environment, showing 
examples of anomalous (.a) and figurative (.f) pattern tags 
 
35 https://the.sketchengine.co.uk  
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Looking at the lines in Figure 4.3, we can see that the typical arguments governed by 
drink in the sense of Pattern 1 are humans in the subject slot and beverages of various 
kinds in the object slot, making the construction, and they all drink shampoo – nearly 
every night an anomalous example of Pattern 1, hence being tagged with the label 1.a. 
The line directly below it, Glasgow’s first lightning conductor drank the power of 
creation, is also unusual, but it is clearly a figurative use of language and therefore is 
labelled 1.f and not 1.a. The line marked 2.a, in which a male camel drinks a female 
camel’s urine, is another anomalous example, this time of Pattern 2, which involves an 
animal in the subject slot and water in the object slot (see Fig. 4.4). All of the lines tagged 
with .a are examples of exploitations as introduced in Chapter 3.  
Once all lines have been sorted and tagged, their pattern information can be written up 
into a lexicographical entry (see Fig. 4.4). This includes the pattern structure – the verb 
and its typical arguments for that pattern, represented by semantic types (STs) selected 
from the CPA Ontology – as well as the implicature entailed by the pattern. This usually 
involves some anchoring of the implicature to the pattern itself via their shared STs, 
though this is not always the case. Every pattern will have a primary implicature, and 
some will even have a secondary implicature, as is the case for Pattern 3 in Fig. 4.4. This 
allows the lexicographer to record extra information or nuance that they feel is important 
to include in the dictionary entry. Orthographic conventions denote different features of 
patterns: double square brackets signify a semantic type; an equals sign converts a 
semantic type to a semantic role; round brackets imply optionality; curly brackets specify 
a fixed word or phrase; and pipes are used to separate alternative elements. It is also 
possible to mark instances that are phrasal verbs (as in pv on Pattern 4) and those that 




Fig. 4.4: The non-public-facing PDEV entry for the verb drink, with pattern structures (in black), primary 
implicatures (in green), and – in one case – a secondary implicature (in grey). 
 
The public-facing version of the PDEV is simplified for the end user. It also includes 
example sentences for each pattern (see Fig. 4.5). The percentages of the most prominent 




Fig. 4.5: The public-facing PDEV entry for the verb drink 
 
For the lexicographer, analysis using CPA ends here. Dictionary makers will have little 
to say about the observations that i) humans do not appear to drink in the same way as 
other animals, at least not according to this sample, and ii) out of four senses of the verb 
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drink, three relate solely to the concerns of humans, who account for just one species out 
of several million on the planet, the majority of whom will also have the capacity to drink, 
in some form or other. It is therefore necessary for a critical discourse analyst to take the 
lexicographical entry as an empirically founded basis for further investigation, rather than 
an end point in itself. 
 
4.3.1.2 CPA for discourse analysis 
 
To apply CPA outside of lexicography, the process begins in the same way as outlined 
above: a corpus is identified, a node word is selected for investigation, a random sample 
of concordance lines is taken, and the syntagmatic patterns and their implicatures are 
established through the iterative process of tagging, sorting, lumping and splitting. 
However, CPA-assisted discourse analysis – or corpus-lexicographical discourse 
analysis, as it might be called – differs from CPA in a number of ways: 
 
- The type of corpus. CPA seeks to comment on widespread and typical language 
use, and as such takes a large, general corpus as its main source of data. Discourse 
analysis, on the other hand, is usually more concerned with distinguishing 
characterising features of particular discourses, and might therefore, as in the 
current project, require a more specialised and thematically focused corpus.  
- The goals of the analysis. CPA was specifically designed for lexical analysis, in 
particular for distinguishing ‘normal’ word uses from ‘abnormal’ ones. Discourse 
analysis goes beyond word- and sentence-level language and seeks to draw 
conclusions about certain types of texts, topics and speakers.  
- The focus of the analysis. Typically, CPA is used for analysing verbs, and verbs 
are treated as the focal point of the analysis. A discourse analyst may be interested 
in the participants or themes of a discourse, i.e. the noun phrases (or semantic 
types, in CPA). Discourse analysis using CPA can therefore begin with a verb 
analysis and from there progress to the arguments connected with the verb. 
- The output of the analysis. CPA produces inventories of patterns, as in the case 
of PDEV. For discourse analysis purposes, the analysis needs to be taken further 
so that the output can answer the researcher’s questions relating to participants, 
rhetorical devices, and so on. An inventory of the subjects and objects associated 
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with a pattern, for example, could go some way towards answering the discourse-
related research question at hand. 
- The Ontology. As the PDEV project aimed to comment on general, typical and 
normal language, using the BNC its main source of data, it makes sense that an 
analysis of ‘general’ language which also uses a large and heterogeneous corpus 
such as the BNC should use the Ontology from the PDEV project. For specialised 
corpora and discourses, however, it is necessary to adapt the Ontology to reflect 
the evidence found in the data, or even to create a brand new, data-driven, 
specialised Ontology. 
 
CPA as used in this project 
 
The adapted CPA method, for each verb analysed in this project, is as follows: 
1. Carry out CPA, using the CPA Ontology36, on a random, 250-line (or as many as 
available, if fewer than 250) sample of the BNC. This might already have been 
done as part of the PDEV project, in which case the existing annotation needs to 
be reviewed. If the BNC does not have sufficient data for that term, refer to the 
enTenTen corpus. 
2. Produce a list of patterns and implicatures for that verb, as used in ‘general’ (BNC) 
English. If an entry already exists in PDEV, check these against the supporting 
data and annotation. 
3. Carry out CPA for that verb on a random, 250-line (or as many as available, if 
fewer than 250) sample of the PPPP corpus, noting explicitly the entities that 
commonly feature as Agents and Patients. Then either select suitable semantic 
types to represent these from the CPA Ontology or create new ones to be added 
to the PPPP Killing Ontology. (The samples taken from the PPPP corpus for each 
verb contribute the overall Killing Verb Dataset, the dataset used in this project.) 
4. Produce a provisional list of patterns and implicatures. The patterns from the 
BNC/PDEV project may already be satisfactory, but new patterns may also occur 
in the PPPP data. If they do, take another random sample of 100 lines, if available, 
and annotate them as above. 
 
36 http://pdev.org.uk/#onto  
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5. Finalise the list of PPPP patterns and implicatures. 
6. Compare the patterns and implicatures from the two corpora, along with the more 
specific types of entities which constitute the semantic types. 
7. Once steps 1-6 have been carried out for all verbs and the PPPP Killing Ontology 
is stable, revise all patterns, implicatures and Ontological nodes, and adjust, if 
necessary.  
 
The drawback of opting for a ‘natural’, data-driven and corpus-specific Ontology is that 
it needs to be built and altered gradually over time whilst carrying out CPA on the data. 
The CPA Ontology was therefore used as an initial starting point for the PPPP Killing 
Ontology, as discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.3. 
Taking a lexicographical approach entails a holistic approach to meaning; for verbs such 
as destroy and sacrifice the non-killing-related senses are considered to be just as 
important as the ‘killing’ ones. Their patterns, arguments and other features were 
therefore analysed in the same way as all other instances. 
In standard CPA, such as that of the PDEV, the analyst is not interested in semantic types 
that correspond to thematic roles such as agent and patient, and instead reports the 
semantic types that fill clause role slots, such as subject and object. As this study is 
specifically concerned with killing, and those involved (the killer and those killed), it 
made more sense to annotate Agent and Patient rather than grammatical subject and 
object, given that the subject and object are inverted in a passive construction. 
  
4.3.2 Data annotation 
 
To carry out CPA-assisted discourse analysis on the Killing Verb Dataset (KVD) – the 
totality of all of the ‘killing’ verb concordances sampled from the PPPP corpus – it was 
necessary to find a suitable annotation environment. The adapted Sketch Engine tagging 
platform used for the PDEV was designed for purely lexicographical purposes, and so 
was insufficient for the analysis carried out in this project. I opted instead to use Microsoft 
Excel, due to its availability, intuitive interface and potential to be customised without 
specialist programming knowledge. Concordance results for verbs were generated using 
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AntConc37 by loading the POS-tagged version of the PPPP corpus, setting the 
concordance window as wide as possible, searching for verb-only hits of the term in 
question, and then exporting the results to a .txt file with tabs on either side of the node. 
The .txt file was then loaded in a macro-enabled Microsoft Excel template file (.xltm) 
into which I had built a custom tagging platform; once imported, the concordance data 
was automatically arranged by way of macros under column headers (left context, node, 
right context, filename) along with extra columns for annotating various features of the 
data. The ‘rand()’ function of Excel was used to generate random samples of concordance 
lines, and an ‘=IF’ formula to automatically derive the text type from the filename data. 
The embedding of a macro button in the template made it possible to open, in a separate 
program, the full texts from which concordance lines were taken, and this was crucial in 
determining the meaning in many cases. 
In CPA, concordance lines are only annotated with one piece of information: the pattern 
number. For the purposes of this project, it was necessary to take this annotation further 
and to undertake an exploratory analysis of the potentially relevant features of ‘killing’ 
language which might be able to shed light on the trends, and perhaps even motivations, 
behind different lexical choices. Each concordance line was therefore analysed for the 
features that follow, each of which was recorded in a separate column in the Excel 





CPA is the first step of analysis for each verb. Patterns are first established for ‘general’ 
language, i.e. using a sample from the BNC, and these patterns were used as a guide when 
doing CPA on the Killing Verb Dataset (KVD). I should reiterate here that the KVD is 
not treated as a corpus but as a dataset – a set of instances, i.e. concordance lines; see Fig. 
4.6 for an illustration of the data. 
In some cases, general/BNC patterns had already been recorded in the PDEV, and in those 
instances my task was to check over the PDEV concordance and corresponding pattern 
entries and decide whether I agreed with them. Even in the cases where the previous 
 
37 http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/  
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annotator was me, the tagging was problematised and evaluated. Patterns were noted in a 
separate file, and the pattern number recorded under the ‘Pattern’ column. This is also the 
column used for marking ‘noise’, such as meta-linguistic instances (e.g. Instead of 
‘killing' or ‘shooting' or whatever, we'd use ‘culling' or ‘dispatching’), POS-tag errors 
(e.g. chickens are being bred to grow to slaughter weight in less than six weeks), and 
otherwise untaggable instances, such as ungrammatical constructions or concordances 
with missing information (e.g. headers: Part 3 Trading Income / 115 Amount of receipt if 
old animal slaughtered under disease control order). These were marked ‘m’, ‘x’ and 
‘u’, respectively, and excluded from the final data set. Such instances were also excluded 




Given the recognition in the literature of the effect of grammatical voice on the construal 
of events, as discussed in Chapter 3, each instance was marked according to whether it 
was expressed in the active (‘a’) or passive (‘p’) voice.  
 
4.3.2.3 Agent  
 
This research is interested in the discursive representation of participants implicated in 
acts of killing. Under the ‘Agent’ column I therefore recorded the noun phrase in the text 
that referred to the killer, or otherwise the doer of the action, since not all verb instances 
were used in a ‘killing’ sense. I use ‘Agent’ with a capital ‘A’ to signify that I am not 
using ‘agent’ in the traditional sense (i.e. to confer specific qualities such as intention, 
volition and animacy) but in a sense similar to Dowty’s (1991) Proto-Agent and Cruse’s 
(1973) ‘performer of an action’ understanding of agency. ‘Agent’ is therefore the part of 
the text that refers to the entity that ‘performs’ the action; in an active construction, this 
is the grammatical subject, and in a passive construction, the grammatical object. If the 
Agent-referential noun phrase was an anaphoric or cataphoric reference, e.g. ‘he’ or ‘the 
man’, then this was noted, followed by an underscore and the resolved identity of the 
Agent, e.g. ‘he_dog’. If the Agent was elided, typically as a result of a passive 
construction, then the Agent value was recorded as ‘X’ followed by an underscore and 
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resolved identity, e.g. ‘X_slaughterer’. On the rare occasion that the identity could not be 
determined or reasonably inferred, then ‘X_X’ was used. This textual evidence did not 
form a key part of the analysis (CPA deals in semantic types rather than noun phrases, 
explicitly), but was useful when it came to deciding on an appropriate semantic type as 
well as calculating the Referential Distance (below). 
 
4.3.2.4 Agent Referential Distance (ARD) 
 
As established in Chapter 2, the concepts of distance and concealment are highly relevant 
to the topic of killing. Inspired by Givón and colleagues’ (1983) use of referential distance 
to measure topic continuity in discourse (Chapter 3), I opted to record the distance 
between participant references in the text. The Agent Referential Distance (ARD) is the 
number of clause boundaries between the immediate Agent reference and the closest 
sufficiently disambiguating mention of the same Agent, where a clause is considered to 
be a subject and a predicate. As with “Agent”, I use initial-letter capitals to mark this type 
of Referential Distance in contrast with the original. This is only loosely based on Givón’s 
referential distance, which was not interested in how explicit or unambiguous references 
are (ambiguity was handled differently), but in how continuous they are, and so accepted 
potentially ambiguous references, such as pronouns, as referential tokens. In this study, 
only sufficiently disambiguating references are accepted. A coreferential noun phrase is 
‘sufficiently disambiguating’ if it provides enough explicit evidence for the annotator to 
select a semantic type from the Ontology. For example, the phrase the pigs implies the 
semantic type PIG, but the word they does not give enough information for the annotator 
to make a decision. If the identity of the Agent is made explicit in the immediate clause, 
the score is ‘0’ (for Givón, the minimum score was ‘1’ since he was measuring 
continuity). Givón only used ‘lookback’, while I use both ‘lookback’ and ‘lookahead’, so 
the window is five clauses either side of the node. If the distance is greater than the 
maximum of five clauses (for Givón it was 20, both arbitrary cut-off points), or if the 
identity is never revealed and/or world knowledge is required to identify the Agent, it is 
marked ‘NF’ (not found). Below are some examples, with the node in bold, the 
disambiguating Agent reference underlined, clause boundaries marked //, and zero-
anaphors marked Ø: 
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(4.1) A crazed teen held a sick Facebook party just hours after // Ø murdering his 
parents with a hammer. (ARD = 1) 
(4.2) New Zealand and Australia today called for a Japanese whaling fleet // Ø to 
return to port a day after // it set off for the southern ocean whale sanctuary // Ø 
vowing // Ø to slaughter more than 1,000 whales. (ARD = 4) 
(4.3) Around 1.3 billion pigs are slaughtered annually for meat worldwide. (ARD 
= NF) 
Given that slaughtering is typically carried out by slaughterhouse workers, we can assume 
that this is the intended referent in (4.3). However, this isn’t specified in the text and such 
an inference requires world knowledge about industrial animal-killing practices. Since 
the aim of this exercise is to assess the visibility of surface references, examples such as 
this are marked ‘NF’. As shown in (4.2), catenative chains (e.g. vowing to slaughter) were 
not grouped together but broken down into their distinct processes. 
 
4.3.2.5 Agent-ont-1 and Agent-ont-2 
 
For the purposes of creating a hierarchical Ontology similar to that of the CPA Ontology, 
Ontological38 information for the Agent and Patient of each instance was initially 
recorded as two values: ‘ont-1’ and ‘ont-2’. ‘Agent-ont-1’ denotes Ontological 
information for the Agent at the more general level, e.g. HUMAN, ANIMAL, PROCESS, 
INSTITUTION, etc. ‘Agent-ont-2’ provides more specific ontological information, if 
available, e.g. FARMER, DOG, PROCEDURE, GOVERNMENT. In many cases, the 
value is the same for ‘ont-1’ and ‘ont-2’, e.g. simply HUMAN, due to a lack of specific 
or pertinent information. Having the Ontological information at two levels of generality 
made it easier to create the PPPP Killing Ontology (PKO) later, as it provided evidence 
for which nodes tend to belong under which, hierarchically. See 4.3.3 for more on the 
PKO. 
In the line taken as Example 4.3 in the previous section, revisited below in (4.4), the value 
for ‘Agent’ is X_slaughterer, because although the Agent is not mentioned we can infer 
 
38 I continue to differentiate between the philosophical ‘ontology’ and the semantic ‘Ontology’ by way of 
initial-letter capitalisation. 
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(square brackets) that the killing is carried out by professional slaughterers and not by 
just any humans. The value for ‘Agent-ont-1’ is the general semantic type of HUMAN 
and the value for ‘Agent-ont-2’ is the more specific semantic type of SLAUGHTERER: 
(4.4) Around 1.3 billion pigs are slaughtered annually [by slaughterers] for meat 
worldwide. 
In (4.5), the value for ‘Agent’ is a cyanide spill, the value for ‘Agent-ont-1’ is 
EVENTUALITY, and the value for ‘Agent-ont-2’ is EVENT: 
(4.5) A CYANIDE spill has wiped out wildlife in a tributary of the Danube. 
As described in Section 4.3.3, all nodes in the Ontology are recorded in the singular. 
Whether the Agent or Patient is encoded as singular or plural is recorded elsewhere: in 
the ‘number’ columns. 
 
4.3.2.6 Agent Number (AN) 
 
Informed by findings in the literature suggesting that violence is legitimised using 
deindividuating language (Chapter 3), and in order to gather more information on number 
and individuation in the data, the Agent Number (AN) was recorded. Plural instances 
were marked ‘Pl’; collective noun phrases (e.g. family, species) were marked ‘Col’; and 
singular/individual references were denoted with ‘In’. The value ‘MN’ was used for non-
count, mass nouns (e.g. money, sugar) and ‘NS’ for ‘not specified’, i.e. cases where the 




As with the Agent, the part of the text referring to the Patient (or killed, or otherwise 
affected entity), was noted. Again, I use a capital ‘P’ to denote a looser understanding of 
patienthood than is formalised in most of the thematic role literature. The ‘Patient’ here 
is simply the ‘done-to’, the affected party, the Proto-Patient (Dowty, 1991). In an active 
construction, this is the grammatical object, and in a passive construction, this is the 
grammatical subject. If the Patient-referential noun phrase was an anaphoric or cataphoric 
reference, e.g. ‘her’ or ‘it’, then this was recorded, followed by an underscore and the 
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resolved identity of the Patient. If the Patient was elided, e.g. in an active construction 
without an object, then the value for ‘Patient’ would be an ‘X’ followed by an underscore 
and the resolved Patient identity. If the identity could not be determined or reasonably 
inferred, it was marked ‘X_X’, as in the example below. The PPPP Killing Ontology 
features a ‘semantic type’ (not a true ST, rather an Ontological node that can be selected 
by the analyst) of ‘X’ for such cases. 
(4.6) Well, all animals, like, the ones that kill, they kill to eat, don't they 
It might be argued that the elided Patient in (4.6) can be inferred, from our world 
knowledge, to be ANIMAL, given that many animals kill other animals to eat them. But 
to do so would be to impose a specificity that is not present in the text and is not invoked 
by the intrinsic semantic properties of the verb kill. This is different from slaughter, which 
denotes a very specific type of killing event in certain contexts. 
 
4.3.2.8 Patient Referential Distance (PRD) 
 
As with ARD, the Patient Referential Distance (PRD) is the number of clause boundaries 
(a clause is considered a subject and predicate) between the immediate Patient reference 
and the closest sufficiently disambiguating mention of the same Patient. Some examples 
are given below, disambiguating Patient references underlined, node in bold, and zero 
anaphors marked Ø. 
(4.7) They thought // the bird was a witch // and Ø had summoned the tempest // so 
they killed it. (PRD = 2) 
(4.8) Both Arctic Foxes and Red Foxes are murdered by anal electrocution.  
(PRD = 0) 
(4.9) wonderful, got deer, // but after a while, they started // Ø eating the trees // 





4.3.2.9 Patient-ont-1 and Patient-ont-2 
 
The values for Patient-ont-1 and Patient-ont-2 follow the same premise as those for 
Agent-ont-1 and Agent-ont-2. 
In (4.10), the value for ‘Patient’ is as many immune cells as possible, the value for 
‘Patient-ont-1’ is the general ST of PHYSICAL OBJECT and the value for ‘Patient-ont-
2’ is the more specific ST of CELL: 
(4.10) Thus it would be of great benefit for pathogens to infect and kill as many 
immune cells as possible for a successful infection. 
 
4.3.2.10 Patient Number (PN) 
 
As with Agent Number (AN), the Patient Number (PN) was a means of recording the 
relationship between expressions of Patient individuation and other factors in the 
construal of ‘killing’ events. The same values, ‘Pl’ (plural, countable), ‘Col’ (collective), 




Intuitively, and from literature such as that reviewed in Chapter 2, we know that the fate 
of animals in human society depends heavily on the context in which they exist or into 
which they are placed by humans, as opposed to their inherent properties. For this reason, 
I decided to record a value for ‘Context’. This meant that, along with the Ontological 
information denoting the type of animal (or human, or other entity), there would also be 
some information on the setting, place or purpose of the event against which to triangulate 
linguistic data on acts of killing. Context, with a capital “C”, is therefore a rough 
indication of the material circumstances in which the killing takes place, and is closely 
linked to the place of the killing. The various Contexts were built up gradually during the 
course of the annotation and refined into the following list: 
• ‘Lab’, for killing that takes place for scientific purposes, e.g. of animal test 
subjects;  
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• ‘Animal industry’, for the killing of animals for their flesh, fur and other 
commodities;  
• ‘Farming’, for killing that takes place in arable farm settings, e.g. of ‘pests’ that 
pose a threat to crops; 
• ‘Entertainment’, for instances involving animals used for entertainment purposes, 
such as animals whose roles as entertainers have come to an end;  
• ‘Work’ for animals used as workers, e.g. dogs used by the Police; 
• ‘Wild’, for killing that takes place in a ‘wild’ environment as opposed to a 
controlled one;  
• ‘Domestic’, for the killing of a pet or, rarely, killing that takes place in the home;  
• ‘War’, for the killing of humans and animals as a direct result of war; and  
• ‘General’, for events that do not happen in any one particular context, or happen 
in multiple contexts at once. This category also serves as a sort of catch-all bin for 
ill-fitting instances, especially those which do not refer to killing. 
Evidence for the Context might be derived in part from the text type (e.g. a scientific 
journal article might suggest that the context is ‘lab’); the actors involved (e.g. if the killer 
is a hunter then the context is likely to be ‘wild’); the verb itself (the verb slaughter might 
invoke the context ‘animal industries’ while the verb put to sleep might lend itself to 
‘domestic’); and any extra information inferable from the text.  
Deciding how to classify the Context was not always straightforward. In difficult cases, 
the following criteria were used as deciding factors in the order given below: 
Place > purpose (of killing) > circumstances (of living) > source / text type 
For example, in the case of a hunter killing an animal in the wild for entertainment, the 
place will take precedence over the purpose of killing, resulting in the context of ‘wild’ 
and not ‘entertainment'. Where the place of killing is not mentioned and the source is e.g. 
a journal article, but the purpose and circumstances point to, e.g. animal agriculture, rather 
than animal experimentation, then these factors will take precedence over the source, in 






A ‘notes’ column at the end of the annotation was used for recording any thoughts, 
questions and observations on the data, including possible new additions or other 
amendments to the Ontology. 
Fig. 4.6 shows a screenshot of the full annotation platform with a sample of the 
annotation. The values that were populated automatically and did not require manual 































4.3.3 The Ontology 
 
The Ontology developed in this project, the PPPP Killing Ontology (PKO), is based on 
the CPA Ontology (CPAO), which was developed during the course of the DVC project39, 
referred to elsewhere as the ‘PDEV project’. The CPA Ontology40, introduced in Chapter 
3, is a shallow ontology of 254 nodes, each one a semantic type (ST) which represents a 
logical construct to which the members of a lexical set are linked, e.g. the type 
[[Beverage]] to which the arguments a cup of tea, a pint, some water, etc., are linked. 
(Note that I use double square brackets to denote STs from the CPAO and italicised, 
upper-case text to denote STs from the PKO.) Although it is a widely applicable Ontology 
of ‘general’ English, based on BNC data, the CPAO is still corpus-specific and is 
therefore not necessarily appropriate for use on more thematic language data. For this 
reason, it was used as an initial starting point in this project and was gradually altered and 
adapted to fit the data until a new Ontology, the PKO, was established. Like the CPAO, 
it is ‘faithful’ to the data upon which it is based, in this case the Killing Verb Dataset 
derived from the PPPP corpus. 
  
4.3.3.1 The CPA Ontology 
 
The CPA Ontology is organised hierarchically into ten levels, with [[Anything]] and 
[[Not Connected]] the nodes at the highest level, and then [[Entity]], [[Eventuality]], 
[[Group]], [[Part]] and [[Property]] at the next level, and so on. The CPAO is illustrated, 
fully expanded, in Fig. 4.7. Due to space limitations, the CPAO has been arranged into 
four columns, each one continuing from the previous one. The first three levels of the 
Ontology are emboldened for emphasis and are formatted as follows: FIRST LEVEL, 







4.3.3.2 The PPPP Killing Ontology 
 
The PPPP Killing Ontology (PKO) is very similar to the CPAO, but differs in a few ways: 
• It is more specific than the CPAO, to the effect that many of the entities that would 
normally be encoded in PDEV entries as semantic roles, e.g. [[Human = 
Butcher]], are readily available in the PKO as semantic types, e.g. BUTCHER; 
• It is visibly more animal-orientated and less concerned with human affairs than 
the CPAO; 
• It is flatter and shallower than the CPAO, with just six levels rather than ten. 
The PKO is identical in size, with 254 nodes (including X, for recording ‘no Agent’ or 
‘no Patient’) and OTHER, for the rare (n=22, 0.7% of all arguments) or anomalous cases 
of unclassifiable or ungeneralisable arguments, e.g. the noun phrase Overfishing, natural 
mortality and weather conditions (a combination of an ACTIVITY, an ABSTRACT 
ENTITY and a STATE OF AFFAIRS). As with the CPAO, all nodes are recorded in the 
Ontology in the singular. There are similar high-level nodes, such as ANYTHING, 
ENTITY, and EVENTUALITY, and they feature in a similar order. The PKO is presented 




Fig. 4.7: The fully-expanded CPA Ontology, adapted from http://pdev.org.uk/#onto 
 
 
ANYTHING    
 | ENTITY  |  |  |  | Fish   
 |  | Abstract Entity  |  |  |  | Insect  |  |  |  |  |  | Land  
 |  |  | Concept  |  |  |  | Snake  |  |  |  |  | Route  |  |  |  | Wave 
 |  |  |  | Proposition  |  |  |  | Spider  |  |  |  |  |  | Waterway  |  | State of Affairs 
 |  |  |  |  | Narrative  |  |  | Inanimate  |  |  |  |  | Aperture  |  |  | System 
 |  |  |  | Rule  |  |  |  | Artifact  |  |  |  |  | Area  |  |  |  | Currency 
 |  |  |  |  | Permission  |  |  |  |  | Artwork  |  |  |  | Stuff  |  |  | Illness 
 |  |  |  | Dispute  |  |  |  |  |  | Movie  |  |  |  |  | Fluid  |  |  | Relationship 
 |  |  |  | Information  |  |  |  |  |  | Picture  |  |  |  |  |  | Liquid  |  |  | Temperature 
 |  |  | Information Source  |  |  |  |  | Beverage  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Beverage  | GROUP 
 |  |  |  | Document  |  |  |  |  |  | Alcoholic Drink  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Alcoholic Drink |  | Human Group 
 |  |  |  |  | Agreement  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Wine  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Wine  |  |  | Institution 
 |  |  |  | Language  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Water  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Water  |  |  |  | Business Enterprise 
 |  |  |  |  | Number  |  |  |  |  | Building  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Water  |  |  |  | Self 
 |  |  |  | Broadcast  |  |  |  |  |  | Cinema  |  |  |  |  |  | Vapour  |  | Vehicle Group 
 |  |  |  | Medium  |  |  |  |  |  | Theater  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Air  |  |  | Water Vehicle Group 
 |  |  |  | Radio Program  |  |  |  |  | Device  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Gas  |  | Animal Group 
 |  |  |  | Recording  |  |  |  |  |  | Software  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Smell  |  | Physical Object Group 
 |  |  |  | TV Program  |  |  |  |  | Document  |  |  |  |  | Solid  | PART 
 |  |  |  | Numerical Value  |  |  |  |  |  | Agreement  |  |  |  |  |  | Material  |  | Language Part 
 |  |  |  |  | Money Value  |  |  |  |  | Food  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Cloth  |  |  | Name 
 |  |  |  |  | Quantity  |  |  |  |  |  | Meat  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Thread  |  |  | Phrase 
 |  |  |  | Psych  |  |  |  |  | Garment  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Glass  |  |  | Word 
 |  |  |  |  | Attitude  |  |  |  |  |  | Footwear  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Metal  |  | Music Part 
 |  |  |  |  | Emotion  |  |  |  |  | Machine  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Wood  |  |  | Chord 
 |  |  |  |  | Goal  |  |  |  |  |  | Vehicle  |  |  |  |  |  | Dust  |  |  | Tone 
 |  |  |  | Resource  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Road Vehicle  |  |  |  |  |  | Soil  |  | Physical Object Part 
 |  |  |  |  | Asset  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Bicycle  |  |  |  |  | Blemish  |  |  | Body 
 |  |  |  |  |  | Deficit  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Car  |  |  |  |  | Structure  |  |  |  | Body Part 
 |  |  |  |  |  | Money  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Motorbike  |  |  |  | Plant  |  |  |  |  | Foot 
 |  |  |  |  |  | Reputation  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Truck  |  |  |  |  | Tree  |  |  |  |  | Hair 
 |  |  |  |  |  | Time Period  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Water Vehicle  |  | Particle  |  |  |  |  | Head 
 |  |  |  | Time Period  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Boat  |  | Self  |  |  |  |  | Limb 
 |  |  |  |  | Vacation  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Ship  | EVENTUALITY  |  |  |  |  | Sense Organ 
 |  |  |  | Obligation  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Plane  |  | Event  |  |  |  | Building Part 
 |  |  |  | Opportunity  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Train  |  |  | Activity  |  |  |  |  | Room 
 |  |  |  | Power  |  |  |  |  |  | Computer  |  |  |  | Action  |  |  |  | Plant Part 
 |  |  |  | Privilege  |  |  |  |  | Weapon  |  |  |  |  | Decision  |  |  |  |  | Tree Part 
 |  |  |  | Responsibility  |  |  |  |  |  | Bomb  |  |  |  | Performance  |  |  |  |  |  | Branch 
 |  |  |  | Time Point  |  |  |  |  |  | Firearm  |  |  |  |  | Broadcast  |  |  |  | Vehicle Part 
 |  |  |  | Uncertainty  |  |  |  |  |  | Projectile  |  |  |  |  | Movie  |  |  |  |  | Engine 
 |  | Energy  |  |  |  |  | Ball  |  |  |  |  | Mus. Performance  |  |  |  | Surface 
 |  |  | Wavelength  |  |  |  |  | Ceramic  |  |  |  |  | Radio Program  |  | Speech Act Part 
 |  |  |  | Light  |  |  |  |  | Container  |  |  |  |  | TV Program  |  |  |  | Speech Sound 
 |  |  |  | Signal  |  |  |  |  | Drug  |  |  |  |  | Theatr. Performance  |  |  | Word 
 |  |  |  | Sound  |  |  |  |  | Engine  |  |  |  | Speech Act  |  |  | Undefined 
 |  |  | Force  |  |  |  |  | Flag  |  |  |  |  | Agreement  |  | Document Part 
 |  |  | Heat  |  |  |  |  | Furniture  |  |  |  |  | Command  |  | Movie Part 
 |  | Physical Object  |  |  |  |  | Image  |  |  |  |  | Offer  |  | Recording Part 
 |  |  | Animate  |  |  |  |  | Medium  |  |  |  |  | Question  | PROPERTY 
 |  |  |  | Animal  |  |  |  |  | Musical Instrument  |  |  |  |  | Request  |  | Cognitive State 
 |  |  |  |  | Cat  |  |  |  |  | String  |  |  |  | Investigation  |  |  | Skill 
 |  |  |  |  | Cow  |  |  |  | Light Source  |  |  |  | Mental Activity  |  | Role 
 |  |  |  |  | Dog  |  |  |  |  | Flame  |  |  |  | Plan  |  |  | Human Role 
 |  |  |  |  | Fetus  |  |  |  | Location  |  |  | Process  |  | Visible Feature 
 |  |  |  |  | Horse  |  |  |  |  | Building  |  |  |  | Weather Event  |  |  | Colour 
 |  |  |  |  | Primate  |  |  |  |  |  | Cinema  |  |  |  |  | Wind  |  |  | Shape 
 |  |  |  | Human  |  |  |  |  |  | Theater  |  |  |  |  |  | Storm  |  | Character Trait 
 |  |  |  |  | Deity  |  |  |  |  | Light Source  |  |  |  |  | Precipitation  |  | Injury 
 |  |  |  |  | Fetus  |  |  |  |  |  | Flame  |  |  |  | Disease  |  | Institution Role 
 |  |  |  |  | Ghost  |  |  |  |  | Nat. Landsc. Feature  |  |  |  | Explosion  |  | Pace 
 |  |  |  |  | Self  |  |  |  |  |  | Watercourse  |  |  |  | Fire  |  | Use 
 |  |  |  | Bird  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Waterway  |  |  |  | Procedure  |  | Weight 





Fig. 4.8: The fully-expanded PPPP Killing Ontology 
 
ANYTHING    
 | ENTITY  |  |  |  |  | Butterfly   
 |  | Abstract Entity  |  |  |  |  | Buzzard  |  |  |  |  | Otter  
 |  |  | Asset  |  |  |  |  | Caribou  |  |  |  |  | Owl  |  |  |  | Boat 
 |  |  | Concept  |  |  |  |  | Carp  |  |  |  |  | Penguin  |  |  |  | Building 
 |  |  | Proposition  |  |  |  |  | Cat  |  |  |  |  | Pig  |  |  |  | Plane 
 |  |  | Dispute  |  |  |  |  | Catfish  |  |  |  |  | Pigeon  |  |  |  | Weapon 
 |  |  | Energy  |  |  |  |  | Chicken  |  |  |  |  | Piranha  |  |  |  | Trap 
 |  |  | Force  |  |  |  |  | Chimpanzee  |  |  |  |  | Poultry  |  |  |  | Document 
 |  |  | Heat  |  |  |  |  | Clam  |  |  |  |  | Quail  |  |  | Body 
 |  |  | Information  |  |  |  |  | Cod  |  |  |  |  | Rabbit  |  |  | Body Part 
 |  |  | Life  |  |  |  |  | Cow  |  |  |  |  | Rainbow Trout  |  |  | Plant Part 
 |  |  | Time Period  |  |  |  |  | Crab  |  |  |  |  | Rat  |  |  | Stuff 
 |  | Physical Object  |  |  |  |  | Crocodile  |  |  |  |  | Raven  |  |  |  | Cell 
 |  |  | Animate  |  |  |  |  | Deer  |  |  |  |  | Red Kite  |  |  |  | Chemical 
 |  |  |  | Human  |  |  |  |  | Dingo  |  |  |  |  | Reindeer  |  |  |  | Gene 
 |  |  |  |  | Beekeeper  |  |  |  |  | Dinosaur  |  |  |  |  | Rhino  |  |  |  | Liquid 
 |  |  |  |  | Fur Farmer  |  |  |  |  | Dog  |  |  |  |  | Sailfish  |  |  |  | Meat 
 |  |  |  |  | Gamekeeper  |  |  |  |  | Dolphin  |  |  |  |  | Salmon  |  |  |  | Poison 
 |  |  |  |  | Hunter  |  |  |  |  | Duck  |  |  |  |  | Sardine  |  |  |  | Tissue 
 |  |  |  |  | Land Manager  |  |  |  |  | Eel  |  |  |  |  | Sea Bass  |  |  |  | Food 
 |  |  |  |  | Landowner  |  |  |  |  | Elephant  |  |  |  |  | Sea Urchin  |  |  | Location 
 |  |  |  |  | Lord  |  |  |  |  | Elk  |  |  |  |  | Seabreem  |  |  |  | Area 
 |  |  |  |  | Minister  |  |  |  |  | Fish  |  |  |  |  | Seahorse  |  |  |  | Park 
 |  |  |  |  | Pest Controller  |  |  |  |  | Flatworm  |  |  |  |  | Seal  |  |  |  | Nat. Landsc. Feature 
 |  |  |  |  | Poacher  |  |  |  |  | Flea  |  |  |  |  | Shark  |  |  |  | Reef 
 |  |  |  |  | Police Officer  |  |  |  |  | Flounder  |  |  |  |  | Sheep  |  |  |  | Slaughterhouse 
 |  |  |  |  | Breeder  |  |  |  |  | Fox  |  |  |  |  | Shrimp  |  |  |  | Zoo 
 |  |  |  |  | Politician  |  |  |  |  | Gerbil  |  |  |  |  | Skylark  |  |  |  | Earth 
 |  |  |  |  | Researcher  |  |  |  |  | Gharial  |  |  |  |  | Slug  |  |  |  | Environment 
 |  |  |  |  | Sailor  |  |  |  |  | Giraffe  |  |  |  |  | Snake  |  |  |  | Estate 
 |  |  |  |  | Slaughterer  |  |  |  |  | Goat  |  |  |  |  | Sole  |  |  |  | Woodland 
 |  |  |  |  | Soldier  |  |  |  |  | Goldfish  |  |  |  |  | Spider  |  |  |  | Home 
 |  |  |  |  | Sportsperson  |  |  |  |  | Goose  |  |  |  |  | Squirrel  |  |  |  | Land 
 |  |  |  |  | Thief  |  |  |  |  | Great Tit  |  |  |  |  | Starling  |  |  | Egg 
 |  |  |  |  | Trapper  |  |  |  |  | Great White Shark  |  |  |  |  | Stingray  |  | Self 
 |  |  |  |  | Vet  |  |  |  |  | Grouper  |  |  |  |  | Stoat  | EVENTUALITY 
 |  |  |  |  | Vivisectionist  |  |  |  |  | Grouse  |  |  |  |  | Swan  |  | Event 
 |  |  |  |  | Broadcaster  |  |  |  |  | Guinea Pig  |  |  |  |  | Termite  |  |  | Activity 
 |  |  |  |  | Zookeeper  |  |  |  |  | Hamster  |  |  |  |  | Thylacine  |  |  |  | Action 
 |  |  |  |  | Builder  |  |  |  |  | Hare  |  |  |  |  | Tick  |  |  |  | Fishing 
 |  |  |  |  | Butcher  |  |  |  |  | Hawk  |  |  |  |  | Tiger  |  |  | Process 
 |  |  |  |  | Conservationist  |  |  |  |  | Hedgehog  |  |  |  |  | Tilapia  |  |  |  | Procedure 
 |  |  |  |  | Driver  |  |  |  |  | Hedgesparrow  |  |  |  |  | Tortoise  |  |  | Fire 
 |  |  |  |  | Farmer  |  |  |  |  | Hen Harrier  |  |  |  |  | Trout  |  |  | Implosion 
 |  |  |  |  | Fisher  |  |  |  |  | Horse  |  |  |  |  | Tuna  |  |  | Disease 
 |  |  |  | Animal  |  |  |  |  | Humpback Whale  |  |  |  |  | Turkey  |  |  | Weather Event 
 |  |  |  |  | African Hedgehog  |  |  |  |  | Insect  |  |  |  |  | Vole  |  |  | Meteorite 
 |  |  |  |  | Ant  |  |  |  |  | Jellyfish  |  |  |  |  | Whale  | STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 |  |  |  |  | Bass  |  |  |  |  | Krill  |  |  |  |  | Whale Shark  |  | Conditions 
 |  |  |  |  | Baboon  |  |  |  |  | Lion  |  |  |  |  | Wild Boar  |  | Temperature 
 |  |  |  |  | Badger  |  |  |  |  | Lionfish  |  |  |  |  | Wolf  |  | System 
 |  |  |  |  | Bat  |  |  |  |  | Lizard  |  |  |  |  | Worm  |  |  | Ecosystem 
 |  |  |  |  | Bear  |  |  |  |  | Macaque  |  |  |  |  | Zebra  | HUMAN GROUP 
 |  |  |  |  | Beaver  |  |  |  |  | Magpie  |  |  |  | Plant  |  | Institution 
 |  |  |  |  | Bee  |  |  |  |  | Mammoth  |  |  |  |  | Tree  |  |  | Bus. Enterprise (Animal) 
 |  |  |  |  | Big Cat  |  |  |  |  | Mink  |  |  |  | Other Organism  |  |  | Bus. Enterprise (Other) 
 |  |  |  |  | Bird  |  |  |  |  | Mite  |  |  |  |  | Bacteria  |  |  | Industry 
 |  |  |  |  | Bird of Prey  |  |  |  |  | Mole  |  |  |  |  | Microorganism  |  |  | Organisation 
 |  |  |  |  | Bison  |  |  |  |  | Mosquito  |  |  |  |  | Virus  |  |  | Government 
 |  |  |  |  | Bluefin Tuna  |  |  |  |  | Moth  |  |  |  |  | Spirit  |  |  | Military 
 |  |  |  |  | Boar  |  |  |  |  | Mouse  |  |  |  |  | Embryo  |  |  | Ministry 
 |  |  |  |  | Bowhead Whale  |  |  |  |  | Mussel  |  |  |  | Animal Fetus  | ANIMAL GROUP 
 |  |  |  |  | Budgerigar  |  |  |  |  | Octopus  |  |  |  | Deity X 
 |  |  |  |  | Buffalo  |  |  |  |  | Orangutan  |  |  | Artifact OTHER 
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The most noticeable difference between the Ontologies is the treatment of animals. In the 
CPAO there are thirteen animal-related STs, and not all of them are classified in the same 
way: cats, cows, dogs, foetuses, horses and primates are listed under the superordinate of 
[[Animal]], while birds, cetaceans, fish, insects, spiders and snakes all have their own 
nodes at the same level as [[Animal]]. This reflects the nature of the BNC data to refer to 
most animals either rarely or homogenously, the exception being ‘common’ animals such 
as cats, dogs, horses, etc., as well as the tendency of natural language to construe other 
types of animals, such as birds, fish and insects, as not strictly ‘animal’. The creators of 
the CPAO were mindful of the discrepancy between scientific and folk categorisations of 
the more-than-human world, and this explains the way the CPAO has been structured in 
this respect. The PPPP Killing Ontology, on the other hand, is very flat when it comes to 
specific nonhuman animal descriptors; all are grouped on the same level. There is also far 
more variety and specificity of animal types: 135 in total, and in some cases multiple 
nodes for the same kinds of animals, e.g. TROUT and RAINBOW TROUT.  
The PKO is visibly less abstract and more materially-orientated than the CPAO. The 
ABSTRACT ENTITY section is far smaller than that of the CPAO, and PHYSICAL 
OBJECT a great deal larger. Specifically, the ANIMAL part of the PKO is the most 
dominant, and other nodes are also more animal-orientated, such as FISHING, 
SLAUGHTERHOUSE, and TRAPPER. The CPAO, on the other hand, is noticeably 
anthropocentric: the buildings mentioned are cinemas and theatres; there are sections 
devoted to money, vehicles and artistic performances; and at the deepest point of the 
Ontology is [[Wine]], which features twice: once under [[Artifact]] and again under 
[[Stuff]]. In some cases the same nodes feature in both Ontologies but in different 
positions, e.g. DOCUMENT, which is listed as both an abstract entity and a physical 
object in the CPAO, but only as a physical object in the PKO; and DEITY, which in the 
CPAO is an honorary type of [[Human]] but in the PKO is a more general ANIMATE. 
There is also the case of MEAT, which in the CPAO is classed as [[Food]] and in the PKO 
is categorised as STUFF. This reflects the different nature of the two data samples: the 
BNC, which revolves around human activities such as eating and drinking; and the PPPP 
‘killing’ samples, in which ‘meat’ is typically butchered or despatched rather than cooked 
or eaten. These might also be explained in part by personal bias, such as my personal 
rejection of ‘meat’ as food, as well as differences in lexicographic judgement, e.g. of how 
to classify an entity such as a deity. 
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For an ST to be included in the final PKO, which was built up gradually during the 
annotation process and eventually refined, it had to be something that was not 
satisfactorily accounted for by any of the already-existing nodes. If it was deemed 
pertinent that the Agent was, for example, a MINISTER, and not simply a HUMAN, then 
a new ST was created for that purpose. Given the critical and animal-orientated nature of 
this research, I was also wary of ‘lumping’ distinct animal types into more general ones, 
hence the large number of highly specific animal nodes in the PKO. The exceptions to 
this were DOG, which includes all references to specific dog breeds, such as German 
Shepherd and Rottweiler; and COW, which was used for all mentions of cows (in the lay 
sense), including cattle, heifer, steer, calf, dairy cows, and so on. This was due to the need 
for some degree of generalisability and control of the Ontology, as well as – in the case 
of COW – my commitment to resisting, where practicable, the construal of animals as 
biological commodities. POULTRY is unfortunate, but unavoidable without 
overgeneralising, e.g. as BIRD, or – without sufficient evidence – speculating, e.g. as 
CHICKEN or TURKEY. Both would be inaccurate and would flout the principle of 
remaining faithful to the data. Despite my attempts to be principled, however, my own 
bias, as well as my research focus on human-animal relations, is evident in the lack of 
variety for plants; all plant types, such as wheat, cattails, kelp, and shrubs, are 
homogenised in the PKO under PLANT.  
 
4.3.4 Evaluation of the annotation 
 
In order to evaluate the reliability and validity of the annotation scheme, i.e. how well it 
reflects the “truth” of the data (Artstein and Poesio, 2008), it was necessary to carry out 
an interannotator agreement test. For this I hired a second annotator, paid for by the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council41 via the North West Consortium Doctoral Training 
Partnership42. This second annotator was a fellow doctoral student in linguistics, who also 
uses corpus linguistic methods and who had previously been trained in Hanks’ ‘standard’ 
CPA. The annotator received specific training from me over a number of sessions on the 





research questions. Annotation guidelines (Appendix B) were provided and discussed in 
detail, and the annotator was given a sample of 100 lines to annotate in an Excel 
environment with all previous annotation removed. This comprised 25 lines randomly 
selected from the KVD samples of four of the ‘killing’ terms: murder, slaughter, sacrifice 
and harvest. For each of these terms, the BNC-derived (i.e. PDEV) patterns were provided 
with the instruction that they be used as a guide and not necessarily as set patterns for that 
sample. The features to be annotated were reduced from the original 13 (listed in 4.3.2) 
to nine: Pattern, Voice, Agent-ont-2, ARD, Agent Number, Patient-ont-2, PRD, Patient 
Number and Context, with a column provided for any notes. The four features that were 
dropped were Agent and Patient (the relevant noun phrases in the text); and Agent-ont-1 
and Patient-ont-1, the general-level Ontological types for the Agent and Patient. This 
because these features were not used explicitly in the final analysis; they were required 
mainly for the construction of the PPPP Killing Ontology. For each of the final nine 
features, the annotator was asked to be select a value from a drop-down menu of a pre-
defined set of labels, e.g. Agent-ont-2 and Patient-ont-2 there was a drop-down menu 
containing all nodes in the Ontology. For Agent Number and Patient Number the possible 
choices were ‘In’, ‘Pl’, ‘Col’, and so on. The exception was ‘Pattern’, which was left 
open. The annotator was instructed to add or amend patterns as and when necessary.  
Halfway through the annotation process we met to discuss any queries, and at the end of 
the annotation we discussed any major disagreements. If there had been a mistake or a 
deviation from the annotation guidelines, that source of disagreement was amended, 
while others were left intact. Agreement levels were calculated using a basic agreement 
coefficient based on some of the most popular metrics described in Artstein and Poesio’s 
(2008) comprehensive survey, namely Bennett et al.’s (1954) S, Scott’s (1955) π and 
Cohen’s (1960) к, taking the simplest form of calculation (coefficient S) but with some 
weighting included as per some of the other measures. As such, agreement was found for 
each feature using the standard (as used in all of the abovementioned coefficients) 
calculation of 
𝐴𝑜 − 𝐴𝑒
1 −  𝐴𝑒
 
where 𝐴𝑜 is the observed agreement and 𝐴𝑒 is the expected agreement, i.e. the agreement 
that we would expect to occur simply by chance. This expected agreement was calculated, 
following S, as  
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𝐴𝑒 =  ∑ 𝑃(𝑘|𝑐





where 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 refers to the set of possible values, or labels, for that feature;  𝑃(𝑘|𝑐1) is the 
probability of the first coder 𝑐1 assigning one of these labels, 𝑘; and 𝑃(𝑘|𝑐2) is the 
probability for the second coder, 𝑐2. These probabilities will be different for each feature, 
depending on the number of possible labels; for the feature ‘Voice’, for instance, there 
are just two possible labels, ‘active’ and ‘passive’, and so the expected agreement is 0.5. 
For Agent-ont-2 and Patient-ont-2, on the other hand, there are 254 nodes to choose from 
in the Ontology and therefore the random chance of agreement is much smaller. The 
reason this approach might be considered ‘basic’ is because each coder is assigned an 
equal probability of choosing a given category, i.e. their individual distributions are not 
factored in to the overall calculation, and each category is also considered to be as likely 
as the next. The rationale for not taking a more complex approach to measuring the 
interannotator agreement, involving e.g. individual coder distributions and adjusted 
probabilities, is that the aim of this exercise was to measure the basic validity of the 
annotation scheme. To submit this type of semantic data to more detailed – and arguably 
still problematic – statistical testing felt unnecessary. This coefficient is therefore 
considered a somewhat naïve but nonetheless principled and reproducible approach to 
calculating interannotator agreement. 
As is standard, an agreement on a case between Coder 1 and Coder 2 was marked ‘1’ and 
a disagreement ‘0’. However, given that some disagreements are not as ‘punishable’ as 
others, e.g. the distance between HUMAN and FARMER is not as great as that between 
HUMAN and ABSTRACT ENTITY, a basic form of weighting was used for the Agent-ont-
2 and Patient-ont-2 values: where an exact match was found, the score was 1; where the 
agreement was found only at the general level (the first five levels of the Ontology, as in 
the case of HUMAN and FARMER) the score assigned was 0.75; otherwise the score was 
0.43 On the same basis, the scores for ARD and PRD were also weighted: where there was 
an exact agreement, the score was 1; where there was a disagreement of just one, i.e. the 
difference between a ‘3’ and a ‘4’, the score was 0.75; for two, 0.5; for three, 0.25; and 
 
43 This difference score was calculated by first converting all Ontology nodes to alphanumeric codes that 
specify the precise location of each node in the Ontology (see the interannotator agreement data in 
Appendix C for examples). Doing this meant that distance between semantic types could be calculated 
quickly and accurately. 
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for a greater disagreement, 0. This means, for example, that where one annotator marked 
a ‘2’ and the other a ‘5’, the agreement score would be ‘0.25’. The ARD and PRD label 
‘NF’ (maximum score) was converted to ‘6’ for the purposes of this test. 
The final agreement score – an average of the chance-corrected agreement scores for all 
of the nine features – was 0.88, with a standard deviation of 0.06. Agreement scores for 
the individual features are listed in Appendix C, showing their raw agreement scores (all 
of the scores added up and divided by the number of items, i.e. 100) as well as their final, 
chance-corrected agreement scores. Agreement is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, where 
‘0’ means no agreement and ‘1’ means perfect agreement. There is no consensus on what 
is to be considered an ‘acceptable’ or ‘good’ agreement score. Artstein and Poesio (2008) 
cite Krippendorff (2004) who, like many others, considers 0.8 to be the standard cut-off 
point for an acceptable score. There is an acknowledgement, however, that annotation of 
discourse segments, particularly of a semantic or pragmatic nature, is far more prone to 
disagreement than other types of linguistic annotation, and that the use of weighting is 
also problematic since there is no set approach for determining appropriate weights 
(Artstein and Poesio, 2008). 
 
4.4 Summary of Data and Methods 
 
The final dataset analysed in this project is summarised in Table 4.8. The Killing Verb 
Dataset (KVD) is only comprised of the concordance samples listed under ‘PPPP 
sample’, a total of 1,682 instances. The BNC samples, used as reference, were either 
accessed through the PDEV platform, powered by Sketch Engine, or in the absence of a 
PDEV entry taken directly from the BNC (via CQPweb) and exported into Excel. In the 
case of euthanise, there was insufficient evidence in the BNC and so the reference sample 
was taken from the enTenTen15 corpus. Given that assassinate did not feature at all in 
the PPPP corpus, nor consequently the KVD, it could not be analysed in comparison with 
the rest of the KVD data and was effectively excluded from all comparative studies. The 
values here refer to the number of concordance lines remaining after POS-tag errors (‘x’), 
untaggable lines (‘u’) and metalinguistic instances (‘m’) were removed. It should be noted 
that, for the purposes of analysis, euthanise is used to represent all spelling forms 




Table 4.8: The final dataset. *Reference sample for euthanise taken from enTenTen15. 
 
To summarise the main steps to analysis taken in this project: 
• ‘Killing’ terms were sourced from dictionaries and other lexicons and reduced to 
a manageable set of fifteen using a combination of selection criteria; 
• Random samples of 250 lines (or as many as available) were extracted from both 
the BNC (enTenTen in the case of euthanise) and the PPPP corpus for each of the 
terms; 
• CPA was carried out on these samples and patterns derived from the BNC samples 
were used as a guide when analysing the PPPP data; 
• The PPPP samples were also annotated for a range of features, such as 
grammatical voice, ‘Context’, the Agent, the Patient, and referential distance; 
• An Ontology of semantic types, the PPPP Killing Ontology, was developed over 
the course of the annotation, modelled on the BNC-derived CPA Ontology; 
• The annotation scheme was submitted to an interannotator agreement test; 
• The results of the annotation were analysed quantitatively by comparing, e.g. 
referential distance scores and prevalence of certain semantic types across 
‘killing’ terms; 
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• The quantitative results were then analysed in more depth via a CPA-assisted, or 
corpus-lexicographical, discourse analysis; 
• Finally, the effectiveness of CPA as a discourse analysis tool was evaluated, 
taking the results and the overall process into account. 
In the three chapters that follow, I present the results of the analyses. Following these is 
a concluding chapter with a discussion and critical reflection on the findings, both 
methodological and substantive.  
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As discussed in the preceding chapters, recurring themes of the literature around animal-
killing were distance and concealment, both in terms of physical, geographical distance 
and relational, ontological distance. Slaughterhouses in the UK and other countries are 
often hidden from view and their internal processes obfuscated; even in a tightly 
controlled working environment, the person responsible for the killing remains 
ambiguous. A review of discourse analyses on this and related topics found that 
representations of violence and killing consistently feature legitimation devices, whether 
through construal of the victim as ‘killable’ or passive, or by distancing the perpetrator 
from the act. This chapter details findings in terms of grammatical voice and Referential 
Distance and the roles these devices play in the concealment, backgrounding and 
reframing of ‘killing’ events and their participants. In doing so, it addresses RQs 1 and 2, 
commenting on the key themes of distance and concealment as well as the construal of 
the involvement of different types of participants in acts of killing.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 is split into two main parts: one reporting 
on Agent Referential Distance (ARD) and the other on Patient Referential Distance 
(PRD). These terms, explained in Chapter 4, are revisited and discussed below. Section 
5.3 addresses the use of voice, specifically active and passive voice, and how this 
contributes to the distancing of Agents and Patients. The causative voice is also discussed 
with reference to the terms put down and put to sleep, which were found to be distinct 
from the other ‘killing’ terms in this respect. Finally, in Section 5.4, the findings of this 
chapter are summarised and discussed, and it is concluded that distance is achieved 
through a variety of means and with a range of potential motives, which are not 
necessarily easy to infer. As well as (high and low) Referential Distance, in combination 
with – sometimes created through – the use of (active and passive) voice, distance can 
also be achieved through use of subtly ambiguous ‘killing’ terms, particularly those with 
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other, non-killing senses. Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) is used in places to tease out 
these more nuanced aspects of meaning. 
 
5.2 Referential Distance 
 
Referential Distance was calculated for both the Agent and the Patient in all 1,682 lines 
of the Killing Verb Dataset (KVD). As described in Chapter 4, this required counting the 
number of clauses between the immediate mention of the Agent or Patient and its nearest 
sufficiently disambiguating token or noun phrase, up to five clauses either side. This 
process was based on Givón and associates’ (1983) work in topic continuity, mentioned 
in Chapters 3 and 4, which involved counting the number of clauses between references 
to a given discourse topic. Givón was interested in the continuity (distance between 
references), persistence (length of coreferential chain) and ambiguity (interference from 
other potential references in the immediate environment) of a topic, on the assumption 
that a highly topical entity will have low referential distance, high persistence and low 
ambiguity. This study, however, is concerned only with the degree of ease with which 
participants (i.e. killers and those killed) can be located and identified in the immediate 
context of a ‘killing’ verb, and it is not a huge conceptual leap to consider that the 
referential distance measure, originally used to assess continuity in discourse, might also 
be useful for this purpose. Of the original three, referential distance is the only measure 
adapted and employed here. The hypothesis in this case is that the greater the Referential 
Distance, i.e. the further one has to read in order to successfully disambiguate the referent 
(the Agent or the Patient), the greater the perceived detachment from the action, given 
that the predicator represents the discursive nexus of the event. A low Referential 
Distance44 might therefore be considered an act of foregrounding, and a high Referential 
Distance an act of backgrounding.  
Previous studies used only ‘lookback’, while this study uses both ‘lookback’ and 
‘lookahead’ in an attempt to aid location efforts, given that thresholds are already low: a 
Referential Distance greater than four clauses is considered to be ‘high’, and anything 
greater than five is placed in the same category as ‘unresolvable’, i.e. no mention 
 
44 As with ‘Agent’ and ‘Patient’, I use a capital ‘R’ and a capital ‘D’ to differentiate my adapted ‘Referential 
Distance’ from the original referential distance. 
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anywhere in the text. In addition to that, referential tokens are only classed as such if they 
are considered to be sufficiently disambiguating (e.g. the dog signals the semantic type 
DOG; the farmer, semantic type FARMER; his son, semantic type HUMAN). 
Traditionally, referential distance considers potentially ambiguous pronouns (e.g. it, he) 
as eligible nearby anaphoric references, while in this case they are only considered 
eligible if they enable the annotator to confidently select a semantic type, i.e. 
disambiguate the referent’s identity. This adaptation of the measure means that although 
we can refer to the findings of e.g. Brown (1983) that humanness is a positive predictor 
of low referential distance and low ‘ambiguity’ (interference from other potential 
references), they cannot be compared like-for-like with the Referential Distance results 
in this study. 
 
5.2.1 Agent Referential Distance (ARD) results 
 
5.2.1.1 ARD at a glance 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the overall findings from the Killing Verb Dataset (KVD) in terms of 
Agent Referential Distance (ARD). The degree of referential distance, which was graded 
as being ‘low’ (no clauses or one clause), ‘medium’ (two to four clauses) or ‘high’ (five 
clauses or more / unresolvable) is indicated by pattern type: grid squares for ‘low’, stripes 





Fig. 5.1: The proportions of the most commonly occurring types of Agents and their Agent Referential 
Distance (ARD) as found in the KVD. Solid colour indicates a high ARD, stripes a medium ARD, and 
grid squares a low ARD. 
 
I am aware of the potential pitfalls of using pie charts for data visualisation purposes and 
this chart is not intended as a means of comparing the precise proportions of the smaller 
segments. Instead, Figure 5.1 demonstrates the clear dominance of HUMAN as an Agent, 
and within HUMAN the dominance of high ARD scores. The semantic type HUMAN 
makes up the vast majority of all Agents in the data – 83% – while the next most frequent 
type, ANIMAL, features as the Agent in a very small proportion of the data: just 4% of all 
instances. This emphasis on human agency is perhaps to be expected, given what we 
already know about the effects of humanness on topicality (Givón, 1983) and animacy 
(Yamamoto, 1999; Sealey, 2018), as discussed in Chapter 3; human actants are more 
likely than nonhumans to be the topic, the agent, and the grammatical subject.  
Most striking in the chart is the contrast between Agent types in terms of their distribution 
of high, medium and low ARD scores. Each ‘slice’ represents a semantic type acting as 
Agent, and is divided into three segments: one in solid colour, representing the proportion 
of high ARD scores for that Agent; one in stripes, indicating the proportion of medium 
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ARD scores; and another with grid squares which represents the proportion of low ARD 
scores. The exceptions to this are ACTIVITY and PROCESS, for which there were no 
instances of high ARD and therefore they have only two segments: medium ARD and 
low ARD. Three-quarters (77%) of the HUMAN Agent instances entail a high ARD score, 
whereas the distribution of ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ is far more evenly spread for other 
types of agent. In fact, HUMAN is the only agent label – other than X, the label assigned 
in the event of total elision of the Agent NP (i.e. Agent not mentioned and not inferable) 
– for which the proportion of high ARD instances is greater than those of medium and 
low ARD instances. This is in spite of the fact that first- and second-person pronouns (I, 
you, we) were considered to belong unambiguously to humans by default, unless there 
was available evidence to the contrary, and these were typically assigned an ARD of 0, 
which would be expected to have an overall lowering effect on the average HUMAN 
ARD. Examples of HUMAN Agents with high ARD are given in (5.1-5.3, Table 5.1). 
‘High ARD’ means that the sufficiently disambiguating mention of the Agent was five or 
more clauses from the immediate clause of the verb in question (in bold). 
 
 
Table 5.1: Corpus examples 5.1-5.3 
 
Fig. 5.1 tells us that wherever an Agent was HUMAN, the disambiguating Agent referent 
was most likely to be either absent or otherwise hard to locate, often due to agentless 
passive constructions, and the same could not be said for any other Agent type. Why is 
this, when human referents are supposedly heavily referenced in English? One possible 
explanation is that the KVD, like the PPPP corpus from which it was sampled, is heavily 
skewed in favour of journal article texts. Academic writing, particularly scientific journal 
article writing, is known for its impersonal tone, achieved through use of the passive voice 
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and omission of the doer of the action – generally humans, as they are the ones conducting 
the experiments and writing the articles – which might explain why there are so many 
HUMAN Agent instances in the KVD and also why so many of these have a high ARD 
score. Figures 5.2 and 5.3, below, show the breakdown of ARD proportions for all Agents 
across text types in the KVD, first as a proportion of that text type (Fig. 5.2) and then in 
real terms (Fig. 5.3).  
 
Fig. 5.2: Proportions of high, medium and low ARD (for all Agents) by text type 
 
 
Fig. 5.3: Incidence of high, medium and low ARD (for all Agents) for each text type 
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From Figures 5.2 and 5.3 we can see that the journal article data does indeed feature a 
very high proportion of high ARD instances – as do legislative texts – and they also 
constitute a very large part of the overall dataset: 40%. This could explain the 
predominance of HUMAN Agents in the KVD as well as their tendency to have a high 
ARD score. To test this theory, all journal article instances were removed from the data, 
leaving 1,008 concordance lines, and the same ARD chart produced again. Figure 5.4 




Fig. 5.4: The proportions of the most commonly occurring types of agents and their ARD when journal 
article texts are excluded from the data 
 
Though removing all journal article instances makes some difference to the composition 
of the HUMAN ARD proportions, particularly the ‘high ARD’ cases, we can see that the 
‘high ARD’ segment for HUMAN (in solid, dark blue) still accounts for the majority 
(65%) of all HUMAN agent cases, and once again HUMAN is the only agent type, other 
than X (i.e. no Agent), to have a greater proportion of high ARD scores than medium or 
low ones. Humans now comprise 77% of all Agents – down from 83% – meaning that 
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the high proportion of journal article texts does play some role in the dominance of 
HUMAN Agents but does not satisfactorily account for it, and this probably is simply a 
case of humans being the most common topic, agent and subject in English (Chapter 3). 
Returning to the full dataset, still unanswered is the question of why HUMAN is the only 
Agent type to favour high ARD scores over medium and low ones. Clearly the journal 
article texts contribute quite significantly to the high ARD cases for HUMAN, but in their 
absence the data still told the same story. One difference between Figures 5.3 and 5.4 that 
we might comment on is the loss of PROCESS, with only medium and low ARD scores, 
replaced in Fig. 5.4 by the aforementioned X, automatically a high ARD score. This 
difference suggests that journal article texts have a tendency to construe processes as 
Agents and are less likely to omit or suppress such Agents that cannot be reasonably 
inferred from the context (unlike the human author and scientist, whom the reader 
expects). This makes sense when we consider that scientific journal articles often report 
on physical processes taking place, such as diseases killing other entities or biological 
systems taking effect (as in Examples 5.4 and 5.5 in Table 5.2, Agent NPs underlined), 
and that scientists are expected to disclose – at least once in the document – the exact 
methods by which they conducted their experiments. Example 5.6 illustrates this 
discrepancy between explicitness of references: the doer of the harvesting is entirely 
suppressed, while the details of the rest of the procedure are made explicit. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Corpus examples 5.4-5.6 
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In other words, we might hypothesise that humans are not mentioned explicitly in many 
instances simply because we take the human subject (agent, topic) for granted. 
 
5.2.1.2 ARD across ‘killing’ terms 
 
Looking at the results from a different angle, verb by verb45, we see a similar picture 
emerging: the proportion of HUMAN Agents is moderately positively correlated (R2 = 
0.58) with the proportion of high-ARD cases, as shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
Fig. 5.5: Relationship between the percentage of HUMAN Agents and the percentage of high ARD 
instances across all ‘killing’ terms 
 
It appears that, generally speaking, as the proportion of HUMAN Agents increases, so too 
does the proportion of Agents with high referential distance (ARD) scores. For some 
terms, the proportions of human-as-Agent and high ARD are almost equal, e.g. destroy 
 
45 As explained in Chapter 4, assassinate did not feature at all in the PPPP corpus and so is excluded from 
these comparative corpus experiments. 
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(55% HUMAN, 53% high ARD), euthanise (90%, 83%) and sacrifice (96%, 94%). In 
other cases, the proportions are very different, e.g. butcher (89%, 48%), exterminate 
(86%, 57%), murder (93%, 48%), put down (96%, 58%) and put to sleep (100%, 68%). 
In these cases there is a discrepancy of at least 20 percentage points between the 
percentage of HUMAN Agents and the percentage of Agents with a high ARD score. 
The first thing to note about these high-discrepancy terms is that they tend to be the ones 
with smaller sample sizes. Exterminate, butcher and murder have the smallest sample 
sizes of all the verbs in this study (excluding assassinate, which did not feature at all in 
the PPPP corpus and so could not be compared with the others), with 14, 27 and 29 
concordance lines, respectively. These could therefore be interpreted as i) potentially 
unreliable (anomalous) results due to a lack of sufficient data, perhaps owing to the fact 
that the main source of data was scientific journal writing, a genre that does not favour 
such terms as exterminate, butcher and murder; (ii) a result of the semantic nature of the 
verbs themselves; or (iii) a combination of these. Put down and put to sleep are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
5.2.1.3 Exterminate, butcher and murder 
 
The verb exterminate overwhelmingly denotes a HUMAN activity. Of the 14 exterminate 
instances, 12 have the Agent of HUMAN; of the remaining two, one is attributed to an 
EVENT (Example 5.7, Table 5.3) and the other to X, i.e. no inferable Agent (Example 
5.8). Eight lines out of the total 14 have an ARD of ‘NF’, meaning that the disambiguating 
reference is either further than five clauses either side of the immediate reference clause, 
or is not mentioned at all and requires outside knowledge to be inferred. These small 
frequencies make it difficult to comment authoritatively on exterminate, but it could be 
that in the six cases where there is a low or medium ARD (as in 5.9 and 5.10), this short 
Referential Distance has the purpose of making the perpetrator more visible, and perhaps 








Table 5.3: Corpus examples 5.7-5.12 
 
Butcher and murder, like exterminate, carry strong connotations of violence and 
brutality, and they are also predominantly HUMAN-enacted: 93% for murder and 89% 
for butcher. In the case of murder, it could be argued that the short distance between 
the Agent tokens (as in 5.11 and 5.12) was, as with exterminate, a deliberate attempt 
to draw attention to the killer(s) for their behaviour.  
For butcher, on the other hand, there are other factors at play. One is that butcher does 
not necessarily imply killing, but can also refer to the carving up of already-dead 
animals, which has different moral implications. If we look at the definition of butcher 
as given in the PDEV46, similar to the one found in Oxford Dictionaries47, the main 
sense of butcher is ambiguous: “to slaughter or cut up an animal” (underline added for 
emphasis). This means that even when butcher is used to mean ‘to kill [a living animal]’, 
it can also be interpreted as meaning ‘to cut up [a carcass]’. That this ambiguity is of 
 
46 http://pdev.org.uk/#browse?q=butcher;f=A;v=butcher  
47 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/butcher  
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presumably little or no concern to most users of English – who would otherwise find 
ways of distinguishing these two acts through different terminology – demonstrates an 
example of speciesism inherent in our language, a collective indifference to the status 
of the butchered animal as either a living being or an inanimate object. Another 
consequence of this vagueness is a subtle, almost imperceptible distancing of the killer 
from their actions. Did the actor doing the ‘butchering’ kill an animal or did they merely 
cut the animal’s carcass into pieces? Perhaps the listener does not really want to know. 
Far from being considered taboo, butchering is often presented (by butchers and others 
involved in the commodification of animals) as a respectable and wholesome vocation 
(see 5.13 and 5.14, Table 5.4). This creates a somewhat contradictory picture in the data: 
butcher being used negatively to express brutality and immorality in some instances, and 
butcher being used neutrally – or perhaps even positively – to describe a standard business 
practice in others. In fact, butcher was one of only two verbs in this study to present a 
pattern of usage in the PPPP sample that was not seen in the BNC reference data (but 
exists, as an obscure sense, in the OED48): an intransitive use of butcher, with the pattern 
“HUMAN butcher [NO OBJ]” and the implicature “HUMAN works as a butcher”. 5.15 
and 5.16 are examples of this pattern. Perhaps it is worth noting that in all such cases, 
butcher appears in the present perfect continuous, e.g. I’ve been butchering. The patterns 
for butcher, and all of the other verbs, are listed in Appendix D. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Corpus examples 5.13-5.16 
 
48 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/25325?rskey=oGyvG9&result=2#eid  
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Reframing butcher as an intransitive verb – literally redefining it – effectively erases the 
Patient from the event. The animal being butchered has gone from being ontologised as 
a thing – a body part – to being de-ontologised altogether; he or she becomes a victim of 
ontological violence as well as physical violence. This is an example of Adams’ (1990) 
concept of the “absent referent”, the erasing of any mention of the once-living animal.  
It is worth noting, however, that in around half of the lines for butcher (13 out of 27), the 
ARD was still ‘high’, and the majority of these enacted by HUMAN Agents (the 
remaining two are ANIMAL, anthropomorphic examples from television broadcast 
transcripts). In some cases, those who might wish to present this event as a morally neutral 
one, e.g. butchers and ‘meat’ retailers, still opt to remove the Agent altogether by using 
the passive voice (e.g. 5.17, Table 5.5). It is difficult to gauge whether such examples are 
attempts at distancing, which would imply a sense of guilt and shame, or whether – more 
likely – the author is simply conforming to norms of describing standard manufacturing 
processes, implying an indifference to the violence inherent to such a product. In other 
cases, butcher appears to be used in the passive for describing an unfortunate event that 




Table 5.5: Corpus examples 5.17-5.19 
 
5.2.1.4 ARD summary 
 
Agent Referential Distance, like all quantitative measures, requires closer investigation 
in order to establish its potential motives and functions in discourse. What is clear, 
however, is that HUMAN comprises the vast majority of all Agents in the data and, unlike 
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other Agent types, is positively correlated with high (<4 clauses) ARD. Reasons for this 
are not always obvious; in some cases it appears to be an attempt to distance the Agent 
from their actions, and in other cases it is difficult to isolate such motives from adherence 
to genre norms, such as the use of impersonal tone in academic writing. Although these 
findings cannot be compared like-for-like with those of Givón and colleagues due to 
different criteria for eligible references, one would not expect such dramatically different 
results as have been found here, particularly in terms of human Agent suppression. 
 
5.2.2 Patient Referential Distance (PRD) results 
 
5.2.2.1 PRD at a glance 
 
In the same way as for ARD, Fig. 5.6 shows the proportions of the most commonly 
occurring Patient types as well as their Patient Referential Distance (PRD) distributions. 
The same key is used as before: solid colour segments for ‘high’ PRD, striped segments 
for ‘medium’ PRD and gridded segments for ‘low’ PRD. 
 
 
Fig. 5.6: The proportions of the most commonly occurring types of Patients and their PRD as found in the 
KVD. Solid colour indicates a high PRD, stripes a medium PRD, and grid squares a low PRD. 
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As seen in Figure 5.6, the information related to Patients and their referential distance is 
very different from that of the Agents and their ARD scores. ANIMAL is the Patient in 
70% of all instances, and the majority of these (61%) have a low PRD. There is a similar 
trend across the other main Patient types, though with an even stronger tendency towards 
low PRD (gridded segments): 84% for PHYSICAL OBJECT, 94% for STUFF, 89% for 
PLANT, and 92% for ABSTRACT ENTITY. ANIMAL GROUP has a similar PRD 
distribution to ANIMAL, with a ‘low PRD’ majority of 67%. ANIMAL and ANIMAL 
GROUP also have slightly greater ‘high PRD’ proportions than the other Patient types: 
23% and 17%, compared with 8%, 4%, 7% and 3% for PHYSICAL OBJECT, STUFF, 
PLANT and ABSTRACT ENTITY, respectively. Given that HUMAN features as the Agent 
in most cases, we should perhaps expect that the Patients in these instances will be 
ANIMAL victims, i.e. of killing. However, this chart also shows that – after the killing of 
animals – events involving Patients of PHYSICAL OBJECT and STUFF are the next most 
common, indicating non-killing events (as in the examples in Table 5.6). As described in 
Chapter 4, all senses of the verbs – not only ‘killing’ senses – were taken into account in 
the analysis in order to build up a full semantic profile of each of the terms being 
investigated. Non-killing senses account for 21% of all instances in the KVD. 
 
 
Table 5.6: Corpus examples 5.20-5.21 
 
The fact that the animate Patient types – ANIMAL and ANIMAL GROUP – have higher 
proportions of ‘high PRD’ scores than the inanimate types suggests that, once again, the 
previous findings on animacy and reference have been contradicted here.  
The proportions of PRD across text types are quite different to those of ARD; Fig. 5.7 
gives the ARD and PRD proportions side by side, using the same ‘high’, ‘medium’ and 




Fig. 5.7: Proportions of ARD and PRD scores across text types; solid colour indicates ‘high’, stripes 
indicate ‘medium’ and gridded squares indicate ‘low’ scores. 
 
For some text types, there appears to be something of an inverse relationship between the 
ARD and PRD. This would suggest that it is not simply a case of ARD scores generally 
being higher and PRD scores generally being lower across the board, but that in some 
cases, where there is a large proportion of high ARD instances we might also expect to 
find a similar proportion of the data with low PRD scores. This appears to be true for the 
campaign literature, the journal article texts, the legislative texts, and, to a lesser degree, 
the interview data and the promotional texts (shown on the bottom row of Fig. 5.7). 
However, the same cannot be said for the reverse: a greater proportion of low ARD scores 
does not seem to entail a greater proportion of high PRD scores for that text type. For the 
five text types across the top of Fig. 5.7, an R2 coefficient test found no correlation 
between proportion of high ARD and low PRD, but for the five text types across the 
bottom, there was a strong positive correlation (R2 = 0.78). This relationship – if it is a 
relationship – could be attributed to i) recurrent grammatical constructions common to 
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particular text genres; ii) certain types of events commonly reported in particular 
discourses; iii) certain types of Agents and Patients that tend to occur in those texts, for 
whom there is a particular Agent-Patient dynamic; or iv) some other factor. However, 
given that this correlation applies only to some of the text types and not to others, it is 
difficult to say with confidence whether ARD and PRD are dependent variables at all. 
 
5.2.2.2 PRD across ‘killing’ terms 
 
Given that ANIMAL is the Patient type that features most frequently in the data, its 
average PRD was tracked across all ‘killing’ terms. Table 5.7 shows the ANIMAL average 
compared against the average for all Patient types for each term. The ‘difference’ score 
was obtained by dividing the ANIMAL average by the overall average and subtracting 1; 




Table 5.7: Average ANIMAL PRD scores compared against average PRD scores for all Patient types 
across the ‘killing’ terms, ordered by ‘difference’ score from negative through to positive 
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Looking at Table 5.7, we can see that in most cases the average ANIMAL PRD differs 
very little from the average for all Patients – likely because ANIMAL is generally the most 
common Patient type and will heavily influence the overall average PRD – but there are 
some cases in which ANIMAL has a higher-than-average PRD: harvest, destroy, and, to a 
lesser extent, put down. In the cases of butcher and wipe out, it is slightly below average; 
butcher, as we know, is very explicit about the participants involved, and in the case of 
wipe out the main Patient type is not ANIMAL but ANIMAL GROUP (48%), which had 
an average PRD of 1.6. Given the findings in the topic continuity literature, we might 
expect animate Patients, such as ANIMAL, to have lower PRD scores than other types of 
Patients. This warrants a closer look at the terms with especially high ‘difference’ scores: 
harvest and destroy. 
 
5.2.2.3 Harvest and destroy 
 
At first glance, it appears that harvest and destroy are terms which might be used to refer 
to killing when there is a desire to place more distance than usual between the act of 
killing and its ANIMAL Patient. However, looking at Table 5.7, we see that while the 
ANIMAL PRD scores for harvest and destroy are higher than the average PRD for all 
Patient types in those particular verb samples, they are not particularly high compared 
with the average ANIMAL PRD scores across the board. In other words, it is not that the 
ANIMAL Patients have an especially high PRD in the harvest and destroy samples, but 
that there are other senses and, consequently, other Patient types associated with these 
verbs which entail relatively low PRD scores, bringing down the average for that verb 
and creating a high ‘difference’ score. In fact, the harvest and destroy samples have the 
smallest proportions of ‘killing’ instances out of all the terms in this study: 49% for 
harvest and 34% for destroy. This is due to Patients such as STUFF being harvested and 
the tendency for destroy to refer, in a non-killing sense, to PHYSICAL OBJECT.  
Whether PRD is dependent upon the nature of the participants – as suggested by Givón 
and others, i.e. human/nonhuman, animate/inanimate – or the nature of the process, i.e. 
killing/non-killing, is difficult to judge from the data in this study; the PPPP corpus is 
animal-themed and the verb selection is killing-orientated, and this results in a tendency 
for animals to appear in killing-related constructions rather than in non-killing ones. 
However, the data in this study suggests that animate subjects and objects, such as humans 
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and animals, do not yield lower Referential Distance scores by virtue of their intrinsic 
human or animate properties alone, whether acting as Agent or as Patient. Again, this is 
not in line with previous findings on topic continuity and animacy, and suggests that 
perhaps other factors, such as the text type and the nature of the process itself, can also 
dictate, to some degree, the distance between references in the text. Some discrepancies 
are to be expected, however, given that Brown, Givón and colleagues were interested in 
topic continuity rather than in explicitness of identity, and as such were less discerning 
about the ability of a noun phrase to disambiguate the identity of its referent and more 
focused on its role as a link in a coreferential chain. 
 
5.2.2.4 PRD summary 
 
PRD appears to behave very differently from ARD and the two were found, for some text 
types, to have an inverse relationship. Just as HUMAN was by far the most common Agent 
type, ANIMAL was found to be the Patient in the majority of cases, which is to be expected 
given the nature of the corpus and the research questions being investigated. However, 
contrary to previous studies on referential distance, the animate Patients were found to be 
more likely to have high PRD scores than the inanimate patient types. Whether this is 
motivated by a desire to obfuscate the victim when describing an act of killing cannot be 
confirmed without a closer look at the data, and even then it is difficult to accurately 
attribute such motivations from the text alone. In any case, we can say with confidence 
that, overall, animate Patient types such as ANIMAL are placed in positions of greater 
distance than other, inanimate Patients, and this is not necessarily what we would expect 




The most direct route to a high or low referential distance is through the use of voice, 
notably the use of the passive to dislocate (or ‘suppress’) the Agent from their actions 
and, in some cases, to bring the Patient to the fore by making them the topic and 
grammatical subject. This section summarises the main findings from this project in terms 
of voice, focusing on the use of active and passive voice. 
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5.3.1 Active and passive voice at a glance 
 
The active and passive voice are well documented for their use in foregrounding and 
backgrounding event participants, respectively, as discussed in Chapter 3, and the KVD 
proved to be no exception. The passive/active ratio of all KVD instances is illustrated in 
Figure 5.8, broken down by text type. 
 
 
Fig. 5.8: The proportions of active and passive use in the KVD, broken down by text type 
 
We can see from Fig. 5.8 that the majority (64%) of all instances in the KVD are 
expressed in the passive voice, and around half of these passive observations come from 
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journal article sources. If we remove the journal article data from the calculation, for 
comparative purposes, the passive/active ratio across all data becomes almost equal: 52% 
to 48%. As predicted, the academic texts were dense with passive constructions, and this 
explains the high proportion of ‘high ARD’ scores for journal article texts. It may also 
explain why – as illustrated in Fig. 5.7 – for text types such as journal articles, legislation 
and campaign literature, there was an apparently inverse relationship between high ARD 
and low PRD; in passive constructions the Agent is backgrounded, while the Patient 
becomes the subject and usually the topic, thus placing more focus on their identity and, 
presumably, resulting in a lower PRD. The following section explores this relationship 
between voice and Referential Distance. 
 
5.3.2 Voice and Referential Distance 
 
The relationship between (passive) voice and (high) Agent Referential Distance (ARD) 
is illustrated in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, first across text types and then across ‘killing’ terms. 
 
 




Fig. 5.10: The relationship between (passive) voice and (high) ARD across ‘killing’ terms 
 
Looking at Figures 5.9 and 5.10, we can see that there is a moderate positive correlation 
(R2 = 0.61) between use of the passive voice and incidence of high ARD for text types, 
and a strong positive correlation (R2 = 0.72) between these variables when it comes to 
‘killing’ terms. This suggests that use of the passive voice does indeed increase ARD, 
through Agent backgrounding and suppression. When the same graphs were plotted for 
use of passive voice and incidence of high PRD, on the other hand, there was no 
correlation (R2 = 0.01 and 0.08 for text types and ‘killing’ terms, respectively). We would 
surely expect a negative correlation here, given that passive constructions foreground the 
Patient by making them the grammatical subject. This suggests that while the passive 
voice is a reliable measure of Agent explicitness (or lack thereof), it does not have any 
consistent effect on the Patient in terms of explicitness of identity and emphasis. It also 
demonstrates that it is possible for an entity to be the grammatical subject, e.g. of a passive 
construction, and still be fairly ambiguous in identity. To explore this further, the 
following section takes six ‘killing’ terms as short case studies and examines their 





5.3.3 Active, passive and causative 
 
5.3.3.1 Kill and wipe out 
 
Kill and wipe out are unusual ‘killing’ terms: they are both more likely, in the KVD, to 
be used in the active than in the passive voice (58% active for kill; 63% for wipe out) and 
they have the lowest average ARD scores of all verbs in this study; in other words, their 
Agents are more explicit. Both terms are used to refer to the killing of humans as well as 
animals, and they are also examples of ‘killing’ terms that have non-killing senses. In 
fact, kill was found to have 18 distinct patterns in the BNC sample, including “ACTIVITY 
or DRUG kill [NO OBJ]” (as in speed kills), “BODY PART kill HUMAN” (as in my leg’s 
killing me) and fixed idiomatic phrases, such as “{if looks could} kill [NO OBJ]”. 
However, only four of these 18 patterns were present in the KVD, and all but two lines 
referred to acts of literal killing. Similarly, all lines of the wipe out PPPP sample referred 
to acts of (mass) killing  (‘mass killing’ verbs are discussed in Chapter 7). 
The most likely explanation for the low rate of passive voice and the (consequential) low 
ARD scores for kill and wipe out is that they are not very specific ‘killing’ terms; 
connotations of (im)morality are dependent on context. Animals kill; processes kill; 
humans and institutions kill too (Examples 5.22-5.24, Table 5.8). Killing is more palatable 
and less nuanced than, say, murder. Sometimes it is desirable; the decision to kill a virus, 
for instance, does not pose a moral problem. Wiping out can be softened, too; humans and 
events don’t wipe out animals or other humans, so much as animal groups and human 
groups, deindividuated mass Patients (Chapter 7). When this is considered a negative 
situation, it makes sense to expose the participants with little referential distance (5.25). 
When wiping out is not considered to be a moral issue, the necessity to create distance 







Table 5.8: Corpus examples 5.22-5.26 
 
Given that they are less specific terms, kill and wipe out are also enacted by a wide range 
of Agents. Table 5.9 shows that kill, destroy and wipe out top the list of terms when ranked 
by diversity of Agents. As we know from Section 5.2, HUMAN Agents tend to invoke 
high ARD scores, so if there is competition from other semantic types for the ‘Agent’ slot 




Table 5.9: ‘Killing’ terms and their Agents, ordered by number of different Agent types 
 
Where the Agent is not HUMAN, and where a term is not inherently negative in 
connotation, it is reasonable to assume that less effort might be made to distance the Agent 





5.3.3.2 Sacrifice and slaughter 
 
Sacrifice and slaughter are the two verbs with the highest average ARD scores and the 
highest proportions of passive voice (90% passive for sacrifice, 91% for slaughter). 
Sacrifice, unlike slaughter, features some (n=14) examples of non-killing senses in the 
PPPP sample: “HUMAN 1 sacrifice SELF or {REFLDET49 life} (for HUMAN 2)” (e.g. 
she sacrificed her life for him) and “HUMAN sacrifice ENTITY = VALUED” (e.g. flavour 
was sacrificed for profit). Interestingly, there were a few cases in the PPPP data in which 
the subject of these senses was not the typical HUMAN but an ANIMAL; these lines are 
considered anthropomorphic exploitations of the norm rather than examples of new 
patterns. Overall, however, the vast majority (93%) of the sacrifice sample denoted 
killing, specifically the killing of animals by humans as described in journal article texts. 
In all but two of these instances (shown in Table 5.10), the ARD was the maximum score 
of ‘NF’, the absent Agent being inferred to be either a researcher (n=188) or a commercial 
slaughterer (n=8) from the broader context. Although Examples 5.27 and 5.28 have 
sufficient disambiguating information in their immediate contexts to infer the identity of 
the killer (i.e. SLAUGHTERER), it is telling that in these examples sacrifice features in 
postmodifying clauses that form part of the larger NP (underlined) of which the animal 
Patient is head. In other words, the act of killing is backgrounded. 
 
 
Table 5.10: Corpus examples 5.27-28 
 
Slaughter tells a similar story. In some cases, the slaughtering is carried out by an 
individual or group of individuals in a callous or brutal attack (e.g. 5.29, Table 5.11), but 
 
49 REFLDET = reflexive determiner 
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in most cases (87%), the data reports on slaughtering carried out by professional 
slaughterers, researchers or farmers – humans who kill animals as part of their job – 
whose disambiguating referent was either further than five clauses from the immediate 
referent or not explicitly mentioned at all. The fact that sacrifice and slaughter are both 
very specific ‘killing’ terms, in certain contexts – sacrifice a term used to refer to the 
killing of animals who have been experimented on, when the Context (Section 4.3.2.11) 
is ‘lab’; and slaughter a term used to refer to the killing of animals for their flesh, typically 
involving exsanguination, when the Context is ‘animal industries’ – meant that the Agent 
identities were inferable even though they were almost never mentioned at any point in 
the text. In some cases the precise human role was too ambiguous, e.g. in the case of 
animals being slaughtered in an outbreak of disease (e.g. 5.30, Table 5.11), especially in 
non-British systems whose processes may be different to those in this country (e.g. 5.31), 
or when researchers report on the slaughtering of animals who may have been killed by 
slaughterers at a slaughterhouse, or by researchers in a lab, or by someone else in a 
different role at a different type of location (e.g. 5.32). In these cases the Agent was noted 
as simply HUMAN rather than the more specific SLAUGHTERER or RESEARCHER. In 
most cases, however, the unmentioned human killer of animals used in scientific 
experiments was labelled RESEARCHER, unless evidence suggested otherwise. Example 




Table 5.11: Corpus examples 5.29-5.33 
154 
 
Given what the literature had to say on slaughtering and slaughterhouses (Chapter 2), I 
was prepared to have some difficulty in locating the Agents of slaughter. However, I did 
not expect that the identity of the slaughterer – the person responsible for the killing – 
would be as elusive in the text as in the slaughterhouse itself. Even in non-academic 
writing, where there are not the same constraints of genre and style, slaughtering is an 
overwhelmingly passive phenomenon with almost no named culprits. Perhaps slaughter 
simply has such specific connotations, unlike terms such as kill and wipe out, that it is not 
considered necessary to name the killer. Even pro-animal campaign literature (see Table 
5.12) can be seen suppressing these slaughtering Agents, even if this is done with the 
intention of foregrounding the victims. Authors of these texts are probably unaware that 
they are potentially colluding in the oppressive representation of animals that they 
oppose, by effectively concealing the Agents and construing deliberate acts of violence 
as something that happens. 
 
 
Table 5.12: Corpus examples 5.34-5.36 
 
There was one example in the data (5.37, Table 5.13) of a SLAUGHTERER being 
explicitly mentioned – for reasons of clarification, in a legislative document – and six 
examples of a slaughterer being implied (e.g. 5.38), in a similar way to 5.27 and 5.28 in 
Table 5.10. In other cases, I was led down the garden path: slaughtered by was followed 
not by an Agent but by the method of killing (e.g. 5.39 and 5.40, Table 5.13). Sacrifice 
dealt the same red herring (e.g. 5.41 and 5.42). In these scientific journal article instances, 
in which the author is typically also the Agent of the action being described, my 
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impression is not that the writers were deliberately attempting to draw attention away 
from their own Agency (or culpability), but that they were adhering strictly to academic 




Table 5.13: Corpus examples 5.37-5.42 
 
Though the distancing of the author – the human Agent – is to be expected in academic 
journal writing, particularly in the sciences, it is also conventional that the text be clear 
and explicit in all other aspects. In many cases, however, the identities of the animals 
being killed were described in vague (5.43), distant (5.44), ambiguous (5.45) and 
deanimalising (5.46) terms; see Table 5.14. In some texts the animal was named once – 
at the very start of the document – and then never explicitly referred to again. The means 
by which they were killed were also sometimes obfuscated, as in the ambiguous slaughter 
cases. Slaughter and sacrifice were particularly time-consuming verbs to annotate, since 
a lot of time was spent having to read long passages of scientific journal articles to resolve 




Table 5.14: Corpus examples 5.43-5.46 
 
Journal article texts in this data, given that they tend to report on experiments conducted 
on animals, have a particular tendency to objectify animals, rendering them as tools, 
components, resources – as ‘means to an end’. The word sacrifice, itself, implies that the 
animals are killed in the name of something higher and more important than them, for a 
purpose – or higher power – to which humans have no choice but to submit. Both 
slaughter and sacrifice are examples of procedural ‘killing’ terms; they are carried out in 
official contexts for ‘important’ and ‘necessary’ purposes. It makes sense, then, that 
scientific experimentation inflicted on animals should be framed in this way – as routine, 
unavoidable, and ultimately worthwhile – and that the animals should continue to be 
construed in distant, vague and ambiguous terms in order to preserve this narrative of 
necessity. 
 
5.3.3.3 Put down and put to sleep 
 
Put down and put to sleep serve similar communicative purposes when it comes to killing 
(animals), but behave in slightly different ways. In both cases, the Context is typically 
‘domestic’, though they also feature in ‘entertainment’ and ‘work’ (as discussed further 
in Chapter 6). The animals being put down or put to sleep tend to be pets, specifically 
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dogs and cats (53% overall50), but there are also instances of horses (9%51) and, rarely, 
some ‘wild’ animals such as lions, whales and seals (2%52). The main difference between 
the two terms is their polysemy: put to sleep has five senses, only one of which occurs in 
the PPPP sample; put down has 22 senses, ten of which are found in the PPPP sample. 
These patterns and their implicatures are given in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, respectively (pv 
stands here for ‘phrasal verb’ as per PDEV standard notation). The high number of 
possible senses of put down perhaps explains why its average ARD score (3.85) is slightly 
lower than that of put to sleep (4.49); it does not always refer to an act of killing, and this 
is reflected in the KVD. It may also be a result of slight differences in connotation. In 
both cases, however, the average PRD is notably high; put down and put to sleep have the 




Table 5.15: CPA patterns and their implicatures for put to sleep, as found in the BNC and PPPP samples 
 
50 n=101 for put down; n=41 for put to sleep 
51 n=17 for put down; n=6 for put to sleep 
52 n=5 for put down, n=1 for put to sleep 
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Table 5.16: CPA patterns and their implicatures for put down, as found in the BNC and PPPP samples 
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Put down and put to sleep are both euphemistic ‘killing’ terms, typically reserved for pets 
and other animals being killed in seemingly regrettable circumstances. These terms are 
sometimes used to ‘soften’ the act of killing being described (e.g. 5.47, Table 5.17), or to 
construe it as something necessary (5.48) and, in some cases, kind (5.49). 
 
 
Table 5.17: Corpus examples 5.47-5.50 
 
Most interesting about these terms is their relatively high incidence of the causative voice 
(18% of put down; 30% of put to sleep53); see examples underlined in Table 5.17. Aside 
from the objectifying effect this has on the animal, i.e. as burdensome possession in need 
of a service, this construction also creates a greater distance between the Agent and the 
Patient by increasing the valency. If we consider these constructions as catenative chains, 
the owner of the animal is the Agent, the initiator of this “irreversible process” Pachirat 
(2011). The additional use of the deontic modal had to at the start of this construction 
(n=6 for put down, n=9 for put to sleep) reinforces the sense of regret and simultaneously 
serves to minimise any notions of volition. Given that use of such language was found to 
be proportionately greater for put to sleep than for put down, it might be possible to say 
that, of the two terms, put to sleep is slightly more sentimental in connotation. 
 
53 25/136 lines for put down (Pattern 7 only); 17/57 lines for put to sleep (Pattern 3 only / all lines) 
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In both cases, the killing is almost always carried out by a vet, though the vet is rarely 
mentioned explicitly; 5.50 (Table 5.17) is one of those few (n=6) cases. The association 
of put down and put to sleep with pets and, consequently, vets, is perhaps so strong that 
their naming is typically seen as unnecessary, in the same way that the construction 
“[human] was sentenced” does not require the clarification “by a judge” (Hanks, 2013: 
285). Even in instances such as 5.51 (Table 5.18), where the animal owner is placed in 
the position of Agent in an active, non-causative construction, the reader can be fairly 
sure that the owner is not carrying out the killing themselves. In light of this, there might 
be an argument for changing the ‘killing’ implicatures of put down and put to sleep 
(Patterns 7 and 3, respectively) to instead read, “HUMAN kills or causes to be killed an 
old, infirm or unwanted animal” so as to cover examples of this syntax. However, since 
CPA entries are driven by norms, and the norm in this case is for animal owners to have 
the animal put down or put to sleep, in a causative construction, or otherwise for the 
animal to be put down or put to sleep, in a simple passive construction, such an 
amendment would not be justified. One that perhaps could be justified is the inclusion of 
the semantic role of ‘vet’, e.g. “HUMAN = Vet kills old, infirm or unwanted animal”, in 
the same way that the verb sentence invokes the agent HUMAN = Judge. However, unlike 
sentence, the terms put down and put to sleep are not reserved for killing carried out by 
trained professionals, even if that is usually the case, and the ambiguity that the current 
definition provides is not coincidental; these terms are often used to connote necessity, 
regret or a kindness, and not necessarily to specify a professional act of killing. Decisions 
such as these are not always clear-cut, and are the reason that CPA is described as 
involving “a great deal of lexicographic art” (Hanks, 2004: 88). 
 
 
Table 5.18: Corpus examples 5.51-5.53 
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The examples in Table 5.18 exemplify another effect of the use of put down and put 
to sleep: in ‘peaceful’ acts of killing such as these, the event is described as a source 
of pain and suffering not for the animal but for the human, construing them as the 
victim and thus detracting from the victimhood of the individual being killed. Death is 
not necessarily considered to be bad for animals, unlike humans – as discussed in the 
ethics literature (Chapter 2) – and even for animals who are cared about, such as pets, 
their killing is typically framed in terms of the loss of companionship on the part of 
the human, rather than the loss of life on the part of the animal. This attitude is 
summarised in the CPA implicature for these patterns: an animal who is put down or 
put to sleep is one who is old, infirm or unwanted. An unwanted animal is as eligible 
for killing as one who is suffering, because of the current paradigms – legal and 
cultural – in which animals exist as the property of humans. Again, whether or not 
such killings are “bad" for animals is no simple question, but what cannot be denied is 
that any harm construed by put down and put to sleep is consistently centred around 
the human and not the Patient of the killing. It is perhaps relevant that the causative 
construction, “had [companion animal] put down / put to sleep” is graphically 
reminiscent of the pseudo-passive, non-causative construction, “had [unfortunate 




Givón’s measure of topic continuity was not intended to be employed in the way it is 
here, and the differences in approach and research interests have naturally produced quite 
different findings in terms of Referential Distance. Nonetheless, his and others’ work on 
topicality in English – along with that of Yamamoto (1999) on animacy and referential 
expressions – provide a point of reference from which to consider the potential 
implications of high or low Referential Distance, especially where humans are concerned. 
We know from the literature that we should not be surprised to find a large proportion of 
HUMAN Agents. Less predictable is the high Referential Distance associated with 
HUMAN Agents and ANIMATE Patients, whom we would expect to have lower 
Referential Distance and therefore lower ambiguity, even when taking into consideration 
that my application of Referential Distance is more discerning (requires more explicit 
naming) than that of Givón and colleagues. This investigation into Referential Distance 
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suggests that referential behaviour is not necessarily inherent to semantic types 
themselves, but is also potentially attributable to the processes in which these actors 
participate. This is difficult to establish, however, without undertaking a more 
comprehensive comparison of different participants involved in a range of events of 
varying kinds.  
ARD and PRD were found to behave very differently as features, sometimes even in 
opposition, and this reflected the unequal relationship between HUMAN, which 
accounted for the vast majority of Agents, and ANIMAL, which constituted the vast 
majority of Patients. ANIMAL was, on the whole, placed in positions of greater Patient 
Referential Distance than inanimate Patients were, and this often had the result of 
detracting from their victimhood, in the same way that HUMAN Agents in positions of 
high Referential Distance are literally and figuratively distanced from their actions. 
Conversely, cases where Agents and Patients have lower Referential Distance might be 
perceived as attempts to be deliberately explicit: to expose the intentions of the Agent and 
draw attention to the suffering of the Patient. This could explain why the same verb, being 
used in the same sense, might be deployed with varying degrees of Referential Distance 
in order to meet the ideological needs of the speaker or writer. Some cases, however, are 
arguably driven by the norms and constraints of the text domain and genre, such as 
conventions of style in academic writing. In other cases, it may simply be that the speaker 
does not feel the need to mitigate such events, and this can manifest as either a low 
Referential Distance – i.e. an explicit, immediate mention of an unproblematic Agent or 
Patient – or as a high Referential Distance, such as in the form of a truncated passive 
construction whose absent Agent requires no explanation. 
In many cases, especially for verbs such as sacrifice and slaughter, unravelling the act of 
killing begins to feel like a murder mystery: the killer is so far away that all leads run 
cold. In others, they are hidden in plain view; terms like wipe out, sacrifice, butcher, put 
down and put to sleep create a subtle semantic distance even when the more obvious 
Referential Distance remains low. Wipe out, which takes as its object argument not 
ANIMAL but ANIMAL GROUP, provides distance by anonymising its victims; 
individuals are rendered a homogenous mass, as discussed in Chapter 7. Sacrifice evokes 
connotations of sacredness and necessity, so that those who are sacrificed might be 
viewed as useful means to an end rather than victims of appropriation and killing. 
Butcher, in its transitive form, can refer either to killing or cutting, and this ambiguity, 
rather than creating confusion, fits appropriately within a speciesist lexicon. In its 
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intransitive form, butcher erases the animal altogether, their absence unremarkable to the 
hearer, who is now not engaged in a discussion of killing but of a vocation. In 
constructions such as this, the focus shifts towards the human and away from the animal. 
Put down and put to sleep are two more examples of such anthropocentrism; their ‘killing’ 
implicatures, which are the same despite having slightly different connotations, remind 
us of the moral and legal status enjoyed by the most beloved animals in society: as 
companions deserving of life only when they are young, healthy and wanted, and whose 
quiet deaths are only truly harmful to their human owners. 
Unsurprisingly, then, we see that the distance and concealment that surrounds animal 
killing – particularly in the context of animal agriculture and other animal-orientated 
industries – also manifests in linguistic forms of distancing, some of which are less 
obvious, and potentially more powerful, than others. If animal advocates are to resist 
speciesist language, it will involve a concerted effort to close these literal and figurative 
gaps and to focus particularly on those terms that are semantically rather than 
syntactically obfuscating. In the chapter that follows, I turn my attention to another key 











Place and space are recurring themes in the literature surrounding both animals and 
language. Viewed through the lens of assemblage (described in Chapters 2 and 3), this 
begins to makes sense: in a world of flux and endless becomings, where networks are 
continuously being created and recreated, all entities take on a dynamic, processual 
quality, bound up in their spatial contexts. Naturally, this extends to the subjects under 
investigation here: acts of killing and acts of meaning.  Meaning, like killing, is an event, 
(Section 3.7.3), and as with all events there are specific contributing factors (or ‘actors’, 
in the Latourian sense) that come together to make the event what it is. In this chapter I 
analyse the cooccurring evental features of all 1,682 instances in the Killing Verb Dataset 
(KVD), paying particular attention to place, space and ‘Context’, a feature introduced in 
Chapter 4. The politics of sight also play a key role here, and as such I make a deliberate 
effort to present the ‘bigger picture’ of the data in a visual format, where possible. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 is centred around a map of Contexts, 
which presents the data in terms of events taking place across contextual ‘spaces’. The 
triangulated factors are the Agent, the Patient, and the Context of each ‘killing’ event, and 
although the input data was textual, i.e. concordance lines from the KVD, the features 
encoded during the annotation reflect an appreciation of the simultaneously material and 
semiotic nature of the data. The resulting analysis is therefore an examination of the whole 
assemblage: the material act of killing (or not, as the case may be, given that not all 
‘killing’ verb instances refer to killing), and the textual trace of a discursive act of 
meaning. Section 6.3 features another map, this time of text types, and in the ensuing 
subsections it is analysed and discussed in terms of events across text types, or ‘text-
spaces’, as they may well be called. In this analysis, verbs are represented by their 
individual patterns, derived using CPA. The chapter concludes in Section 6.4 with a brief 
discussion of the relationship between space, place, context and event. The RQs explicitly 
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addressed by this chapter are RQs 2 and 2a – concerning representations of the 
involvement of participants in acts of killing, and how stable such representations are 
across domains, respectively – but the chapter also contributes, less directly, to RQs 1 and 
3, given that it seeks to comment on the key themes of space, visibility and assemblage, 
and given that CPA was utilised in the generation of pattern numbers.   
 
6.2 Mapping across Contexts 
 
As described in Chapter 4, each instance (concordance) in the Killing Verb Dataset 
(KVD) was assigned a ‘Context’ value during the annotation process. Similar to the 
development of the Ontology, the Contexts were developed and refined over the course 
of the annotation, and were assigned depending on a number of factors, including the 
inferred place, purpose and circumstances of the event. In deciding to which Context an 
instance belonged, priority was given to place (e.g. in a lab, in a slaughterhouse), followed 
by the purpose of the killing (e.g. for entertainment, for profit), the circumstances of living 
(e.g. as a pet, as a ‘working’ animal), and the source or text type (e.g. scientific journal 
article, promotional text). This has made it possible to arrange the data from a spatial 
perspective, where Contexts constitute spaces – or ‘zones’ – in which the killing/meaning 
events take place. I refer to killing/meaning events as such because killing events and 
meaning events are considered here to be distinct but nonetheless inextricable; they are 
part of the same material-semiotic assemblage. Arranging the data in such a way enables 
me to survey, from a bird’s-eye view, many cooccurring evental attributes at once: the 
Agent semantic type, the Patient semantic type, the Context (a mixture of circumstantial 
features), and how common such clusters of features are. 
Figure 6.3 maps out all 1,682 of the killing/meaning events across the nine Context zones 
– ‘animal industries’, ‘domestic’, ‘entertainment’, ‘farming’, ‘general’, ‘lab’, ‘war’, 
‘wild’ and ‘work’ – and represents multiple instances of the same type of event. This was 
achieved by assigning each of the 56 general-level semantic types (e.g. HUMAN, 
ANIMAL, STATE OF AFFAIRS) with a unique numerical value between 3 and 58, so as 
to fit comfortably within an x-y graph with axis values from 0 to 60, and then plotting the 
Agents along the x-axis and the Patients along the y-axis. Numbers were assigned by 
simply ordering the semantic types alphabetically and then numbering them in ascending 
order; for example, the semantic type ARTIFACT is represented by the number 10, ASSET 
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by the number 11, BODY, 12, BODY PART, 13, and so on. The type ANIMAL, which 
would have been number 6, had to be assigned a different number (23) as it was so 
prevalent in the data that its points on the chart were overlapping the y-axis and affecting 
legibility (and this is also why no types were assigned a number below 3 nor above 58). 
Using a bubble chart (see e.g. Fig. 6.1), it was possible to plot the combinations of 
different types of Agents and Patients and at the same time depict the frequencies of these 
types of events. So, where the Agent was HUMAN (31) and the Patient was ANIMAL 
(23), for example, this event could be plotted with the coordinates (31, 23) and the 
‘bubble’ that appears in that spot is of a size relative to the frequency of that type of 
Agent-Patient pairing. 
 
Fig. 6.1: The bubble chart for the Context ‘entertainment’, with arrows illustrating the meeting of Agents 
(x-axis) and Patients (y-axis) 
 
Fig. 6.1, above, demonstrates how Agent (x-axis) and Patient (y-axis) semantic types, 
having been assigned numerical axis values, can be depicted as ‘meeting’ or ‘crossing 
paths’ in a standard x-y bubble chart. The orange vertical lines show the path of the Agent 
while the green horizontal lines mark the path of the Patient. The point of meeting is 
punctuated by a bubble whose size represents the raw frequency of that type of event, i.e. 
events with the same kind of Agent semantic type and the same kind of Patient semantic 
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type. As an example, Fig. 6.1 represents all events in the data that were tagged as 
belonging to an ‘entertainment’ Context. The same chart is reproduced with more detailed 
annotation in Fig. 6.2, below.  
 
 
Fig. 6.2: The bubble chart for the Context ‘entertainment’, labelled with Agent-Patient information 
 
Fig. 6.2 is the same as Fig. 6.1, but with labels to show which semantic types are entailed 
by the data points in the chart. Most of these are singular in frequency, and the highest in 
frequency is clearly the HUMAN-ANIMAL pairing represented by the large bubble near 
the centre of the chart at (31, 23). This reflects the 39 instances tagged as ‘entertainment’ 
that involve a HUMAN Agent and an ANIMAL Patient, as in Examples 6.1 and 6.2 in 
Table 6.1. Less predictable are pairings like BUSINESS ENTERPRISE-EVENT (n=1) and 
HUMAN-HUMAN (n=1), which are both examples of non-killing senses of verbs in use 




Table 6.1: Corpus examples 6.1-6.4 
 
The chart in Fig. 6.3, below, is essentially nine individual x-y bubble charts of this nature, 
which altogether account for all instances in the KVD. As above, the point where an 
Agent and Patient meet constitutes a killing/meaning event, and the size of the bubble 
that marks that point is indicative of the frequency of that Agent-Patient pairing within 
that Context.54 Along the left-hand side of each of the nine zones is a stacked bar chart 
denoting the proportions of different ‘killing’ verbs used in that context; a key at the 
bottom of Fig. 6.3 indicates which colour corresponds to which verb.55 This is separate 
data and is not related to any of the particular points on the chart; it is merely a way of 
incorporating more information in the same space. 
 
 
54 For reasons of clarity, only the bubbles with a size greater than n=5 were labelled with information, with 
the exception of the ‘war’ Context which had very low frequencies. 




This approach makes it possible to observe, at a glance, the sorts of conditions under 



































































verbs. It is important to note, however, that in the interests of clarity, the rectangular zones 
in Fig. 6.3 are depicted as being of equal size rather than as of a size relative to their 
proportion of the data. Some Contexts were very scarce – ‘war’ and ‘work’, for instance, 
which make up just 1.13% of the data, collectively – while others clearly dominate, 
namely ‘animal industries’ (21%) and ‘lab’ (30%). This is unsurprising, given the journal-
heavy composition of the PPPP corpus. Some of the Contexts are also less coherent than 
others; ‘general’, for instance, has points scattered throughout the space, rather than 
having a tight cluster of events around a particular point, and this is to be expected.  
As can be seen in Fig. 6.3, the relationship of HUMAN > ANIMAL (i.e. a HUMAN Agent 
paired with an ANIMAL Patient) is present in all Contexts – though less so in the Context 
‘farming’, which denotes arable farming rather than animal farming – and is especially 
dominant in ‘animal industries’ and ‘lab’. In most of the zones we also see a vertical 
clustering of points running roughly down the centre; this is due to where HUMAN 
(Agent) falls on the x-axis. This central, vertical line demonstrates a consistent presence 
of human Agency within that context, particularly noticeable in ‘animal industries’, 
‘domestic’, ‘general’, ‘lab’ and ‘wild’. This is rivalled, to some degree, in the ‘domestic’ 
and ‘wild’ zones. In these Contexts, the vertical line of bubbles that runs parallel to the 
HUMAN line, slightly to the left of the centre, is that of the ANIMAL Agent. Clearly, 
animals are described as having more Agency within a home/domestic context (i.e. as 
pets) and when in the ‘wild’ (e.g. as predators) than they are in other situations. In a way, 
the dispersion of data points in these Context zones suggests a slightly less imbalanced 
power relation between humans and animals in these domains, though clearly – from the 
size of the HUMAN > ANIMAL bubble – humans still appear to hold far more power 
overall. 
In the subsections that follow, each Context is briefly discussed in relation to its visual 
representation in Figure 6.3, starting with ‘animal industries’ in the upper left-hand corner 
and ending with ‘work’ in the bottom right-hand corner. 
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6.2.1 Animal industries 
 
‘Animal industries’ was the Context label assigned to all ‘killing’ events which were 
clearly situated in a context of animal exploitation for profit. In this particular zone, 
reproduced in isolation in Fig. 6.4, we see two main vertical lines of Agency: one 
belonging to HUMAN, running down the middle of the zone, and the other belonging to 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE on the left-hand side. These lines – marked with orange dashed 
lines on Fig. 6.4 – both intersect the path of the ANIMAL Patient on the y-axis (marked 
with a green dashed line). Predictable though such an outcome is, this serves as a clear, 
visual representation of how the ANIMAL can become implicated in a context dominated 
by humans and animal-exploiting businesses.  
 
 
Fig. 6.4: The ‘animal industries’ Context zone in isolation, Agent and Patient lines highlighted 
 
Unsurprisingly, the most frequently occurring verb in ‘animal industries’ is slaughter, 
seen in 34% of cases, followed by cull (17%), harvest (11%) and kill (11%). Such findings 
are in line with what we already know about the role of animals within the industrial 
complex, i.e. as Patients and as done to, rather than as Agents or as doers. Specifically, 
they are Patients of systematic and procedural forms of killing, such as slaughtering, 
which has specific connotations in animal-killing industries. They are also treated as 





In the ‘domestic’ zone we see a similar pattern of human dominance to that of ‘animal 
industries’; see Fig. 6.5 for this Context in isolation. This is probably due to the fact that 
cases were classified as ‘domestic’ when they related to human homes and other human 
property, such as pets, but the types of verbs, or processes, that occur here are very 
different from other Contexts: mainly put down (60%) and put to sleep (19%), which is 
what we might expect. Other verbs that feature are destroy (e.g. of pets, of inanimate 
objects in the home, 8%), euthanise (of pets, 4%) and murder (of humans by their family 
members, 3%). It is worth bearing in mind that not all ‘killing’ verb instances in the KVD 
refer to killing (in fact, only 79% of the data, overall), and that is evident here in the 
interactions with inanimate Patients, e.g. HUMAN > STUFF (n=12; see Example 6.5, 
Table 6.2), HUMAN > PHYSICAL OBJECT (n=7, e.g. 6.6),  HUMAN > ARTIFACT (n=7, 
e.g. 6.7), and ANIMAL > ARTIFACT (n=4, e.g. 6.8), amongst others. 
 
 
Table 6.2: Corpus examples 6.5-6.8 
 
These Patients could all be grouped under the umbrella semantic type of PHYSICAL 
OBJECT, but slightly different types of PHYSICAL OBJECT can activate different senses 
of a verb, especially in the case of put down, as demonstrated by (6.5-6.7); to put down 
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STUFF, e.g. food or poison (put down, Pattern 5 in Appendix D) has a different meaning 
to e.g. put down PHYSICAL OBJECT or put down ARTIFACT (put down, Patterns 1 and 
4, Appendix D). This perhaps explains why, although we see the Patient STUFF 
appearing along the HUMAN Agent line in Fig. 6.3, we don’t see STUFF as something 
with which ANIMAL interacts where these verbs are concerned. 
 
 
Fig. 6.5: The ‘domestic’ Context zone in isolation, Agent lines highlighted 
 




Table 6.3: Corpus examples 6.9-6.10 
 
Overall, however, it cannot be ignored that the main activity taking place under 
‘domestic’ circumstances is that of HUMAN killing ANIMAL (n=189), typically a vet 
putting down or putting to sleep a pet. This does not imply that, in these cases, the killing 
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is taking place in the home, but simply that the animals being killed are cohabiting pets 




‘Entertainment’, used to label instances of killing involving animals used for 
entertainment purposes, is a much smaller Context than most, accounting for just 2.9% 
of all instances in the data. The zone is reproduced in isolation in Fig. 6.6. 
 
 
Fig. 6.6: The ‘entertainment’ Context zone in isolation 
 
Again, the main ‘killing’ interactions we see here are between humans and animals 
(n=39), where HUMAN is the Agent and ANIMAL is the Patient. There is also a small 
cluster just to the right of the centre, representing four instances of LOCATION > 
ANIMAL (as in the examples in Table 6.4). It is perhaps worth mentioning that in both of 
these cases, the Agent is not named explicitly but is referred to metonymically (“zoos”, 
rather than “people working in zoos”), creating a semantic distance of the kind discussed 
in Chapter 5. In some cases, as in Example 6.11, the mention of the ‘zoo’ was not only 






Table 6.4: Corpus examples 6.11-6.12 
 
The verbs seen in this Context are varied, including put down (22%), destroy (22%), kill 
(14%), euthanise (14%) and slaughter (12%). The Patients – or victims – of 
‘entertainment’ are mainly those used in sports, e.g. horses (n=21), but also more ‘exotic’ 
animals kept in enclosures, such as tigers, giraffes and whales, who are killed by humans 
when they are no longer fit for (human) purpose. There is also one example of a HUMAN 
destroying another HUMAN – in tennis (see Pattern 2 of destroy in Appendix D) – and 
one of an ANIMAL killing a HUMAN, the animal being a killer whale and the human a 
trainer at SeaWorld. 
‘Entertainment’ is relatively sparse, despite the fact that animals quite often feature as 
objects of entertainment: in recreational hunting and fishing, for example. However, those 
cases were instead classified as ‘wild’, for the reasons described in Chapter 4 and revisited 




‘Farming’, not to be confused with animal-related farming (classed under ‘animal 
industries’), refers to ‘killing’ events that take place within the context of arable farming. 
This explains why the incidence of HUMAN > ANIMAL is very small (n=5) in this 
Context, and instead we see mainly HUMAN > PLANT (n=10), and HUMAN > PLANT 
PART (n=9), the most commonly used verb being harvest (63%). In two cases a HUMAN 
harvests a LOCATION, as in Example 6.13 in Table 6.5. All of these findings are quite 
self-explanatory; arable farming involves the harvesting of plants, plant parts, and 
locations. The 11% of cases which involve culling, i.e. of ANIMAL by HUMAN, 
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represents the instances where farmers or hunters kill animals that threaten their crops or 
encroach on their land; see e.g. 6.14 and 6.15. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Corpus examples 6.13-6.15 
 
‘Farming’ represents a commercial context in which animals are not themselves the 
product – as they are in ‘animal industries’ – but are nonetheless killable for posing a 
threat to the farmer’s financial interests. The deontic modal verbs, underlined in 6.14 
and 6.15 in Table 6.5, demonstrate the sense of obligation imposed on the farmer to 
kill animals who enter into that space. In 6.15 there is an emphasis on the fact that 
culling is dependent on, even induced by, some bothersome property of the animal in 




‘General’, the zone at the centre of Fig. 6.3, isolated in Fig. 6.7, demonstrates the usual 
strong trend of HUMAN agency, represented by the vertical line of bubbles running down 
the middle. HUMAN > ANIMAL is still by far the most commonly occurring relationship 
in this Context (n=45), if we can call this a Context. ‘General’ was used to classify 
instances that did not fit into one of the other eight categories, or otherwise referred to 
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‘killing’ events that take place – or can take place – in a wide range of contexts or even 
several contexts at once. Often, this can be explained by the fact that the event in question 
is not one of killing, and therefore falls outside of the main theme of the data, e.g. 6.16 
and 6.17 in Table 6.6. This is reflected in the presence of verbs such as destroy (31% of 
the ‘general’ Context), put down (13%) and wipe out (8%). It can also be the case that it 
is not a specific, past event that is being reported on – like an attack in the wild or a 
scientific experiment in a lab – but rather a general, habitual or hypothetical activity that 
is perhaps closer in nature to a state of affairs than an event (e.g. 6.18 – 6.20). ‘General’ 
also includes instances that do not have any specific place, motive or purpose, as in 6.21. 
In some cases there was simply not enough evidence in the text and the context was too 
ambiguous to be categorised in any other way. ‘General’ is, in some ways, a catch-all bin 
for ill-fitting cases, which is unavoidable in analyses such as this. 
 
 




Fig. 6.7: The ‘general’ Context zone in isolation, Agent and Patient lines highlighted 
 
Looking at ‘general’ in Fig. 6.7, we see there are several Agent lines emerging (marked 
with dashed orange lines): on the far left-hand side is the line representing the Agent 
ACTIVITY, such as the car-driving in (6.19); just left of the centre is the line for ANIMAL 
Agency, typically referring to animals who are not ‘domestic’ but not necessarily ‘wild’ 
and as a result fall under ‘general’; in the middle we have the usual HUMAN line of 
Agency, and as we can see these are typically HUMAN > ANIMAL events but also – 
unique to this context – some HUMAN > HUMAN instances too; and finally on the far 
right-hand side is the line representing the Agent X, i.e. no Agent mentioned or inferable 
from the text. What is most distinctive about ‘general’ is the presence of a HUMAN 
Patient line. The fact that we see HUMAN as a consistent Patient in ‘general’ is the result 
of a number of factors: i) given the animal-killing theme of the PPPP corpus (and the 
KVD as a result), many of these HUMAN Patient cases are instances of non-killing verb 
senses, hence falling outside of the other, killing-orientated contexts; ii) humans who fall 
victim to acts of violence and killing do not tend to do so within the other contexts found 
in this study, since these are human-controlled domains of animal exploitation, leaving 
‘general’ as the only viable category for such instances; and iii) the settings and 
motivations associated with the killing of humans are different from and far more varied 






‘Lab’ is the most commonly occurring Context of all, present in 30% of all instances in 
the KVD. This is unsurprising, given the high volume of scientific journal article data in 
the PPPP corpus (and consequently the KVD), and the fact that 96% of all ‘lab’ 
occurrences come from journal article texts. Incidence of ANIMAL Agency in the ‘lab’ 
Context is predictably tiny (n=5); this zone of the data is dominated by HUMAN acting 
upon ANIMAL (n=331). Animals are not the only Patients construed in lab-based 
activities, however. We also see HUMAN Agents combining with STUFF (n=86), 
ORGANISM (n=13), PLANT (n=13), PLANT PART (n=12) and BODY PART (n=8); see 
Table 6.7 for examples. 
 
 
Table 6.7: Corpus examples 6.22-6.24 
 
The high number of ‘part’ Patients (e.g. BODY PART, PLANT PART, STUFF), as seen in 
the examples in Table 6.7, explains the high proportion (26%) of harvest occurrences. 
‘Lab’ is also strongly associated with the verb sacrifice, discussed in Chapter 5, which 
constitutes 37% of this section of the data, compared with <5% in all other contexts. 
Slaughter is present in 12% of all ‘lab’ cases, and – like sacrifice – this reflects the 
official, procedural nature of lab-based activities, killing being no exception. 
Seemingly negligible in such a large Context are the 28 instances of euthanise (out of the 
48 lines for euthanise in the entire KVD). Although it is used in much the same way as 
slaughter and sacrifice (e.g. euthanised by cervical dislocation, euthanised for tissue 
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collection), it is striking that the animals euthanised in a ‘lab’ Context include DOG 
(n=6), MOUSE (n=6), GOAT (n=4), COW (n=2), SHEEP (n=2), CAT (n=1), RABBIT 
(n=1) and GUINEA PIG (n=1). These are the kinds of animals that humans either keep as 
pets or might otherwise have personal contact with. The six instances of DOG, distributed 
across three journal article texts, represent half of all occurrences of DOG in a ‘lab’ 
Context. The other six DOG Patients in ‘lab’, which all come from one journal article, 
are not euthanised but sacrificed. When dogs are killed for animal experimentation 
purposes, then, their deaths are either construed as an act of ‘euthanasia’, or as an act of 
‘sacrifice’. This is notably different from how most animals killed for experimentation 
are discursively represented. 
 
 
Fig. 6.8: The ‘lab’ Context zone in isolation, Agent and Patient lines highlighted 
 
As well as the familiar horizontal line of ANIMAL Patients, just below the centre of the 
‘lab’ zone, we can also see a line near the top of the zone, marked by a green dashed line 
in Fig. 6.8, representing the instances of STUFF as Patient. STUFF is acted upon by 
HUMAN, as we already know, but it is also affected by Agents such as PROCESS (n=6), 
other STUFF (n=5), and ANIMAL (n=2), amongst others. In the same way that the ‘animal 
industries’ Context clearly depends on the presence of ANIMAL Patients, as shown by the 
horizontal line of ANIMAL points, so too is the ‘lab’ Context one that clearly revolves 
around the use of resources and materials, judging by the persistence of the STUFF 
Patient line. That the ANIMAL and STUFF lines are comparable in this zone is reflective 






‘War’ is the least represented Context in this data, found in just five ‘killing’ instances. 
There might be an argument for subsuming these few cases under one of the other 
Contexts, given this low frequency. However, these events are closely tied to 
circumstances with a distinct setting, purpose, participants and political context – namely 
war. With such a small sample of such data it is difficult to comment generally on the 
language pertaining to ‘killing’ events in war contexts. In the five instances available 
here, we see two horses riding into battle – one slaughtered, the other killed; lion cubs 
put down “owing to war conditions”; animals wiped out by a civil war in Mozambique; 
and a mention of humankind destroying land with bombs. The lack of ‘war’ data, in 
comparison with ‘animal industries’ and ‘lab’, reflects the nature of the PPPP corpus as 
an animal-orientated source of linguistic data, compiled at a time when wars (involving 
animals) were not being widely discussed in news, journal articles or other general 




‘Wild’ was the most problematic category in terms of annotation. Given that the main 
criterion for deciding on the context of an event represented in the data, as described in 
Chapter 4, was place, followed by purpose (of killing), circumstances (of living), and 
finally source (text type), events that take place in the wild but for specific purposes (e.g. 
hunting for pleasure, killing ‘wildlife’ to meet social or financial demands) are difficult 
to classify. It is interesting, however, that by analysing the context in this predominantly 
place-orientated way, we see that simply being ‘in the wild’ can have radical implications 
in terms of actors and events. 
Unlike other Contexts – apart from ‘domestic’ and ‘general’, to some degree – the 
ANIMAL in ‘wild’ has a vertical line of Agency that can almost rival that of HUMAN. Of 
course, the ‘wild’ is still dominated by humans killing animals, and HUMAN > ANIMAL 
is the most commonly occurring dynamic in this Context (n=168), but the second most 
frequent is ANIMAL > ANIMAL (n=18), a relationship found only in ‘wild’ and, to a lesser 
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degree, in ‘general’ (n=4). ANIMAL is the Agent in a range of events, as can be seen from 
the number of bubbles along the ANIMAL Agent line (the leftmost orange dotted line) in 
Fig. 6.9. The Patients in these events include EGG (n=5), LOCATION (n=5), PLANT 
(n=3), PLANT PART (n=3), PHYSICAL OBJECT (n=2) and HUMAN (n=2), amongst 
others. Conversely, as shown by the long, horizontal dotted green line of ANIMAL as 
Patient, just below the centre of Fig. 6.9, we know that animals in the ‘wild’ are also 
affected (predated upon?) by an equally diverse range of Agents: HUMAN (n=168), 
ANIMAL (n=18), EVENT (n=6), LOCATION (n=6), ACTION (n=5), ORGANISATION 
(n=5), WEATHER (n=4), X (n=4), ACTIVITY (n=2), ARTIFACT (n=2), DISEASE (n=2), 
GOVERNMENT (n=2), and more. 
That there should be more variability in terms of Agents and Patients in the ‘wild’, 
compared with more controlled, homogenous environments such as ‘lab’, is unsurprising. 
Fig. 6.3 shows, however, that not only are interactions in the ‘wild’ more varied – as they 
are in ‘general’ – but certain entities are consistently more productive, both as Agent and 
as Patient, demonstrated by the intersecting Agent and Patient lines in Fig. 6.9. There are 
no other Contexts in which ANIMAL is comparable with HUMAN in terms of the reach 
of its Agency across the zone. The fact that the Patient line for ANIMAL is just as long 
and spread out suggests that, while animals pose more of a threat to other entities in the 
wild, so too are animals at risk of a wide range of ‘killing’ eventualities. Nonetheless, the 
greatest threat to ANIMAL is still HUMAN. 
 
 
Fig. 6.9: The ‘wild’ Context zone in isolation, Agent and Patient lines highlighted 
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The two horizontal green lines in the top half of Fig. 6.9 represent the Patient types of 
PLANT and LOCATION. This is a predictable finding, given that a ‘natural’ environment 
such as ‘wild’ will feature ‘natural’ Patients, as in Examples 6.25 and 6.26, Table 6.8. 
The third Patient line is that of ANIMAL (6.27). 
 
 
Table 6.8: Corpus examples 6.25-6.29 
 
The occurrence of verbs like cull (25%) and wipe out (11%) paints a picture of the 
HUMAN attempting to exert control in wild spaces. Incidence of the verb destroy (17%) 
points to the destruction of natural features, not only by HUMAN but also by ANIMAL, 
EVENT and X (no Agent, represented by the vertical dashed line on the far right-hand 
side of Fig. 6.7). The presence of kill (21%) is indicative of general, multi-directional acts 
of killing in the wild; kill, as discussed in Chapter 5, is the least specific and most widely-
applicable of all of the ‘killing’ terms. 
It is interesting to note that the high proportion of PLANT Patients in ‘wild’ does not 
invoke a similarly high proportion of the verb we would expect: harvest. Instead, this 
relatively low incidence of harvest (3%) is reserved for ANIMAL Patients (as in Examples 
6.28 and 6.29, Table 6.8), while PLANT is destroyed, killed and wiped out. ‘Wild’ is a 
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clear example of how the roles of familiar entities change with their environment: PLANT, 
a Patient typically harvested in human-controlled environments, becomes a natural 
feature, just like a LOCATION, or a freely existing natural phenomenon. ANIMAL takes 
on a unique status: that of free agent, in some cases exerting power over their environment 
in anthropomorphic ways (e.g. 6.28); but also that of natural feature and resource, similar 
to PLANT and LOCATION (e.g. 6.29, Table 6.8). These parallelisms – ANIMAL as 
human-like Agent, and ANIMAL as plant-like Patient, as natural feature – are reflected 




With just 14 data points, ‘work’ is a small and very specific Context, referring to ‘killing’ 
events that take place either in a work environment (as a direct result of one’s job) or 
affecting those whose circumstances of living are work-dependent. All but one (Example 
6.30 in Table 6.9, a case of put down, Pattern 2) of these 14 instances involve humans 
killing animals, specifically dogs, and there are only two verbs found in this Context: put 
down (71%) and put to sleep (29%). These dogs are typically police dogs, guard dogs or 




Table 6.9: Corpus examples 6.30-6.32 
 
Despite the fact that fox hunting is not a ‘work’ environment, and the killing of foxhounds 
may well take place in a domestic environment, the animals’ circumstances of life and 
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death are inextricably linked to their purpose, i.e. to fulfil a job created by humans. As 
with ‘war’, the ‘work’ Context is small and its borders may be fuzzy, but its circumstances 




Philosophically speaking, the map of Contexts in Figure 6.3 could be seen as a 
problematic illustration of human-animal relations, in the same sense that the term 
‘human-animal relations’ does not accurately convey a situation where humans are 
consistently found to be exerting their power over other animals across a range of spaces 
and contexts (cf. Wadiwel, 2015). By plotting Agents and Patients on axes and noting 
where they ‘meet’ and ‘cross paths’, there is a danger of construing the Patient as a willing 
participant, as though an equal force of causality and intentionality is being exerted by 
both parties. After all, a correspondence analysis such as this one illustrates co-
occurrences of features in neutral, mutual terms; they are data relationships. Is it right to 
conceptualise the dynamic between a killer and their victim as a ‘relationship’?  
If we consider these events as assemblages, or actor-networks, we can recognise them as 
arrangements of cooccurring features. Each of these features is critical to the assemblage: 
the Agent (themselves an assemblage), the Patient (another assemblage), spatiotemporal 
features, and so on. No two data points are the same; I have grouped them here under 
similar types of events (similar actants, e.g. HUMAN > ANIMAL; similar circumstances, 
e.g. in a Context of animal commodification) because this is a useful way of identifying 
trends and patterns, not because ‘a human is a human’ or ‘stuff is stuff’. Taking 
assemblage thinking to its logical conclusion, one could argue that everything is 
temporary and in flux, and as such no two entities are the same. Heraclitus famously 
claimed that change is ever-present; we cannot step in the same river twice. We do not 
even need to fully commit to this view of becoming to accept that every event that takes 
place is a unique arrangement of elements, and that each of those elements is 
indispensable. In this way, it is possible to appreciate the role of the patient in a violent 
event without insinuating that the victim is somehow to blame, or that they invited such 
treatment; their presence simply matters to the outcome. They unfortunately co-construct 
the event, which is immanent to its arrangement of parts. 
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An important aspect of the Contexts map is that it does not chart a linear chain of 
causality, although the labelling of Agent-Patient pairings using a ‘more than’ symbol 
(e.g. HUMAN > ANIMAL) implies direction of action. The ‘Agent’ as marked here is the 
doer of the action being described, but from an assemblage point of view, they are just 
one participant in a network of distributed agency. Agency – not to be conflated here with 
intentionality – is also exerted by other actants in the assemblage ‘mixture’, even if they 
are not marked as ‘the Agent’. In this case we can trace what looks to be evidence of 
Agency on the part both of the Patient and of the Context – Agency in the material-
semiotic sense – but it is difficult to comment on the extent of their causal power. This 
analysis reminds us that animals are consistently oppressed in contexts of 
commodification, regardless of the commodity; where financial interests are involved, 
such as in animal industries, laboratory settings and arable farms, we can expect ANIMAL 
to represent a Patient, and not an Agent. There are ANIMAL Agents in less structured 
settings, such as in the home and the ‘wild’, but they are still far more likely to feature as 
Patient. Whether the Context influences the action, or whether in some ways the action 
constructs the Context, there appears to be a clear relationship between a space, its 
purposes, its inhabitants and its processes. In many ways, it seems that an animal in one 
place truly does become a different animal in another. 
 
6.3 Mapping across Text Types 
 
In the previous section, killing/meaning events were mapped across Context zones, 
exploring the role of Context – a mixture of place, purpose and circumstance – in 
Agent/Patient ‘killing’ assemblages. In this section, I consider texts as spaces, and map 
killing/meaning events across the text types – or as I call them, text-spaces – that feature 
in the KVD (as a result of being derived from the PPPP corpus). Events are denoted here 
by specific CPA verb patterns, rather than verbs in general. By focusing on the most 
prominent verb patterns within each text type, we can begin to get an idea of the sorts of 
events – or meanings – that are consistently being reproduced in those text-spaces. 
First, it makes sense to get an idea of the distribution of the different text types in the 
PPPP corpus, and how well these genres are represented in the Killing Verb Dataset 
(KVD). As noted above, and as seen in Table 6.10, journal articles are by far the most 
dominant text type, comprising around two-thirds of the PPPP corpus. They still represent 
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the largest text type in the KVD, but are not as common as would be expected. Legislation 
is another underrepresented genre in the KVD. News, campaign literature, MO data, focus 
groups and interview transcripts, on the other hand, are all more than twice as prevalent 
in the KVD than would be expected from the composition of the PPPP corpus. Given that 
the data was sampled by searching for ‘killing’ verbs within the PPPP corpus, this result 
might reflect a stronger preoccupation with killing in certain text types – which could be 
true for the news and campaign literature genres – or it may reflect a tendency of certain 
texts to be more verb-heavy than others; for example, if the same processes might in other 
text types be encoded using nominalisations. If this is the case, it could explain the lower 
representation of journal article and legislative texts and the higher representation of 
spoken-language subcorpora such as the focus group and interview transcripts. 
 
 
Table 6.10: The distribution of text types across the PPPP corpus and the dataset used in this project 
 
Similar to the Contexts map in Figure 6.3, the text types map (Figure 6.10) provides an 
‘aerial view’ of all 1,682 instances that make up the KVD. This time, the data is arranged 
by text type, and the zones are sized proportionately, rather than uniformly. This is 
because the size of each zone represents the number of instances of a specific verb pattern 
within a text type, making it possible to compare proportions of verb patterns within a 
specific text type as well as across the rest of the dataset.56 Verb patterns are indicated 
 
56 This was not possible to do with the Contexts map because there were some Contexts, such as ‘war’ and 
‘work’, that were too small in size to be able to demonstrate the data clearly. 
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using verb names with subscript numbers, e.g. destroy₁ for Pattern 1 of destroy, and put 
down₅ for Pattern 5 of put down. Raw frequencies are listed alongside the verb patterns. 
Patterns whose frequencies are lower than 5 within a text type are unlabelled on the map; 
the full list of verb pattern frequencies across text types is given in Appendix E.  
In the following subsections, each area of the Contexts map is discussed in terms of its 
most frequent verb patterns, and in some cases the verb patterns that are noticeably absent. 










































6.3.1 Journal articles 
 
The journal article data – which comprises 40% of the dataset – dominates the text-type 
landscape in Fig. 6.10. The most prominent patterns found here are sacrifice₁, in which a 
human kills an animal (traditionally for the benefit of a deity, but in this case for research 
purposes); harvest₄, the removing of a body part for use in research, in which it is not 
always clear whether killing has taken place; and slaughter₁, the killing of an animal by 
a human “for a purpose” (see Appendix D for all verb patterns and their implicatures). 
Other verb senses that feature heavily in this section are cull₂, used to describe the killing 
of unwanted farmed animals by, or on behalf of, farmers (see Example 6.33, Table 6.11); 
harvest₁, which refers to the cutting down and gathering of plant crops (6.34); and 
harvest₃, which denotes the killing of animals – usually fish – by humans, to be used as 
food (6.35). Kill₁, destroy₁ and euthanise₁ also feature with roughly equal frequency. All 
of these patterns are evidence of the kinds of preoccupations one would expect in a 




Table 6.11: Corpus examples 6.33-6.35  
 
As a genre of high referential distance (see Chapter 5) and with relatively strict discursive 
conventions, it makes sense that the journal article texts be devoid of more emotive verb 
senses encoded as e.g. murder₁, butcher₂, put down₇ and put to sleep₃, and that distribution 
of verb patterns be fairly consistent across the domain. 
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6.3.2 News and broadcasts 
 
The next largest text-type area in Fig. 6.10 is that of news articles. Here we see a 
predominance of put down₇, i.e. the killing of unwanted (typically domestic) animals by 
humans (see Example 6.36, Table 6.12), followed closely by kill₁, which can refer to the 
killing of any living creature. There is also a high representation of cull₁, the sense that 
refers to the mass killing of animals by humans (6.37); destroy₄, denoting the (usually 
official and sanctioned) killing of an animal by a human (6.38); slaughter₁, another nod 
to official procedure (6.39); and destroy₁, which refers not to killing but to the damaging 
of inanimate objects (6.40).  
 
 
Table 6.12: Corpus examples 6.36-6.40 
 
Other high-frequency verb patterns found here are cull₂, the killing of unwanted farmed 
animals (6.41, Table 6.13); wipe out₁, the eradicating of a human or animal group, by a 
wide range of possible causes (6.42); and murder₁, which refers mainly, but not 
exclusively, to the killing of humans by other humans (e.g. 6.43 and 6.44). Again, these 
preoccupations are to be expected: news articles report on events that are of public 
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concern, either because they are shocking (as in the cases of murder₁, kill₁, destroy₁ and 
wipe out₁), or because they are the result of some official, procedural, decision-making 
process (e.g. put down₇, cull₁, cull₂, destroy₄ and slaughter₁).  
 
 
Table 6.13: Corpus examples 6.41-6.46 
 
Just south of the news section in Fig. 6.10, in the broadcast transcripts, we see similar 
examples of ‘newsworthy’ events: wipe out₁, destroy₁, kill₁ and slaughter₁. Broadcast 
transcripts, however, lack some of the more personal and emotive terms found in the 
news, such as put down₇ and murder₁, and place greater emphasis on actions of mass 
violence and physical destruction, e.g. wipe out₁ (6.45) and destroy₁ (6.46); see Table 
6.13.  
Interestingly, despite its prevalence in the news texts, the broadcast transcripts do not 
mention culling at all. Perhaps this reflects the fact that news texts are more 
anthropocentric (of relevance to, or for the benefit of, humans), while broadcasts cover 
more ‘natural’, ‘wild’ phenomena. 
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6.3.3 Campaign literature 
 
In the top right-hand corner of the chart in Fig. 6.10 are the campaign literature texts, 
which make up 9.75% of the dataset. Again, we see a mixture of ‘official’ killing verb 
senses (kill₁, slaughter₁, cull₁, destroy₄; e.g. 6.47 and 6.48, Table 6.14), as well as more 
emotive terms (murder₁, put to sleep₃, euthanise₁, put down₇; e.g. 6.49 and 6.50), with a 
focus on the killing of animals. The most frequently occurring verb sense is kill₁, which 
perhaps simply reflects the general purpose of the genre: to convey the plight of oppressed 




Table 6.14: Corpus examples 6.47-6.50 
 
An unexpected verb here is dispatch₂, which refers to the deliberate killing of an animal 
by a human. Of the eight campaign literature instances of dispatch₂, five (6.51-6.55, Table 
6.15) are modified by the adverb humanely, which is not to be expected from animal 
advocates given that it serves to soften or justify acts of killing by implying that they are 
done nicely. These all come from different texts, yet they all refer to the killing of snared 
animals by trappers, gamekeepers and other professional animal killers. It seems as 
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though this phraseology has been borrowed, perhaps uncritically, from animal snaring 
guidelines and the language of snare proponents.  
 
 
Table 6.15: Corpus examples 6.51-6.55 
 
Coupled with a euphemistic verb like dispatch, “humane” or “humanely” further 
increases the semantic distance between the agent and the moral implications of their 
actions. This is the kind of construction that animal advocates need to resist rather than 
reproduce. 
 
6.3.4 MO data and dogs transcripts 
 
The Mass Observation (MO) data and dogs transcripts zones at the bottom of the chart 
represent more personal territory: in these instances, respondents were asked for their 
thoughts on animals and animal-related topics. For the MO data – which consists of 
responses to the question “What do animals mean to you?” and other related subquestions 
– this preoccupation with personal interests can be recognised in domestic and pet-related 
terms such as put down₇ (6.56, Table 6.16) and put to sleep₃ (6.57), as well as put down₅ 
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(i.e. to put down food or poison; see Example 6.58 in Table 6.16). There are also 
references to animal industries, prompted by the respondents’ reflections on their own 
use of animals as food, e.g. kill₁ (6.59) and slaughter₁ (6.60). Evidently, as seen in these 
final two examples, such reflections prompted expressions of guilt and obligation towards 
the animals killed for human consumption.  
 
 
Table 6.16: Corpus examples 6.56-6.62 
 
The dog owners who contributed to the dogs transcripts data have similar preoccupations: 
put down₇, put to sleep₃, put down₂ (i.e. to put something down on paper; 6.61), and again 
put down₅ (to put down e.g. food or water; 6.62). 
In both of these text types, the most frequently used verb patterns are put down₇ and 
put to sleep₃, reflecting the (expected) interest in animal companions, particularly 
dogs. Absent from both of these sections of the map is the less sentimental killing term 
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used for domestic animals, destroy₄, as well as more technical terms like harvest and 
euthanise. 
 
6.3.5 Focus groups 
 
The focus group transcripts are fairly general and varied in topic: respondents were 
recruited based on their occupations, group membership, and so on (e.g. farmers, hunters, 
vegans), and they were asked to discuss a range of pre-defined topics. The results of this 
can be seen in the verb patterns on the chart in Figure 6.10; kill₁, cull₁, cull₂, wipe out₁ 
and destroy₁ indicate more general topics of human-animal relations and questions of 
groups or species rather than individuals (6.63-6.65, Table 6.17). Put down₇, put to sleep₃ 
and destroy₄ refer to stories of animal ownership, i.e. of pets (see 6.66 and 6.67), while 




Table 6.17: Corpus examples 6.63-6.68 
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The variety of ‘killing’ terms present in this subcorpus perhaps reflects the diversity 
of stances represented by the participants; some statements are more general and 




The ‘interview’ portion of the KVD is of a similar nature to that of the focus group 
transcripts, but it is evident that the responses were generally less personal and more 
professional and authoritative: interviewees were usually discussing their fields of 
expertise rather than their personal lives, and predominantly used terms with greater 
semantic distance and with less personal connotations, e.g. cull₁, kill₁, destroy₄, euthanise₁ 
and slaughter₁ (Examples 6.69-6.73, Table 6.18). Put down₅ is a reference to ‘pest-
control’ techniques (6.74). 
 
 
Table 6.18: Corpus examples 6.69-6.74 
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While the MO exercise provoked personal reflection (“I am”, “I want”, “my guilt”) and 
the focus groups involved discussions of ideas (“I don’t think”, “I thought”, “aren’t 
they”), the interview data seems to revolve around the imparting of knowledge from a 
position of authority (“I know that”, “this would be”, “the last thing you should do”). 
Differences in modality, while not the focus of this study, would evidently be a fruitful 




Unsurprisingly, the legislation texts feature the most official and least personal ‘killing’ 
verb senses of all of the text types, and the limited number and relative evenness of 
frequency of the ‘killing’ terms demonstrates a tight coherence of genre. Slaughter₁, 
destroy₄ and kill₁ relate to animal-killing practices (see 6.75 and 6.76, Table 6.19), while 
destroy₁ refers to instances of damage inflicted on physical entities (see 6.77). In several 
cases, the line between destroy₄ and destroy₁ becomes blurred, and living beings are 
subtly coerced into taking on the status of “things”. This is explored in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Table 6.19: Corpus examples 6.75-6.77 
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Entirely absent from the ‘legislation’ sample are uses of butcher, cull, dispatch, euthanise, 
exterminate, murder, put down, put to sleep, sacrifice and wipe out. 
 
6.3.8 Promotional food texts 
 
Finally, the smallest area on the ‘map’ in Fig. 6.10 is that of promotional food texts: 
websites advertising animal-derived food products. Predictably, the main processes 
involved are butcher₁ (the cutting up of animals’ bodies to be processed for food orders; 
see 6.78) and dispatch₁ (in the sense of packaging and delivering orders to customers; see 
6.79). The three instances of sacrifice₃ found here are not the ‘killing’ sense of sacrifice 
as used in the journal article texts (sacrifice₁), but refer to the prioritising of certain aspects 
of food products (e.g. 6.80). 
 
 
Table 6.20: Corpus examples 6.78-6.80 
 
Naturally, this subcorpus sample does not feature any emotive ‘killing’ terms that might 
remind the reader (consumer) of the moral value of animals or the suffering they have 





Aside from visually illustrating the distribution of text types and their verb patterns across 
the KVD, Fig. 6.10 also serves as an example of the “shimmering” nature of words and 
their meanings (Hanks and Jezek, 2008; discussed in Chapter 3). Not only do we see a 
shimmering of verb patterns, i.e. certain patterns appearing in one space and dropping out 
in another, but also a shimmering of the kinds of nouns that feature with verbs in those 
patterns, as found by Hanks and Jezek (2008.). For example, the verb in the pattern put 
down₅ – meaning to ‘lay something down purposefully’ – takes as its direct object a trap 
or a snare in ‘campaign literature’; a bowl or food in ‘dogs transcripts’; bait or poison in 
‘interview’; and a combination of these in ‘MO data’. Destroy₁ – the kind that denotes 
damage inflicted on physical objects – applies to nests and eggs in ‘broadcast’ and 
‘campaign literature’; habitats, the world, and ecosystems in ‘focus group’; and tissues, 
cells and pathogens in ‘journal articles’. Not only are we seeing text types leaning towards 
particular verb senses, but it also seems that specific members of semantic types selected 
by a verb vary according to the text. So, just as “membership of the lexical set changes 
from verb to verb” (Hanks and Jezek, 2008: 399), so too it changes from text type to text 
type, or from a spatial perspective of textual environments, from text-space to text-space. 
Some genres are more distinctive and homogenous than others – journal articles and 
legislative texts, for example – and this is reflected in the types and frequencies of their 
verb patterns. News, broadcast and campaign literature texts share some common 
discursive agendas, such as the dissemination of information to an audience, but each 
have their own specific topics and aims, as exemplified by the differences in verbs. More 
‘personal’ text types, such as the MO data and the dogs transcripts on the one hand, and 
the focus group and interview transcripts on the other, occupy a cline of emotive/distant 
text-spaces, some with more specific concerns (e.g. the putting down₇ of pets in ‘MO 
data’ and ‘dogs transcripts’) and others with more general concerns (e.g. the killing₁ and 
culling₁ of animals in ‘focus group’ and ‘interview’). The promotional food texts 
represent a tiny proportion of the dataset, but they, too, have a distinct discursive style 
and agenda. 
Analysis of the data in Figure 6.10 demonstrates degrees of instability of word meanings. 
Verb patterns may be taken as evidence of verb senses, although they do not directly 
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correspond on a one-to-one basis with them. Thus, they are a convenient shorthand for 
different types of meaning events, but, as seen here, these events are heavily dependent 
upon their context. Understanding texts as spaces enables a spatial conceptualisation of 
meaning, whereby the meaning event is shaped by and, to a degree, shapes its 
environment, itself a key element of the meaning assemblage. More homogenous texts 
with narrowly defined discursive conventions, e.g. legislative texts, represent more stable 
environments for meaning events. That is, they are more likely to allow for the repeated 
reproduction of similar assemblages over and over again. These meaning events are more 
stable than, say, those found in focus group transcripts, which are less predictable and 
less likely to be characterised by the (loose) nature of the text-space. This may also mean 
that the processes and entities described within these text-spaces are afforded 
corresponding degrees of ontological freedom; the mention of a sheep in a journal article 
text, for example, is almost certainly to be one of a sheep as a resource, while a reference 
to a sheep in an interview transcript or in a news text could potentially refer to a wide 
range of ontological classifications. If we consider all meaning events to be rhizomatically 
connected, it makes sense that meanings from one domain can seep into others; the 




The direction of causality between a space, its inhabitants, and the events in which they 
participate is not clear-cut. Based on the evidence presented here, it is plausible that there 
is no one, main driving factor in an event, and that the Agent and the space are no more 
relevant than the Patient, the circumstances, the instrument, or any of the other 
heterogeneous elements in the assemblage; all elements matter to the outcome. In terms 
of text-spaces, we can say that while some texts are more constricting than others in terms 
of assemblage (phraseology) production, all texts have some powers of determination, 
and as such a kind of Agency in the event. Each killing/meaning event can be considered 
unique, though some share enough features in common to be classed as the same kind. 
This enables the empirical analysis of material events as well as messy, natural-language 
data, and does not preclude an assemblage-aware reading of the findings.  
With these factors in mind, it is perhaps uncontroversial to argue that elements of 
assemblages are prone to becoming – to becoming a killer, a victim, a product, a person 
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– both as a result of, and resulting in, specific contextual features such as space, place and 
action. Causality is complex and non-linear, and as uncovered in the analysis in this 
chapter, there is some evidence of actors – and processes – taking on a different nature, 
becoming different entities, from one space to the next. An act of killing, we might argue, 
is not solely the product of the killer’s intention and agency, but is co-produced by the 
other actors involved. We should be careful of following this line of thinking to the point 
of ‘victim-blaming’ or of relieving actors of their responsibilities and moral obligations. 
Nonetheless, we are left with a new understanding of the kind of distributed agency and 
co-constructed event proposed by material semiotics, and this provides a fresh perspective 
on acts of killing and acts of meaning. 
I now turn my attention from agency to individuation, and from spaces to boundaries. In 
the next and final analysis chapter, CPA takes a central role in the demarcating of verb 








Taken for granted in Animal Studies is the fact that animals are objectified, effectively 
ontologised as ‘things’ rather than as individuals. But how exactly is this achieved in 
language? And how does such language produce this effect? Beyond anecdotal 
observations by e.g. Jepson (2008) and Trampe (2017), and with the exception of lengthy 
treatments on ecofeminism (e.g. Adams, 1990) and ecolinguistics (e.g. Stibbe, 2015), 
remarkably little has been written on the precise mechanisms by which language can 
construe animals as person-like or thing-like. Chapters 2 and 3 surveyed a range of 
literature and found that personhood, with its related (linguistic) concepts of animacy, 
agency and individuation, is highly relevant to the perceived moral value of an entity, as 
well as the legitimacy of acts of killing. In this chapter I take the results from the data 
annotation related to grammatical number – Agent Number and Patient Number – as a 
starting point for a close, critical, CPA-assisted analysis of five of the ‘killing’ terms in 
this project: harvest, cull, exterminate, wipe out and destroy. I also take a look at 
assassinate in the BNC alone, given that it does not feature in the KVD, and evaluate its 
implications in terms of Patient individuation and, consequently,  Patient killability. In 
making extensive use of CPA in discourse analysis, this chapter directly addresses RQs 
1 and 3. It concludes, based on the evidence presented, that CPA is a reliable and robust 
method of lexical analysis which has much to offer the (critical) discourse analyst.  
 
7.2 Humans, Animals and Number 
 
Killability is bound up in traditional, humanistic understandings of what it means to be a 
‘person’, and as such entails judgements on the presence of certain person-like qualities. 
The proposed criteria for personhood vary wildly, and are ultimately the qualities one 
would expect to find in a normal, adult human: agency (of the traditional kind), 
subjectivity, and autonomy, for example. As described in Chapter 2, there have been 
difficulties in attributing such qualities to certain types of humans, e.g. the unborn foetus 
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(a ‘potential person’) and adult humans in a permanent vegetative state (‘former 
persons’). There are some nonhuman animals who arguably do possess many of these 
qualities, as is becoming clearer from scientific inquiry, and this poses a potential threat 
to the commonly held view of human-person equivalence.  
A basic requirement of qualities such as agency and autonomy is a sense of individuation, 
whose relationship with the related concepts of animacy and agency has been 
corroborated by linguists as well as philosophers. Animacy is positively associated with 
overt expression of number and countability, and negatively associated with plural, 
especially mass, expressions of number (Dahl and Fraurud, 1996; Grimm, 2018; Corbett, 
2000). Explicit discussions of animacy, agency and individuation with regard to the 
representations of humans and other animals are provided by Yamamoto (1999), Stibbe 
(2006) and Sealey (2018). In short, it can be argued that the cline between an individuated 
person and a mass-like thing represents a cline of moral worth, or in other words, a cline 
of killability. 
Individuation, marked linguistically through number and countability, was therefore 
chosen as the focus of the corpus-lexicographical discourse analysis presented in this 
chapter. The annotation procedure described in Chapter 4 involved recording, amongst 
other features, whether the actant (event participant) was encoded linguistically as 
singular, plural, mass, collective, or of unspecified number. These results are given in the 
following section.  
 
7.2.1 Human and animal actants 
 
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 revealed that the majority of Agents in the data are 
HUMAN, and that the most common Patient type is ANIMAL. In fact, despite the Killing 
Verb Dataset (KVD) being sampled from an animal-themed corpus, humans still 
dominate the semantic landscape: human actants feature – whether as HUMAN or 
HUMAN GROUP, Agent or Patient – 1,434 times in the KVD, compared with animals 
(ANIMAL and ANIMAL GROUP) who feature as actants, collectively, 1,287 times. The 
breakdown of these actants is given in Table 7.1, according to their thematic role (Agent 
or Patient) and number (Singular, Plural, Collective, Mass Noun, and Not Specified). The 
annotation scheme is described in detail in Chapter 4, but to summarise: ‘Singular’ was 
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assigned to entities expressed in grammatically singular, countable form, e.g. a dingo, my 
son; ‘Plural’ was the label given to entities expressed in the plural, countable form, e.g. 
wildebeests, hundreds of birds; ‘Collective’ was used for collective (also countable) 
nouns, e.g. the family, a species; and ‘Mass Noun’ was to mark all non-countable nouns, 
e.g. meat, connective tissue. ‘Not Specified’ was a label assigned when the plurality was 
not inferable: for entities not explicitly mentioned in the text, as in the case of intransitive 
active constructions (e.g. I’ve been butchering since I was 16); for generic entities 
without a specific number (e.g. You can kill yourself saving forests or chimps); or more 
typically in passive constructions where the Agent is elided and its plurality is not 
satisfactorily inferable (e.g. Colonies were harvested in phosphate-buffered saline). 
 
 
Table 7.1: The plurality and Agency of human and animal actants in the KVD 
 
As can be seen, the semantic types HUMAN GROUP (realised as e.g. we, mankind) and 
ANIMAL GROUP (e.g. groups of pigs, some species) are far less common than their 
‘individual’ HUMAN and ANIMAL counterparts, and their plurality is intrinsically linked 
to their semantic value. Groups entail multiple entities and therefore are plural, and if they 
are expressed in a singular form then it must be as a collective noun, hence the lack of 
‘singular’ instances for these types. We can also see that none of the four semantic types 
in Table 7.1 are encoded as mass nouns in the data, as is to be expected; when animals 
are referred to as ‘meat’, for example, this incurs an ontological shift (i.e. to STUFF, as 
opposed to ANIMAL or ANIMAL GROUP). This raises questions about the nature of 
plurality itself and how it is linguistically encoded. Is not everything multiple, complex, 
a mesh of assemblages? What does it ‘mean’ when one entity is expressed as countable 
and another entity – in many respects very similar – is construed as mass, for instance? 
As argued by Grimm (2018), the countability of nouns is not determined by the inherent 
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‘real-world’ properties of their referents, but rather multiple, interacting factors, one of 
which is the way these real-world entities are experienced and perceived by language 
users. This explains why the same entities are individuated differently across languages, 
and even in some cases within them (see Chapter 3). 
There is an asymmetry between the human actants and the animal ones in Table 7.1. 
Humans are most likely to feature with an unspecified plurality (n=853), followed by 
plural (n=400), followed by singular (n=158). Animals, on the other hand, is most likely 
to feature in the plural form (n=841), followed by singular (n=312), followed by 
unspecified (n=5). In terms of thematic roles, 97.4% of human actants feature as the 
Agent, while for animal actants it is the other way around: 93.9% are Patients. These 
results are no doubt influenced by the fact that the KVD is heavily skewed in favour of 
journal article texts (as a result of the PPPP corpus composition), which are written by 
humans and which represent experiments carried out by humans, but which do not tend 
to specify, in writing, the plurality of the Agent of each particular process. Following the 
findings in Chapters 5 and 6, however, we should be wary of attributing too much to this 
fact. Considering causality in a complex and non-linear way, we can appreciate that these 
results are the product of multiple interacting factors: the actants, the process, and the text 
(or text-space), amongst others. Taking the journal articles out of the equation, for 
argument’s sake, we see a similar picture as before: for human actants, the most common 
number label is still ‘not specified’ (n=371), followed by plural (n=284), followed by 
singular (n=149); and animal actants are still predominantly plural (n=432), followed by 
singular (n=286), and finally unspecified (n=5). HUMAN now features as Agent 96% of 
the time, while 91.8% of all animal instances are as Patient. Clearly, the journal article 
data is responsible for the majority of the ‘unspecified’ human instances in the KVD, but 
it does not account for all of them, nor does its omission lead to a change in the ranking 
of human or animal actant number classifications. Similarly, the Agent/Patient dominance 
for humans/animals, respectively, is mitigated slightly but the overall trend persists. 
 
7.2.2 Patient Number 
 
Table 7.2 summarises the distribution of labels assigned for Patient Number (PN) across 
‘killing’ terms in the Killing Verb Dataset. Just one in four Patients (23.6%) was 
expressed in the standard singular form (e.g. the dog, a pet bird, it). 61.7% were encoded 
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in the standard plural form (e.g. cows, the specimens, mice), 7.4% as collective nouns 
(e.g. local shoals, our native wildlife, stock), and 6.4% as mass nouns (e.g. serum, poison, 
plasma). In 14 cases (<1% of KVD), the PN was not specified, due to – as described 
above – the direct object of an active construction being absent or elided (e.g. a kind of 
gut response, just kill, kill, kill) or the direct object being generic or ambiguous (e.g. False 
widows look like black widows but instead of killing you just give you a nasty bite).  
 
 
Table 7.2: Plurality of Patient references across ‘killing’ terms in the Killing Verb Dataset (KVD). 
Percentages relate to the sample specified in the left-most column. 
 
 
Fig. 7.1: A stacked bar chart representing the data in Table 7.2  
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The data in Table 7.2, presented more visually in Fig. 7.1, gives an idea of how differently 
the verbs behave when it comes to Patient Number. The terms that stand out as having 
particularly high proportions of singular Patients, for example, are put to sleep (84.2% 
singular) and put down (66.4%). Murder also ranks highly, with almost half (48.3%) of 
all Patients expressed in the singular. These results are not surprising, given what we 
know about the types of animals typically put to sleep and put down: individuals, usually 
family pets, referred to as ‘him’, ‘her’, or by their given name (see Chapter 5). Murder 
victims also tend to be specific individuals, and in this (admittedly small) sample, more 
than a third (n=11) of Patients were HUMAN, which no doubt played a part in the Patient 
Number results. Of interest here, then, are the terms with very low incidence of singular 
Patients: harvest, just 1.9% singular, and exterminate, with no singular Patients at all. 
These are both discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
The majority (61.7%) of Patients in the KVD were encoded as plural, countable nouns, 
and this was a fairly consistent finding across the ‘killing’ terms, with the exception of 
put to sleep, put down, and to a lesser extent, butcher and destroy. Put down and put to 
sleep are clear-cut: most of their Patients are singular entities (individuals) so they have 
far fewer examples of plural Patients. Butcher is a small sample (n=27) and, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, is often used in a non-killing sense, hence its relatively high proportions of 
Patients with ‘mass noun’ and unspecified plurality. Destroy is another verb with a strong 
non-killing component, and is examined in more detail in Section 7.5. Especially high 
proportions of plural Patients are seen in sacrifice and slaughter, which is to be expected, 
given that these verbs feature prominently in the journal article data which reports the 
killing of multiple animals. Sometimes this is done in groups; one in ten slaughter Patients 
was expressed as a collective noun. The highest proportion of plural Patients, however, 
is seen in cull, and this is explored in Section 7.3.2.  
Collective nouns occupied the role of Patient in relatively few cases: just 7.4% of the 
KVD. It is surprising, then, to see terms like exterminate and wipe out exhibiting much 
higher proportions of ‘collective’ Patients: 50% and 27.4%, respectively. They are 
investigated in depth in Section 7.4. Similarly infrequent are ‘mass noun’ Patients, absent 
altogether from cull, euthanise, exterminate, murder, put to sleep and slaughter. Mass 
nouns cannot denote individuals; they are characterised by their lack of individuation. 
That they should feature at all as arguments of ‘killing’ verbs is worthy of our attention, 
as is the case for butcher, put down and harvest in particular.  
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Least frequent of all – almost negligible – are the Patients whose plurality is unspecified. 
As shown in Table 7.2, these are found, in very small numbers, for the verbs whose 
Patient arguments are either more general than others (e.g. kill, destroy) or absent 
altogether, as in the intransitive Pattern 3 of butcher (n=4), discussed in Chapter 5). 
In the sections that follow are closer examinations of harvest, cull, exterminate, wipe out 
and destroy using CPA, based on their tendency to (de)individuate Patients according to 
the Patient Number results. It is interesting to note that these five terms had some of the 
lowest average Patient Referential Distance (PRD) scores in the analysis presented in 
Chapter 5. 
 




The Pattern Dictionary of English Verbs (PDEV) reports four patterns for the verb 
harvest, and all four were also present in the KVD sample. Table 7.3 gives the patterns, 
their primary implicatures and their distributions across both samples: that of the PDEV57 
(taken from the BNC) and that of the KVD (taken from the PPPP corpus). 
 
 





The first thing to note is the difference in pattern distribution: there is a clear bias in the 
PPPP data towards the ‘animal agriculture’ and ‘laboratory’ senses (Patterns 3 and 4) as 
opposed to the ‘crop farming’ sense (Patterns 1 and 2). This represents a shift from plant-
killing to animal-killing, which is to be expected, given the thematic priorities and 
journal-heavy composition of the PPPP corpus. In fact, the pattern that is the least 
frequent in the BNC sample – Pattern 4, a jargonistic term from the domain of 
biochemistry – is the most common harvest pattern in the PPPP sample. This makes sense 
when we consider that 93.4% of harvest instances come from scientific journal article 
data, and this is worth bearing in mind when analysing results from the KVD.  
To provide some etymological background, the noun harvest can be traced back, via the 
Old English hærfest ‘autumn’ to the Proto-Indo-European root *kerp- meaning ‘to gather, 
pluck, harvest’, also seen in the Latin carpere ‘to cut, divide’ and the Greek karpos 
‘fruit’58. The earliest examples of its use as a verb date back to the 15th century, but it 
wasn’t until the mid-20th century that it began to take animals and cells as object 
arguments59. Given that the original BNC is now several decades old, it might be argued 
that some of the differences in pattern distribution seen in Table 7.3 are indicative of 
language change over time. This is unlikely, however, given the skewed nature of the 
KVD sample and the fact that mainstream language norms do not tend to change that 
quickly (Hanks, 2013: 93). 
 
7.3.2 Harvesting stuff 
 
Around half (49%) of all harvest lines in the KVD are Pattern 4, for which the implicature 
is “HUMAN removes BODY PART for research or transplanting”. Predictably, Patients 
include CELL (n=43), STUFF (n=24), BACTERIA (n=13) and TISSUE (n=11), all of 
which – other than STUFF – are semantic types unique to the PPPP Killing Ontology (see 
Chapter 4) as a result of their prevalence in the KVD. Given that these instances come 
from academic journal articles, they are almost exclusively expressed in the passive voice 





centrifugation, from the dish, and with a micropipette. Harvesting is just one of many 
processes described in the Pattern 4 instances; the most frequent collocate of harvested is 
the word and (n=21), underlined in Examples 7.1-7.3 in Table 7.4. Similar are the cases 
(n=8) in which it is part of a list of processes, followed by a comma (as in Example 7.4). 
The act of harvesting is not necessarily the focus in these instances; it is just one part of 
a string of events. The reader is presumed to be more interested in the methods of 
harvesting, or what happens after the harvesting, than the harvesting itself.  
 
 
Table 7.4: Corpus examples 7.1-7.8 
 
Patterns 1 (“HUMAN harvest PLANT = Crop”, with the implicature, “HUMAN cuts down 
and gathers PLANT = Crop when PLANT is ready for use”) and 2 (“HUMAN harvest 
LOCATION”, with the implicature, “HUMAN gathers foodstuff from LOCATION”) are 
syntagmatically very similar to Pattern 4: emphasis is typically placed on where, when, 
how and why the harvesting takes place (e.g. Examples 7.5-8, Table 7.4), signalled by 
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use of prepositional phrases to the right-hand side of the node (underlined). This is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that, in these cases, harvest does not denote an act of killing 
but rather of gathering, in the traditional sense of the word, and as such the act of 
harvesting is not particularly notable. 
Harvest, like butcher, is ambiguous: we cannot say for sure whether killing is involved 
where Patterns 1, 2 and 4 are concerned. Referents categorised as PLANT and PLANT 
PART can survive being harvested, and in many cases they do, but whether or not the 
harvesting is fatal is presumably of little importance to most speakers and hearers. 
Similarly, in harvesting cells, plasma, and other entities classified as BODY PART, 
their status as living or not is unclear; they are being removed from a body that is either 
still living or has previously been killed, and in any case such details are not the focus 
of a harvest proposition which takes a PART or STUFF as its object argument. This 
prompts some difficult questions regarding the lives of cells, bacteria, plants and other 
‘stuff’; what is it about these kinds of lives that means a loss thereof is seemingly 
uncontroversial? 
 
7.3.3 Harvesting animals 
 
As noted above, harvest is an ancient word with roots in the plucking and gathering of 
fruit, and is still predominantly – in the reference corpus data – a term applied to the 
collecting of plants and plant parts. That harvest can also be extended to denote the killing 
of certain animals tells us something fundamental about the speakers’ perceptions of those 
animals and their status as individuals. There are many animals who are not harvested, 
for instance, according to the data as well as our intuition: dogs, horses, and pigs, for 
example. The types of animals that feature as Patients of Pattern 3 of harvest – henceforth 
harvest₃ – are mainly marine animals (78%), typically denoted by the term fish. Such 
animals are generally small and tend to coexist in groups, and, perhaps as a result of this, 
they are deindividuated by English speakers in a number of ways: their deaths are 
discussed in terms of weight, rather than number of individuals (cf. Despret, 2016); 
distinction is often not made between the singular, plural and non-countable forms of the 
noun (e.g. fish, krill, salmon; cf. Stibbe, 2012); and these nouns are also unmarked 
arguments of ‘amassing’ verbs such as harvest. This is analogous to the way plants, plant 
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matter and other mass-like, insentient entities are construed, and harvest provides plenty 
of examples of this; a quarter of its Patients are encoded as mass nouns. 
Harvest₃ presents similar problems to the other patterns: when animate Patients are 
involved, we cannot say for certain whether harvest means “kill” or whether it means 
“gather”. In some cases, this is disambiguated by context (Examples 7.9-11, Table 7.5) 
but in others (e.g. 7.12-14) this is unclear, and no attempt is made to clarify the distinction. 
In 7.9, for instance, we can understand harvest to mean “gather” because it is coordinated 
with the verb kill; it would not make sense to talk about killing twice. In the case of 7.10, 
we can safely assume again that this is an act of gathering rather than killing, because the 
excerpt describes how the shrimps, having been harvested, are then placed in tanks and 
fed twice daily. The preposition from is also an indicator of gathering here. Example 7.11 
is less obvious, but similar to (7.9) we can assume that the writer does not intend to use 
two terms to describe the same action, so in retain and harvest it is likely that harvest 
refers to killing and not to gathering. The fact that consumption is cited as a reason for 
harvesting also supports this assumption; the shrimps are intended to be killed. Examples 
7.12-7.14 do not provide such cues for disambiguation; even if they involve stock and 
fishermen, we do not know for sure whether the harvesting done at this stage is of the 




Table 7.5: Corpus examples 7.9-7.14 
 
The use of collective and mass terms such as species, stock and catch, modified by 
partitives such as most of, some component of, and larger quantities of, further 
deindividuate the animals being harvested, for many of whom the outcome of said 
harvesting is already unclear. As argued in the case of butcher (Chapter 5), the inherent 
ambiguity in cases such as these demonstrates a collective indifference towards the fates 
of many nonhuman animals and is another speciesist feature of the lexicon.  
Harvest effectively coerces (cf. Pustejovsky, 1995; Hanks, 2013) its Patients into the roles 
of crops and resources. This is especially explicit in the examples in Table 7.6, both of 




Table 7.6: Corpus examples 7.15-7.16 
 
In these cases, the fish being harvested are not even the living commodities – the livestock 
– they are typically construed to be, but rather abstract concepts of economics: 
productivity and growth. These are not typical arguments of harvest and are marked ‘3.a’ 
(‘anomalous’; see Chapter 4), but these exploitations of the norms of harvest are a clear 
example of the permeability of semantic boundaries and how easily they might be 
crossed. 
Other animal types harvested₃ in the KVD (n=7) can be categorised as: animals targeted 
by hunters (ELK, DEER, PIGEON), those killed for their flesh or fur (INSECT, MINK) 
and lab test subjects (GOAT). While these are all permissible examples of Pattern 3, some 
of them are less central and prototypical than others. The ELK, DEER (x2) and PIGEON 
instances all come from the same journal article text in which hunters are described as 
harvesting animals who pose a tuberculosis threat; these are not stereotypically 
harvestable animals (small and numerous), other than PIGEON, and nor is the motive 
(disease control) particularly harvest₃-like. Given that they are all from the same text, 
these instances are not especially generalisable and could be considered anomalous rather 
than norms. The INSECT, on the other hand, in this case referring to dragonfly nymphs, 
is being killed for typical harvest₃ reasons – to be used as food – but is not an animal 
usually killed and eaten by most humans, as suggested by the text (see Example 7.17, 
Table 7.7). MINK fulfils most of the harvest₃ Patient criteria: mink(s) are relatively small 
animals, their individual status threatened by the ambiguous morphology of the 
singular/plural forms of the noun as well as a general lack of human-mink interactions on 
an individual basis. In this case (Example 7.18), however, the use of harvest could be 
seen as a euphemistic attempt to mitigate the perceived wrongness of the act of killing by 
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creating semantic distance (Chapter 5), rather than because MINK is a typical harvest₃ 
Patient. The sentiment expressed in Example 7.18 gives some support to this hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 7.7: Corpus examples 7.17-7.19 
 
GOAT is another unexpected Patient type (Example 7.19, Table 7.7), and understanding 
its use in this context requires extensive reading beyond the immediate concordance 
environment. Despite the expanded context in this example, we are still many lines away 
from seeing an explicit mention of goats. In fact, the word goats features just 13 times in 
the entire article, despite its being around 7,000 words long and titled, “Assessing the 
effect of controlled seasonal breeding on steady-state productivity of pastoral goat herds 
in northern Kenya”. As becomes clear from this excerpt, goats do not matter as 
individuals here but as herds, populations, proportions, units. The Agent of the verb is 
also unexpected: an offtake policy, rather than the human initiators and enforcers of said 
policy. Not only does this exemplify the kind of distancing – both syntactic and semantic 
– discussed in Chapter 5, but it is also an example of the routine deindividuation, the 
217 
‘massifying’, of animal Patients. The use of the prepositional phrase, underlined in (7.19), 
adds to the construal of the Patient as a kind of STUFF by mirroring the structure typically 
seen in Patterns 1, 2 and 4, which place more emphasis on the method of gathering (i.e. 
from LOCATION) than any killing entailed. 
 
7.3.4 Animals harvesting stuff 
 
Despite having its origins in peaceful, arable farming practices, harvest represents a 
powerful display of human dominance over the Other. The Patient is rendered passive, 
impotent and ultimately removable, and any presumed resistance on the part of harvested 
animals is entirely suppressed. This is a form of ontological violence and a privileging of 
human actors over all others. It is surprising, then, to find four examples of ANIMAL and 
ANIMAL GROUP in the Agent position of harvest, shown in Table 7.8. 
 
 
Table 7.8: Corpus examples 7.20-7.23 
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The first three of these examples come from broadcast transcripts, specifically ‘wildlife’ 
documentaries narrated by David Attenborough. There is a temptation to dismiss these as 
instances of Attenborough’s signature anthropomorphic style (Sealey and Oakley, 2013), 
and there is language in these examples that could be considered anthropomorphic: the 
use of you’re in 7.21, as discussed in Sealey and Oakley (2013); and the words job and 
hitchhiker in 7.22. Is harvesting an activity exclusive to humans? I would argue not; 
nonhumans have surely been gathering and eating plant parts for even longer than humans 
have. Yet, there is something about the word harvest that suggests a kind of organised 
behaviour, and perhaps Attenborough is priming the viewer for this with the word job in 
7.22. This ‘organised’ element is captured to a degree in the PDEV entry for harvest₁, 
which specifies a prototypical direct object of PLANT = Crop, rather than simply PLANT, 
thus incorporating the notion of cultivation. This is not to say that animals do not organise 
themselves (as in the case of the colony in 7.22) or intentionally select and harvest their 
food (as claimed in 7.23) but it does suggest that normal language may not comfortably 
accommodate this. In 7.20 and 7.21 the harvested entities are animals, making these 
anomalous instances of Pattern 3 (marked ‘3.a’), while 7.22 and 7.23 are anomalous 




If harvest is a verb of mass, cull is a verb of plurality. Cull has the highest proportion of 
‘plural’ Patients in the KVD, and, like harvest, its origins are not in killing but in 
collecting: cull is a descendent of the Old French coillier and the Latin colligere 
‘collect’60. Table 7.9 lists the patterns found for cull in the PDEV, along with their 
primary implicatures and the distributions of these patterns in the PDEV61 (taken from 







Table 7.9: The CPA-derived patterns and implicatures for cull 
 
Once again, there are quite dramatic differences in pattern distribution: the pattern found 
most frequently in the PDEV sample (Pattern 3) does not appear once in the KVD, nor 
do Patterns 4 and 5. These are the non-killing, and often abstract, senses of cull, as 
opposed to the concrete, killing senses entailed in Patterns 1 and 2, which are found with 
almost equal frequency in the KVD.  
Although they refer to processes of killing, as opposed to selecting or gathering, Patterns 
1 and 2 – henceforth cull₁ and cull₂ – retain some of the original sense of ‘curation’ 
associated with culling. This is demonstrated in the form of justifications for killing; 
animals are killed because their presence (in the group, the area, the farm, and so on) is 
damaging to the overall design. Quite often this is literally an issue of aesthetics, whether 
in terms of landscape features or to preserve the population of a favoured species. In other 
cases, the culling is done to protect human financial interests. In just over half (53%) of 
all cull instances, explicit justificatory language could be found in the immediate 
concordance environment. These were found fairly evenly across both patterns – in 48% 
of cull₁ and 58% of cull₂ instances – and included words and phrases such as need to be, 
had to be, because, necessary, due to, so, requirement, and [to + INF] constructions. 




Table 7.10: Corpus examples 7.24-7.28 
 
Example 7.28 encapsulates the essence of cull₁; animals who exist in undesirably high 
numbers are a problem, their killing a positive solution for reaching “that happy balance”. 
The use of the demonstrative “that” presents the idea of the “happy balance” as a specific 
and apparently shared notion of an ideal state of co-existence.  
The language used in the above examples also suggests that the killers reject their 
culpability; these animals need culling, and as such it is unavoidable. In some cases, 
particularly in the cull₂ instances from journal article texts, the justifications are even 
framed in such a way that the animals are portrayed as being somehow culpable for their 
own culling through their (lack of) actions or attributes, signalled by the preposition for 




Table 7.11: Corpus examples 7.29-7.31 
 
In many of these cull₂ examples, however, we are faced with the same ambiguity seen in 
many of the other verbs, and it is unclear whether cull always refers to killing, or whether 
it might refer to a non-fatal exclusion from the group of animals being studied or used for 
breeding; Examples 7.29-31 are potentially ambiguous in this sense. Examples 7.32 and 
7.33 in Table 7.12 make this distinction between killing and removing clearer as the word 
culled here could not feasibly be replaced with killed; animals cannot be killed “due to … 





Table 7.12: Corpus examples 7.32-7.36 
 
Again, the fact that cull might mean anything from ‘remove’ to ‘kill’, with presumably 
little consequence to the hearer where it falls along that cline, is suggestive of an 
indifference towards the fate of culled animals. Perhaps we should not be surprised, then, 
that animals are repeatedly referred to as things in the context of ‘culling’. The first two 
of these, 7.34 and 7.35 in Table 7.12, come from the same interview transcript and are 
the words of broadcaster Chris Packham. He reflects, in his interview, on the expectations 
of viewers that as a passionate naturalist he ought to be opposed to positive 
representations of “culling”, but he does not appear to mark his repeated and oppressive 
use of the word things. We also see, in Example 7.36, the argumentation of things with 
the phrasal verb wipe out, another term of ‘removal’. Wipe out and exterminate are 





7.4 Exterminate and Wipe out 
 
While harvest and cull have overtones of collection, curation and control, exterminate 
and wipe out both convey a sense of mass removal and eradication. Exterminate can be 
traced back to its Latin roots of ex ‘beyond, out of’ and termine, ablative of termen 
‘boundary, limit’, combined in exterminare ‘to drive out’62. Wipe out is self-explanatory: 
a combination of wipe from the old English wipian ‘to wipe, cleanse’, and the adverb 
out63, lending a sense of cleanliness and the removal of undesirable entities. There is also 
a shared notion of boundaries, space and place; similar to harvest and cull, which involve 
direct engagement with a specific place, exterminate and wipe out refer to the ridding of 




After assassinate, for which there were no examples in the PPPP corpus, exterminate has 
the smallest sample in the KVD with just 14 concordance lines. It also had the lowest 
average Patient Referential Distance (PRD) score of all verbs (see Chapter 5) and, as 
shown in Table 7.2, no examples of a singular Patient. Exterminate has two patterns, 
according to the PDEV64, but only one of these was present in the PPPP corpus – 
unsurprisingly, the sense that relates to animals. Table 7.13 gives the patterns of 
exterminate; the mention of ‘a particular locality’ in the primary implicature of Pattern 1 





64 http://pdev.org.uk/#browse?q=exterminate;f=A;v=exterminate; I deviate slightly from the PDEV pattern 
and implicature for exterminate₁ to reflect the plurality of the data (corroborated by both the BNC sample 
and the PPPP corpus sample) 
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Table 7.13: The CPA-derived patterns and implicatures for exterminate 
 
Exterminate is a classic example of a ‘killing’ verb that is used differently for humans 
and animals, even when both senses refer unambiguously to an act of killing. One might 
ask, as I did on first glance, what the difference is between the exterminating of a human 
and the exterminating of a nonhuman animal, given that in both instances the result is that 
the Patient is killed. In Table 7.13, we can see that there are two distinct kinds of 
argumentation. In Pattern 1, henceforth exterminate₁, the Agent is typically a HUMAN or 
an EVENTUALITY while the Patient is an ANIMAL GROUP or a PLANT GROUP. In 
Pattern 2, henceforth exterminate₂, the Agent and Patient are both a HUMAN GROUP, 
and the implicature suggests a deliberateness and systematicity. In exterminate₁, no such 
intentionality is necessarily supposed. The data corroborates this distinction; examples of 
exterminate₁ are presented in Table 7.14 (Examples 7.37-7.39), and examples of both 
patterns from the BNC (due to the absence of Pattern 2 in the KVD) are presented further 












Table 7.14: Corpus examples 7.37-7.45 
 
It appears that animals may be exterminated by a range of Agents, including events (coded 
as EVENTUALITY), and it is normal to talk about the extermination of animals in the 
passive, where the Agent is either unknown or backgrounded. In 7.39 (Table 7.14), for 
example, the enactor of the extermination is presented vaguely (a great disaster), and its 
specific cause is unknown (whatever its cause). In 7.38 we are told that the animals were 
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killed when modern humans arrived, implying that the Agent is not a HUMAN GROUP, 
but an EVENT (a subtype of EVENTUALITY): the arrival of the humans. An EVENT is 
something that happens, rather than something that acts with intention. When humans are 
exterminated, on the other hand, there is a specific agenda, usually political, and the Agent 
is named explicitly (the Cro-Magnons, the Serbs, the Nazis). In this sense, both the Agent 
and the Patient are individualised to a greater degree than their nonhuman equivalents. 
Another obvious difference in patterning is that ANIMAL GROUP features as a Patient in 
the same pattern as PLANT GROUP (7.41), while HUMAN GROUP belongs to a pattern 
of its own.  
Similar to the case of slaughter, in which the verb may be applied differently to humans 
and to other animals to refer to an act of killing, the distinction between the two patterns 
of exterminate highlights differences in implicature. The primary implicatures are given 
in Table 7.13, but if these patterns had secondary implicatures (as some in the PDEV do), 
they might allude to the fact that, in Pattern 1, the ANIMAL GROUP or PLANT GROUP 
is living in ‘the wild’, and that, in Pattern 2, the HUMAN GROUP is understood to be 
killed on the basis of their group membership. In other words, the Nazis exterminated the 
Jews precisely because of their Jewish identity, and the developers hired murderers to 
exterminate the Indians due to their being Indian, making the subsequent clause about a 
pro-Indian movement entirely cohesive. This means that some information about the 
motive is encoded in the verb, in the case of the human-applicable sense. Exterminate, 
when applied to humans, signals that the group identity of the humans involves is a key 
motive in the killing, and the choice of exterminate draws attention to this political 
dimension. Where slaughter is concerned, the extra information encoded in the human-
applicable sense relates to other elements of the killing: “an egregiously malevolent agent, 
an innocent patient … and a context of exceptional brutality” (Jepson, 2008: 142). 
 
7.4.2 Wipe out 
 
Wipe out has similar connotations to exterminate and has a similarly low incidence of 
singular Patients (n=3), but has a much broader set of potential arguments. Table 7.15 




Table 7.15: The CPA-derived patterns and implicatures for wipe out 
 
As perhaps ought to be expected, the patterns that revolve around exclusively human 
affairs – in this case Patterns 2, 3 and 4 – do not feature at all in the PPPP corpus, nor in 
the KVD as a consequence. There may be an argument for splitting the very large Pattern 
1 into two more fine-grained patterns, given that the wiping out of a GROUP, e.g. of 
living beings, and the wiping out of an ENTITY, e.g. memories, arguably involve very 
different processes and outcomes; one involves killing and the other does not. This is a 
judgement to be made by the analyst or lexicographer, and there is no hard-and-fast rule 
for how this should be done. Although I see a semantic (and moral) distinction between 
the killing of e.g. a group of humans and the erasure of an abstract entity such as an idea, 
or – less commonly – a natural landscape feature such as a forest, the pattern boundary is 
exceptionally fuzzy where wipe out is concerned. Examples (7.46-55) present examples 
from both sides of this hypothetical boundary – some taken from the BNC, as the PPPP 











Table 7.16: Corpus examples 7.46-7.55 
 
Despite the fact that some of these examples in Table 7.16 refer to killing, while others 
don’t, the common threads are undeniable: Agents are diverse, Patients are group-like or 
mass-like, and there is no inherently positive or negative connotation to the process of 
wiping out. If we were to divide these cases into two groups, then, where might 7.51 fall? 
Mildew is not like a HUMAN GROUP or ANIMAL GROUP, but it is also not like an 
abstract entity such as profits, and there is killing involved. In this instance it falls under 
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the general category of ENTITY. Example 7.51 demonstrates the generalised nature of 
wipe out: kelp (a PLANT) is wiped out alongside bio-diversity (a STATE OF AFFAIRS or 
an ASSET, depending on the coder’s outlook). Unless we are talking about the creative 
use of a word, as in jokes and wordplay such as fruit flies like a banana, we can expect 
two entities occupying the same argument slot of a verb to be activating the same meaning 
(Hanks, 2013: 72). In this case, it means that both the kelp and the biodiversity are 
participants in the same kind of wiping out. Is it possible to ‘kill’ biodiversity? Intuitively, 
I would say not. This raises some questions in terms of where to place the pattern 
boundary; if wipe out has the potential to mean ‘kill’ but ultimately means ‘eradicate’ – 
which sometimes, but not always, involves killing – then it becomes difficult to justify 
having two separate patterns here. 
Another key observation on the examples in Table 7.16 is that wiping out appears to be a 
quantifiable process. Entities may be wiped out “completely” (7.46), “virtually” (7.54), 
“almost” (7.48), or in some other proportion: “90 per cent” (7.47), “100 per cent” (7.53), 
“half” (7.49), and so on. In other words, wipe out is an example of a predicator that entails 
“incremental themehood” (Dowty, 1991); the affected entity is an ‘incremental theme’ in 
that it can be acted on partially as well as wholly. The example given by Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav (2005: 93) is the eating of an apple: each subpart of the apple that is 
eaten corresponds to a subpart of the event of eating the apple, and as such the eating of 
the apple is incremental and the apple itself is an incremental theme. Krifka (1992) would 
call this a “gradual patient”, while Tenny (1992) inverts the direction of causality, 
describing the argument or noun phrase as “measuring out” the event, as opposed to the 
verb entailing a particular kind of argument. A material-semiotic reading would posit that 
both interpretations are valid; an incremental theme is both created by, and co-creates, 
the process in which it participates.  
However we conceptualise this relationship between a verb and its arguments, killing is 
not something that can be done incrementally. The killing is either accomplished or it is 
not; there is no partial killing of a being – at least, not according to the folk understandings 
of killing and dying with which we are concerned here. What can be done incrementally, 
however, is the diminishing or erasing of a group by means of killing its individual 
members. Wipe out is an example of this kind of process. Not only does it have the effect 
of erasing members’ individuality by ontologising them as parts of a whole, rather than 
as singular and well-individuated entities, but it also makes their mass killing comparable 
with other, non-killing, processes of eradication. Whatever is wiped out is done so broadly 
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and incrementally, and any individual acts of killing entailed in this process are not the 
focus of what is being described here. 
Given that Pattern 1 is so broad and general, encompassing so many different kinds of 
entities and outcomes, one might ask what makes Patterns 2, 3 and 4 so special. Why are 
they, in contrast, so specific and fine-grained? Examples of these, taken from the BNC, 
are given in Table 7.17. 
 
 
Table 7.17: Corpus examples 7.56-7.59 
 
Pattern 2, exemplified in 7.56, has the intransitive pattern, HUMAN = Surfer wipe out 
[NO OBJ], and a very specific meaning: “to be capsized by a wave while surfing”. This 
is clearly a pattern in its own right.  
Patterns 3 and 4, while related to the basic sense of destruction encoded in Pattern 1, have 
specific semantic types as their Patients (as opposed to general semantic types such as 
GROUP and ENTITY) and with them come specific entailments. When an 
EVENTUALITY wipes out an INSTITUTION, as in Pattern 3 (7.57), it does not necessarily 
mean that the INSTITUTION was completely removed or destroyed, but that it was 
severely financially damaged. This financial damage may well lead to the destruction of 
the INSTITUTION as a whole, but that is not the focus of this kind of wiping out. Again, 
we can check this by testing the verb sense on both Patient NPs in 7.57: the firm and its 
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owners. Both entities must be affected in the same way, unless we are dealing with 
creative exploitations of language, which I find not to be the case here. Rather than both 
entities here being wiped out in the sense of being “removed or destroyed” (feasible for 
the firm, less so for its owners), it is more likely that they are being wiped out in the sense 
of being “bankrupted” (feasible for both). When an EVENTUALITY wipes out a HUMAN 
(not a HUMAN GROUP), it typically means one of two things: that the HUMAN, like the 
INSTITUTION, was made bankrupt (Pattern 3 again; see Example 7.58); or that the 
HUMAN became very tired as a result of the EVENTUALITY (Pattern 4; Example 7.59). 
Distinguishing between these two senses requires context. The cues here are unable to 
pay the rent in 7.58, which primes us for the financial sense of the verb, and normally … 
after nursery in 7.59, suggesting that it is a repeated, habitual event and that the referent 
is a toddler, rather than a financially responsible adult. 
For these reasons, the decision to split wipe out along the pattern boundaries given in 
Table 7.15 is maintained to be a defensible one. To wipe out a group of humans or animals 
is morally very different from wiping out an abstract entity such as memories, but there 
is a semantic commonality between these two that is not found between the other patterns. 
Any ‘killing’ aspect is not made explicit by wipe out; instead, the emphasis is placed on 
the extent to which the Patient is incrementally affected. The reference to place and space, 
entailed in the out of wipe out, suggests that there is an emphasis on “removing” or “doing 




Destroy is a similar case to wipe out in several ways. It has four patterns, according to the 






Table 7.18: The CPA-derived patterns and implicatures for destroy 
 
In this instance, the most commonly occurring pattern is the same in both samples – 
Pattern 1 – while there is a notable difference in the distributions of Patterns 2, 3 and 4. 
Unsurprisingly, the patterns that are concerned with exclusively human affairs, Patterns 
2 and 3, which relate to e.g. a defeat in sport (exemplified in 7.60, Table 7.19) or the 
emotional or spiritual damage suffered by a human (7.61), respectively, are far higher in 
frequency in the BNC sample. Pattern 4, on the other hand, which denotes the killing of 
animals by humans (exemplified in 7.62), is dramatically higher in the PPPP sample. 
Pattern 1, which could arguably be split into two to reflect the physical/abstract divide, is 
similar to Pattern 1 of wipe out. It includes a wide range of potential arguments, and any 
acts of killing entailed in the destroying are not foregrounded. There are, however, two 
clear groups of Patients for Pattern 1, henceforth destroy₁: on the one hand, physical, 
typically inanimate, objects such as buildings and artefacts; and on the other, abstract 
entities or states of affairs such as relationships, systems, and mental states. Examples of 









Table 7.19: Corpus examples 7.60-7.68 
 
In both samples – from the PPPP corpus and from the BNC – there is a tendency for the 
physical object being destroyed₁ to be a location or building of some kind. In the BNC 
data, 37% (n=56) of the physical objects destroyed₁ are locations, e.g. country, church, 
laboratory, land. One in five of these instances (n=11) describes the destruction of a home 
of some description, e.g. homes, cottage, houses, habitat. Similarly, in the PPPP sample, 
31% (n=37) of the physical entities destroyed₁ are locations, e.g. the world, the forest, 
China’s natural environment, with almost half (n=16) of these lines referring specifically 
to the destruction of homes, e.g. nests, habitats, badger setts, homes. When we consider 
the etymology of destroy, this makes more sense: destroy is derived from the Old French 
destruire, in turn from the Latin destruere, comprised of de- (denoting reversal) and 
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struere ‘build’66. To destroy, then, is fundamentally to ‘unbuild’. This explains why, even 
in abstract cases such as (7.66-7.68, Table 7.19), the destroyed₁ entity is essentially 
something that has previously been built, and is now being dismantled: faith, confidence, 
everyone’s image of T-Rex. This also offers an explanation as to why the physical 
destroyed₁ entities tend to be homes and other constructed locations. 
The homes and other locations found in the KVD sample have a distinctly ‘natural’ 
flavour to them, which is perhaps to be expected, given the nature of the PPPP corpus. 
Examples of destroy₁ instances from the PDEV (BNC) sample are given in 7.69-7.74 in 
Table 7.20, followed by destroy₁ instances from the KVD (PPPP) sample (7.75-80) for 
comparison. Example 7.74, taken from the BNC sample, makes explicit reference to the 
natural homes of nonhuman animals, underlined, as opposed to the unmarked 



















Table 7.20: Corpus examples 7.69-7.80 
 
This raises a few questions. What makes something a ‘natural’ home? Is a bird’s nest or 
badger sett truly ‘natural’? Why are these not considered homes in the same sense as a 
human-built cottage or house? ‘Natural’ is defined by Oxford Dictionaries as “[e]xisting 
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in or derived from nature; not made or caused by humankind”67, which supports my own 
intuition about ‘natural’ locations, but also presents us with some problems. Does this 
mean that humans are not ‘natural’, a part of nature? These examples seem to suggest a 
perceived distance between humans and the rest of nature – as corroborated by the 
literature around human exceptionalism, discussed in Chapter 2 – with humans exerting 
a kind of destructive power over other animals and their habitats, which is rarely 
reciprocated in the data (n=1 in the KVD, an example in which houses are destroyed by 
elephants). Interestingly, another sense of ‘natural’, in the same entry by Oxford 
Dictionaries, is taken from Christian theology: “Relating to earthly human or physical 
nature as distinct from the spiritual or supernatural realm”. From this perspective, then, 
‘natural’ can refer to that which relates to a ‘lower’ being, in contrast with a ‘higher’ and 
more spiritual one (cf. the Great Chain of Being, Chapter 2).  
This ‘spiritual vs. natural’ dichotomy is also evident in the patterning of destroy. To 
destroy a human, for example, as in Pattern 3, is not to physically attack them, but to 
cause a kind of emotional or spiritual harm. When the fictional character in 7.61 (Table 
7.19) says, leaving the children will destroy me, it is not implied that they will be killed 
or that they will cease to exist, but that they will be extremely upset. Here we find a 
familiar asymmetry between humans and all other animals. When we say that an animal 
or a group of animals has been destroyed, it has nothing to do with their emotional states; 
rather, it refers to physical harm (resulting in their deaths). In Table 7.21 are some 













Table 7.21: Corpus examples 7.81-7.89 
 
In all of the examples in Table 7.21, the event being described is one in which animals 
are killed. In 7.85, for instance, food undoubtedly refers to animals such as seals. One 
might look at the list of available patterns for destroy and decide, then, that these examples 
belong with Pattern 4. Pattern 4, or destroy₄, refers not to the attacking or damaging of an 
inanimate object, such as a house, or the blow dealt to an abstract entity, such as one’s 
confidence or marriage (destroy₁), nor does it refer to the defeating of a human group nor 
the emotional ruining of a human (destroy₂ and destroy₃, respectively), but to the killing 
of certain animals by humans. This is fundamentally different from Patterns 1, 2 and 3 in 
that the destroyee is not an incremental theme of the kind discussed in Section 7.4.2; that 
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is, the destroying does not progress incrementally. There can be no partial destroying of 
an animal in this sense; the animal is either alive or dead. We will not find any qualifiers 
for destroy₄; an animal cannot be *totally destroyed₄ or *completely destroyed₄ or 
*partially destroyed₄, as is the case for incremental themes such as The Deaf Institute in 
Bath (7.64) and his confidence (7.67), both Patients of destroy₁. Destroying₄ is typically 
carried out by humans on dogs and horses, but is also extended to other pets, farmed 
animals, and indeed any animal deemed to be dangerous or unwanted. Interestingly – 
from the perspective of the personhood ethics discussed in Chapter 2 – it is also used to 
refer to the killing of human foetuses. There are two main reasons why the examples in 
Table 7.21 belong to Pattern 1 and not to Pattern 4, as argued below. Typical examples 




















Table 7.22: Corpus examples 7.90-7.109 
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The first reason for not classifying the examples in Table 7.21 as destroy₄ is that, based 
on prototypical examples, demonstrated in Table 7.22, there are certain necessary 
conditions for destroying in the strict sense of killing. First, the Agent should be a human. 
Second, the Patient should be a nonhuman animal or a human foetus. Third, there should 
be a procedural, intentional or official context to the destroying. Animals and foetuses are 
not destroyed₄ by accident, as can happen in Patterns 1, 2 and 3, and they are typically 
destroyed₄ on the orders of someone; destroying₄ comes about through a decision, or 
number of decisions. Hence, it is common to find destroy₄ constructions such as “may 
have to be destroyed”, “will have to be destroyed”, “shall be destroyed”, “should be 
destroyed”, “ordered to be destroyed”, “is to be destroyed” and “the decision to destroy”. 
Given these criteria, Examples 7.81.-85 in Table 7.21 do not fit destroy₄, as although they 
denote the killing of animals, they do not meet the other necessary conditions. 
Secondly, in instances where a predicator takes as an argument a coordinated noun phrase, 
such as “cows and sheep” (similar to the kelp and biodiversity example in the case of wipe 
out), we must assume that the relationship between the verb and each of these nouns or 
noun phrases is the same, unless we are dealing with creativity and wordplay (Hanks, 
2013: 72). In the case of destroy taking the object argument of the animals, the plants, 
the water, the land (7.87), the verb sense must therefore be one which is applicable to all 
four of these entities, and the hypernym of these co-hyponyms is taken as the candidate 
for the semantic type: in this case, PHYSICAL OBJECT. The same goes for they [salmon] 
or the spawning beds in 7.88. If spawning beds cannot be killed, then it is unreasonable 
to assume that the verb sense activated here is destroy₄; instead, it is more reasonable to 
conclude that the salmon are treated here as things rather than as beings, and that the sense 
being activated is not that of destroy₄ but destroy₁. Example 7.89 refers to the destroying 
of wildlife, which typically refers to both animals and plants. This example is more 
contentious as both animals and plants can be killed, but since plants are not prototypical 
objects of destroy₄, in the sense that they are not animal-like nor foetus-like, and are not 
typically ordered to be killed in an official, procedural way, it is difficult to justify the 
classification of this instance as destroy₄. It might be that, in this case, the speaker uses 
“wildlife” to refer solely to animals; this is an example of a vague reference which makes 
precise textual analysis quite difficult. 
Example 7.86, taken from a legislative document, and which refers to the destroying of 
any semen, egg or embryo, is a particularly fuzzy case. As with the animals, the plants, 
the water, the land, this argument moves along a gradual cline of animacy, though in this 
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case from least animate to most animate. Semen is, strictly speaking, not animate, 
although to destroy semen is to kill the spermatozoa it contains, which are animate. 
Similarly, an egg is not necessarily animate, though it might house a developing foetus. 
An embryo is arguably more animate than both of these. However, in order to be able to 
safely classify an instance as a particular pattern, its components should satisfy the basic 
criteria implied by prototypical cases, and since these entities are not all animate per se, 
and therefore it does not necessarily refer to killing for all components of the argument, I 
am inclined to classify this as Pattern 1, and not Pattern 4. Some additional evidence is 
provided by the co-hyponymy of “eggs” and “nests” in another legislative instance of 
destroy, and by the fact that eggs are incremental themes; they can be both partially and 
entirely destroyed. Eggs – incidentally – were recurrent Patients of destroy in the KVD 
(n=10). Perhaps eggs typify the kind of precious, “built” entity that needs protecting: a 




At this point it seems fitting to introduce assassinate, the verb whose absence has been 
consistent throughout the analyses thus far. Given that assassinate does not feature at all 
in the PPPP corpus, nor, as a consequence, in the KVD, its data in terms of frequencies 
and features cannot be compared with those of the other ‘killing’ terms in this study. 
Hence, it has been excluded from all Referential Distance and grammatical voice 
comparisons (Chapter 5), the tracing of verb senses across Contexts and domains 
(Chapter 6), and the analysis of number and (de)individuation devices laid out in this 
chapter. Here, I examine the behaviour of assassinate in the BNC alone, and briefly 
discuss its implications for animals and their recognition as individuals. Table 7.23 
presents the pattern listed for assassinate in the PDEV. 
 
 
Table 7.23 The pattern and implicature from the PDEV entry for assassinate 
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Asssassinate is derived from the Medieval Latin assassinare, from assassinus ‘assassin’, 
in turn from the Arabic ḥašīšī ‘hashish-eater’68. The hashish users in question were a 12th-
century “fanatical Muslim sect in the mountains of Lebanon”, who “had a reputation for 
murdering opposing leaders after intoxicating themselves by eating hashish”69. As can be 
seen from the PDEV entry in Table 7.23, there is only one recorded pattern for 
assassinate, and it specifies a human leader as the object argument, citing political reasons 
in the implicature.  
The hashish-eating may now be obsolete, but still present in assassinate is a sense of 
planning and preparation for a specific goal or mission. In 38 of the 226 lines for 
assassinate in the BNC, there is an explicit mention of a plan or plot, exemplified in Fig. 
7.2, and in 33 lines an explicit mention of an attempt or trying, exemplified in Fig. 7.3. 
Assassination is presented as a kind of daring, dastardly feat. 
 
 







Fig. 7.3 Example concordance lines of attempt* to assassinate from the BNC 
 
Another notable feature of assassinate is a tendency to specify time and place, e.g. on 
Christmas Eve 1942; in Memphis on April 4, 1968; in Nairobi in 1969; in Jerusalem in 
July 1951. An assassination is an event in the truest sense: something shocking and 
memorable, a rupture in the usual flow of goings on. The person assassinated is not 
simply a human, but an important one – typically a political leader, as specified in the 
PDEV entry – whose murder marks a significant historical event.  
Assassinate, unlike the other verbs discussed in this chapter, is a term of individuation: 
88% of all assassinate Patients in the BNC sample are singular individuals. Although 
there are mentions of multiple people being assassinated at once (e.g. his opponents 
abroad; the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife), humans are not assassinated in 
groups or as mass entities; they are encoded as countable, plural individuals. Three 
exceptions were found in the sample: two figurative examples (the enormous national 
faith, the Conservative Party) and one case in which a group of left-wing politicians (the 
entire FMLN leadership) was threatened with assassination by a right-wing death squad 
in the Salvadoran Civil War. This is an anomalous case of assassinate being applied to a 
collective noun. 
Assassinate has a highly specific meaning, hence having only one CPA pattern. It is also 
highly exclusive; not just anyone is assassinated. The political dimension of assassinate 
explains why the division between those who are and are not assassinated is not drawn 
along species lines, given that not all humans may be assassinated, but along 
sociopolitical lines. It also explains why animals are never assassinated, hence the 
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absence of assassinate in the PPPP corpus. To be assassinated, one must be considered 
an opponent, someone who constitutes a (political) threat. Since animals are not 
considered to hold political power – they are legal objects, in most cases with the status 
of ‘product’ – they do not qualify as candidates for assassination. To assassinate, one 
must be capable of acting with political intent, which means that animals are also 




This chapter has investigated (de)individuating ‘killing’ terms using CPA, and has 
identified some common features of animal-killing discourse. Animals, unlike humans, 
featured in the KVD as predominantly plural, and sometimes even as mass, entities. For 
verbs that can be applied to both humans and animals, such as wipe out, exterminate and 
destroy, the human-only patterns were found to be more specific when representative of 
killing (e.g. Pattern 2 of exterminate), and more abstract in nature when not (e.g. Pattern 
3 of destroy). Humans dominate the KVD, despite the animal-orientated sampling criteria 
and the animal theme of the corpus from which it is derived. Humans also feature, the 
vast majority of the time, as Agent, while the opposite is true for animal actants. There 
was a consistent inconsistency among HUMAN and ANIMAL Patients, sometimes 
experienced as an asymmetry, and other times as zones of exclusion. Humans and animals 
were rarely found to coexist in the same patterns; an exception is Pattern 1 of wipe out, 
which objectified its Patients indiscriminately. Assassinate was the most exclusionary 
‘killing’ term of all; not only are animals excluded from assassination, but so are many 
humans. 
Animals were presented as (de)individuated and (un)killable through a number of means. 
Wipe out and exterminate express their Patients in terms of groups, homogenising their 
members and suppressing their individuality. Wipe out was an explicitly quantifiable 
process, construing its Patients as incremental themes. As we know, killing cannot be 
done incrementally; incremental themes are unkillable. In the case of harvest, animals 
were ontologised as ‘stuff’, either directly through lexical choices (e.g. protein 
productivity, additional growth), or by being grouped with inanimate or abstract entities 
which by definition cannot be killed, only damaged or destroyed. With cull, animals were 
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simultaneously construed as passive ‘features’ to be ‘curated’, and as troublesome actors 
causing an undesired effect, the killing of whom is justified.  
In the case of destroy, the animal-killing sense was encoded in a separate pattern from the 
rest, and this pattern was reserved for animals and (human) foetuses. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, both of these are examples of animate beings who almost qualify for 
personhood, but not quite. It is perhaps of relevance that the animals destroyed, in the 
‘killing’ sense, tend to be dogs, horses and other animals who feature heavily in humans’ 
lives. However, the boundaries between the ‘killing’ and ‘non-killing’ patterns became 
blurred when animals featured alongside less animate entities, such as incremental 
themes, in the same argument slot (e.g. the animals, the plants, the water, the land). At 
first glance, these examples did not look particularly irregular, but the exercise of sorting 
concordance lines into patterns shone a light on their anomalies. Such subtleties would 
have been significantly more difficult to detect without the use of a precise, pattern-
demarcating technique such as CPA.  
The use of CPA in this analysis provided empirical evidence for the taken-for-granted 
notion that humans and animals are treated differently in language, and that animals are 
ontologised as things rather than persons. It is now possible to say, with confidence: that 
animals may be fatally destroyed, while humans are not; that destroy can in fact construe 
animals as both animate and inanimate, making them both killable and unkillable; that 
exterminate, applied to humans and animals, does not have the same meaning; that wipe 
out coerces its Patients into a state of incremental themehood, while harvest coerces its 
Patients into the role of passive ‘stuff’; and that cull, like other ‘killing’ verbs, has an 
ambiguity of meaning even after close textual analysis. Assassinate, with just one pattern, 
does not accommodate the kinds of ambiguity and boundary-blurring that is seen in verbs 
with multiple patterns. CPA therefore has the potential to empower the critical discourse 
analyst to say not only what is happening in the data for a given term, having surveyed it 
all and condensed it into a manageable entry, but also how it is happening. Seeing patterns 
side-by-side and being able to compare their similarities and differences makes it far 









This project has sought to shed light on human-animal relations by way of a CPA-assisted 
discourse analysis of ‘killing’ verbs. Specifically, it set out to answer the overarching 
research question, 
RQ1. What can a discourse analysis assisted by Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
reveal about the ‘killing’ verbs selected in relation to the key themes identified in 
the literature? 
Entailed in this question are a number of assumptions, e.g. that an analysis of verbs is an 
appropriate method of research; that CPA will have an effect on the outcome of a 
discourse analysis; and that this is a subject worthy of our attention. The first half of the 
thesis provides extensive justification for these assumptions, as well as identifying the 
key themes to which RQ1 refers, notably: distance, concealment, space, visibility, 
assemblage and event. Expanding on RQ1 are three more questions: 
RQ2. How is the involvement in acts of killing, of humans and nonhumans 
respectively, typically represented in the extracts of discourse analysed?  
RQ2a. Are these representations stable across the different discourse domains 
represented in the corpus? 
RQ3. What does CPA contribute to the task of discourse analysis? 
In this final chapter I summarise and evaluate the findings of this project with reference 
to the literature and my original research aims. In the following sections, 8.2 and 8.3, I 
outline both the substantive and the methodological significance of the key findings in 
the project. Section 8.4 draws on these findings to provide succinct answers to the 
Research Questions. Sections 8.5 and 8.6 deal with the limitations and implications of the 
study, respectively, and Section 8.7 concludes the chapter with some recommendations 
for future research. 
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Distance and concealment were repeatedly cited in the literature as key instruments in the 
widespread oppression of animals by humans. Pachirat (2011) introduces the notion of a 
politics of sight, which I propose as a potential fourth prong for Nibert’s (2002) Theory 
of Oppression, introduced in Chapter 2. For Pachirat, a politics of sight represents a 
positive intervention in the ongoing, nefarious occlusion of animal-killing practices. In 
this thesis, it featured more generally as a critical lens through which to consider (the 
visibility of) human-animal relations. Distance was found to manifest in quite obvious, 
tangible ways: during analysis, the identity of the killer was often quite literally out of 
sight and I would find myself expanding the context of the concordance wider and wider, 
eventually giving up and going direct to the source file. This was especially true for verbs 
like sacrifice and slaughter, which had high incidence of passive voice, and it was a 
common problem with the journal article texts, whose vague, obfuscating language was 
at odds with their precise, technical content. Slaughterers and researchers were almost 
never explicitly mentioned. 
In some cases, distance was created through euphemism. Verbs like dispatch, put down 
and put to sleep helped to create a semantic distance in terms of the process itself; they 
don’t sound like obvious acts of killing. Semantic distance was also experienced with 
verbs that have more than one sense, and for which the alternative, non-killing senses 
provide a convenient ambiguity – somewhere for the killing to hide. These were terms 
like destroy, wipe out and cull. CPA proved to be an excellent method for pinning down 
the troublesome cases that seem to straddle two senses, which at first glance do not appear 
unusual or suspicious, but on close inspection are found to be straying beyond their 
presumed semantic place. Sometimes, the ambiguity was not caused by separate patterns 
and senses, but by vagueness inherent in the verb itself. Butcher, for example, can refer 
to both the killing of someone and the carving up of their dead body, and a distinction 
between the two is evidently presumed unnecessary where animals are concerned. Even 
in cases like put down and put to sleep, reserved for the most beloved animals in society, 
the lexicographical entry betrays a vagueness of means and motive. The killing of an 
animal due to their being old or infirm is exposed, by the lexicographical entry, to be no 
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different from the killing of an animal simply because they are unwanted by a human (see 
the put down and put to sleep entries in Appendix D). 
Euphemistic verbs not only conceal the nature of the act, but they can also have the effect 
of coercing arguments into having a different semantic value. Harvest, for instance, 
coerces the Patient into taking on the quality of stuff. Cull imbues its arguments with a 
sense of collection and curation. Sacrifice designates its Patients with the role of tool or 
token, something to be used in the name of a higher cause. Wipe out and exterminate have 
the effect of imposing a status of GROUP on their Patients, and while members of a group 
may be killed, a group may not. Destroy, while it has very distinct patterns in comparison 
with exterminate and wipe out, for example, construes the destroyee as an inanimate entity 
to be damaged rather than harmed. While these observations may sound obvious and self-
explanatory, the evidence provided by CPA demonstrated that they are neither. The 
mechanisms through which animals were rendered non-animal, or killing was rendered 
non-killing, were not necessarily straightforward and required close, critical examination 
in order to be identified. 
In all of these cases, it seems there is an attempt either to obscure the act of killing itself, 
e.g. by creating ambiguity around the fatality of the verb, or to present the Patient as 




Intertwined with issues of distance are questions of culpability. While it is difficult to 
state with confidence the precise reasons why a writer or speaker chooses to use certain 
language, one can comment on the effects these choices have. Uses of metonymy, for 
example, help to place distance between an actor and an act. When killing is carried out 
by an INSTITUTION, such as the government, or a LOCATION, such as a zoo, the human 
element of culpability is significantly backgrounded. A similar effect is created when 
animals are killed by [method], e.g. sacrificed by asphyxiation. This was especially 
common in journal article texts, which avoid specific mentions of researcher culpability.  
Culpability was also managed through expressions of justification. Cull, for instance, was 
found to have explicit justificatory language in around half of all instances; culling was 
presented as something that needs to be done. If something is necessary or unavoidable, 
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then the culpability of the Agent is significantly diminished. The use of modal verbs and 
causative constructions in put down and put to sleep, e.g. had to have him put down, 
presented the act of killing as simultaneously unavoidable and distant from the speaker.  
In 83% of all instances in the KVD, the Agent was inferred to belong to the semantic type 
HUMAN, but in three-quarters of these cases, it took a concerted effort (or specialised 
knowledge) to be able to reach that conclusion. The use of truncated passive constructions 
was instrumental in the backgrounding and suppressing of Agents. Given the results of 
original investigations into referential distance by Givón and colleagues (1983), which 
found human participants to be strongly associated with agency, topicality (both in terms 
of frequency and persistence) and low ambiguity (interference from potential candidate 
references), it was somewhat surprising to observe the relative absence of the human 
Agent of killing. The proportions of high, medium and low ARD, illustrated in Fig. 5.1 
in Chapter 5, was especially striking, demonstrating that human Agents were far more 
likely than not to have a high ARD.  
Whether this is an issue of the ontological status of the Agent, or the ontological nature 
of the process, is difficult to say. It is interesting to note that the verbs shortlisted for case 
studies in Chapter 7, based on their tendency to feature deindividuated Patients, also had 
some of the lowest PRD scores in the analysis in Chapter 5. One might argue that these 
verbs – destroy, wipe out, cull, harvest – also have strong non-killing components which 
will therefore entail inanimate Patients, and as such it could be either the non-killing 
nature of the verb sense or the inanimate nature of the Patient that brings the average PRD 
down, given that culpability is presumably not such an issue in these instances. However, 
exterminate has the lowest average PRD score, and all instances in its (admittedly very 
small) sample denote killing; it has no non-killing senses. It may be, then, that how the 
Patient is individuated (e.g. as mass, as a group) has a greater influence over PRD than 
the nature of the process itself. It might be that perceived morality and culpability are 
simply not a factor in PRD results. This is something that will require an in-depth study 







An animal in a new place is a different animal, or so suggests the literature. Similar claims 
have been made about words and word meaning. In Chapter 6, killing and meaning events 
were tracked across spaces and (con)texts to see how they might change with their 
environment. It was observed that animals – like all event participants – really are 
construed differently in different environments and under different circumstances. The 
‘bubbles’ in Fig. 6.3 representing the convergence of different actants could be seen 
clustering, expanding, and spreading out in different ‘zones’. Lines of Agency and 
Patienthood demonstrated parallels to be drawn between different kinds of entities: in a 
lab, ANIMAL becomes synonymous with STUFF; in ‘the wild’, animals play a number of 
roles, from free-living agent to natural feature. There were, however, elements of stability. 
Dogs, for instance, retained some of their ‘pet’ connotations even in a lab: they were never 
slaughtered or harvested, only euthanised or, in one text, sacrificed. Whether animals 
constitute products in themselves (in the Context of ‘animal industries’) or whether they 
pose a potential threat to a product, such as a plant crop (in the ‘farming’ Context), their 
lives were consistently found to be subordinated to the pursuit of profit. In every Context, 
even in the ‘wild’, humans are represented as maintaining a position of dominance over 
other animals.  
Words, too, displayed elements of (in)stability. Most of the ‘killing’ terms in the study 
could be found in most of the text types in the KVD, but only in certain forms. When 
presented as their individual verb patterns established using CPA, they were found to drop 
in and out of sight. The same could be said for semantic types and lexical sets; while the 
same verb pattern might appear with the same semantic type from one domain to the next, 
closer analysis showed – as one might expect from Hanks and Jezek’s (2008) comparisons 
of verbs – that members of the lexical sets associated with those semantic types also 
dropped in and out, or “shimmered”, across text types, or text-spaces. 
These findings raise complex questions around place, space, causality and structure. 
Consistent with the material-semiotic view that events are brought into being not by an 
atomistic subject or agent but by “a convergence of multiple interacting influences” 
(Elder-Vass, 2015: 101), the findings in this project suggest that there is no one, main 
driving factor in the outcome of an event, even in one as violent and deliberate as an 
intentional act of killing. Meaning, as argued by Hanks, is no exception, and is to be 
251 
considered an event rather than an entity. While I might talk about verbs “coercing” 
semantic types, in the Pustejovskyan (2005) sense, this is really a shorthand for the 
process in which a verb and its associated arguments form an unstable alliance – an 
exploitation – that results in a change to the argument and a change to the verb. A norm 
would appear to be a more stable assemblage, an event that goes largely unnoticed given 




In Chapter 2, I presented a review of the literature surrounding the ethics of killing, taking 
into account historical factors that continue to play a role in contemporary debates. The 
wrongness of killing was found to be generally dependent on whether or not the victim is 
considered to be a person, and personhood was shown to be a highly inconsistent concept 
rooted in anthropocentric ideals of worth. The model of a person is essentially a (normal, 
adult) human, based on their possession of human-like qualities such as agency, 
intentionality, autonomy and self-awareness, and their capacity to do such human-like 
things as telling stories and making long-term plans. To be killable, then, is to be deficient 
in human-like traits and capacities such as these. Killability can be understood – like 
personhood, and the wrongness of killing – as a matter of degree, meaning that some 
entities will be held to be more killable than others.  
In recognition of this, critical discourse analysts, as discussed in Chapter 3, have 
identified a number of ways in which killability is discursively constructed and the role 
that such language has played in facilitating and legitimising violent atrocities. In some 
cases, humans are dehumanised by way of comparisons with animals, such as insects, 
which has the effect of rendering the victim less person-like, and therefore more killable. 
In other cases, analogies are made that liken the victim to an inanimate object, thus 
creating “a discourse in which killing [is] no longer killing” (Lifton, 2000: 460). The 
analysis presented in Chapter 7 provided several examples of such non-killing discourse: 
destroy and wipe out entail incremental themehood; cull and harvest construe Patients as 
aesthetic features and passive foodstuff, respectively; and exterminate and wipe out 
reframe acts of killing as acts of removal. Euphemistic verbs such as these were found to 
be dangerous not because they present their Patients as more killable, but because they 
present them as unkillable. If a Patient is unkillable, no killing can take place. Killability 
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and unkillability, then, are two sides of the same coin. One denies the Patient their moral 
value, and the other relieves the Agent of culpability. In both cases, the result is that any 
sense of immorality is downplayed, or even removed. 
 
8.3 Methodological Findings 
 
8.3.1 CPA: Rigid, robust, reflexive 
 
CPA is a technique, but it is also a kind of framework, and as such it will necessarily have 
rigidity in places. In most situations, however, this is experienced as a robustness. Natural 
language is messy and unpredictable, and the simplicity of CPA helps to bring clarity to 
what appears very complicated. Human-animal relations are, it turns out, quite 
complicated. 
Unlike many semantic frameworks, which provide a list of fine-grained, predefined labels 
from which the analyst must choose, at the core of CPA are not labels but types. CPA 
specifies a set structure for lexicographic entries, which includes (often optional) SPOCA 
clause constituent slots, but the entry template is constructed in such a way that any 
language construction, from a phrasal verb to an idiom, can be recorded and then 
compared with others. The slots are almost always occupied by a node from the CPA 
Ontology, which is predefined, but the analyst is free to adapt this or construct their own 
Ontology, as I did, based on the corpus being used. CPA is effectively a principled process 
of tagging and sorting based on observable similarities and differences in the data; labels 
are open to debate. With that said, the hierarchical Ontology, although shallow, is a source 
of rigidity that goes against the principles of a material-semiotic, flattened Ontology. 
Arguments in defence of hierarchical Ontologies were included in Chapter 4. 
While CPA is in a way quite rigid and structured, it also involves – as expressed by Hanks 
– “a great deal of lexicographic art” (Hanks, 2004: 88). Identifying a pattern and deciding 
on the appropriate level of generalisation is not always an intuitive process and takes 
some practice. This will be easier for those with a background in lexicography or other 
disciplines that involve sorting and categorising, e.g. botany. Most newcomers to 
lexicography – myself included – are at first prone to taking too fine-grained an approach; 
they tend to be ‘splitters’ rather than ‘lumpers’. CPA is not an automated approach, and 
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although it is reassuringly simple and robust in its concept, it also requires some practice 
and careful considerations on the part of the analyst. 
Doing CPA means constantly asking questions. Does this line belong with this pattern, or 
with this one? Should I lump these patterns together? Should I split this pattern into two? 
Why (not)? What does the data actually say? This practice of constantly questioning, 
checking, comparing and weighing up is what makes CPA a thorough and data-
committed method. In the case of this project, it was in engaging with the Ontology that 
such questioning proved the most illuminating. Inherent biases in the Ontologies – both 
the CPA Ontology (CPAO) as well as in the PPPP Killing Ontology (PKO) – became 
clearer the more questions I asked. Why should this type of animal be given this level of 
specificity, but not this one? Am I unfairly conflating all PLANT entities? What about 
FISH? Engaging critically with the Ontology forced me to reflect on my own biases and 
how these might manifest in the analysis. The process of selecting an appropriate 
semantic type from the Ontology was also instrumental in identifying anomalous 
examples in the data that, at first glance, appeared quite normal.  
 
8.3.2 Challenges and rewards 
 
Maintaining a principled approach to the data, which seemed to shift with my outlook, 
was at times very difficult. In the early stages of the project, I was plagued by doubts 
about my own judgement. Was I analysing the surface language – the words – or was I 
analysing the material event being described in those words? I often felt that I was not 
satisfactorily describing either of these, but rather the ‘space in-between’. On learning 
more about material semiotics and Deleuze’s concept of ‘sense’ (Chapter 3), I realised 
that this was a legitimate problem, but one that I was now theoretically equipped to deal 
with. Recognising that all language is simultaneously material and semiotic allowed me 
to take a more balanced and consistent approach to the data. CPA was designed with 
lexical analysis in mind, rather than the kind of critical discourse analysis that was carried 
out in this project. As such, it was helpful to bolster the CPA method with supplementary 
theory. Other analysts may look to other theoretical ontologies. 
One of the greatest assets of CPA in this project was its ability to account for all data in 
a sample, bar one or two ‘untaggable’ cases (e.g. POS-tag errors, ungrammatical 
254 
examples, etc.). Covering all bases was not only a priority from an empirical perspective, 
but also in the interests of visibility; no stone should be left unturned. The effect of this 
kind of approach can sometimes be that – even in a project on a subject so controversial 
as killing – parts of the analysis are somewhat tedious. But given the commitment of this 
research to the data in its entirety, as well as conscious engaging in a politics of sight, 
such cases are not just inevitable but methodologically important. How can we know an 
exploitation without having established the norms? How can we see what is absent or 
being obscured from view without shining a light on every corner of the data? CPA 
proved to be a thorough, systematic and data-committed way of exposing all language in 
a dataset – normal and abnormal. 
Disregarding for a moment the extra annotation features that were included in this project 
– the active/passive voice, Agent, Patient, Agent and Patient Number, Agent and Patient 
Referential Distance, and Context, which were included purely out of curiosity and a wish 
to explicitly record my decision-making process – CPA was found to be a remarkably 
unfussy exercise. It requires only one feature to be annotated: the pattern number. CPA-
assisted discourse analysis can be carried out using only the basic CPA pattern-number 
annotation, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, which used Agent and Patient Number results 
purely as a means of shortlisting case study candidates related to the theme of 
(de)individuation. This project was an exploratory experiment into the potential role of 
CPA within a broader critical analysis of discourse and so extra features were annotated 
purely out of interest and as a means of determining the effectiveness of CPA alone and 
with other features. As it happens, these features produced some interesting findings, but 
the results also showed that standard CPA is all that is really needed for a corpus-
lexicographical discourse analysis. 
The analysis of features such as Referential Distance, Number, Context and grammatical 
voice was surprisingly time-consuming. This was mainly due to the fact that – as 
discussed in Chapter 5 – the identities of the key participants were often difficult to 
establish. Material uses of distance and concealment in animal-killing, such as the screens 
and doors that obfuscate the precise site of killing in a slaughterhouse, and the 
geographical distance placed between sites of slaughter and sites of consumption, were 
mirrored in the language. ARD and PRD, though labour-intensive, proved fruitful 
features to analyse. Identification of Context, not always clear-cut and dependent on a 
number of factors, required some careful thought and was another exercise that added 
time onto the overall annotation process. The efforts paid off, however, when in Chapter 
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6 I was able to map all 1,682 instances of the data across a landscape of Context ‘zones’, 
combining many important features of the analysis in one place. This was instrumental in 
demonstrating the co-constructive nature of place, space, event, participants and 
circumstance. 
I do not mean to insinuate that CPA, in contrast, is quick and easy. While there are verbs 
that can be annotated with relative ease, taking perhaps an hour to annotate a 250-line 
sample and write up its patterns and implicatures, most verbs take quite a lot longer. This 
difficulty is not a reflection on the CPA method, but on the phraseological complexity of 
the word being analysed, which usually is not apparent until examined more closely.  
 
8.3.3 Application of CPA 
 
Applying CPA to this specific problem, using a specialised corpus of animal-themed 
discourse, demonstrated the corpus-dependence of CPA output. As described in Chapter 
4, the CPA Ontology (CPAO) and specially-built PPPP Killing Ontology (PKO) were 
very similar, given that the latter was modelled on the former, but had quite obvious 
differences. The PKO, based on a specialised, animal-themed corpus, did not include 
several of the more abstract, human-orientated semantic types that feature in the CPAO, 
and instead priority was given to specific animal types. This was done to meet the needs 
of my project, but was not strictly necessary. Having now carried out the project, it would 
seem that the CPAO is quite adequate – given its general nature and broad scope – for 
most uses of English-language CPA. There were no patterns found to be present in the 
KVD that were not already present in the BNC sample, except in the case of butcher, 
which was found to occur with one extra pattern in the KVD – the intransitive Pattern 3. 
Even where there were noticeable differences in patterning (e.g. animal homes vs. human 
homes for destroy₁), the PDEV patterns themselves remained valid. This was also an 
argument for only basing lexicographic patterns on a large, general corpus rather than a 
smaller, thematic one; had I based my patterns solely on the KVD, I might claim that the 
primary meaning of destroy is ‘kill’, that humans cannot be exterminated, and that murder 
refers to the premeditated killing of an animal, though this may occasionally be extended 
to humans. The use of a separate reference corpus of general language is therefore 
essential in this kind of analysis.  
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Another finding that arose from the application of CPA was that it is not so much verbs 
that mattered, but rather individual verb patterns and their associated senses. The patterns 
of a verb are related, and sometimes blur into one another, as found in the course of this 
study. But different patterns, while they do not necessarily correspond on a one-to-one 
basis with senses, usually signal different meanings. As demonstrated by the analysis in 
Chapter 6, most verbs could be found in most text types in the KVD, but only in the form 
of certain patterns. Similarly, while verbs were found to feature heavily in both corpus 
samples – the PDEV sample of the BNC, and the KVD taken from the PPPP corpus – 
their patterns featured in very different distributions. Perhaps it is not enough to be talking 
about verbs. Perhaps a pattern-delimiting analysis, such as CPA, should be a prerequisite 
to discussions on verbs and their behaviour. 
 
8.4 Answers to the Research Questions 
 
RQ1. What can a discourse analysis assisted by Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
reveal about the ‘killing’ verbs selected in relation to the key themes identified in 
the literature? 
 
Some key themes identified in Chapter 2 and 3, and consequently focused on in this 
study, were those of distance, concealment, space, visibility, assemblage, and event. 
A CPA-assisted exploration of these themes proved highly illuminating, though the 
role of CPA in the analysis varied from case to case. Chapter 5 mainly relied on 
analysis of Referential Distance and grammatical voice, but CPA provided the means 
for a more nuanced discussion of those quantitative results. In Chapter 6, the themes 
of space and visibility were explored via the concept of ‘Context’, which did not 
strictly require the use of CPA, but the process of assigning Pustejovskyan semantic 
types, of the kind used in CPA, made the ‘meetings’ of actants possible to map out.  
The CPA-derived patterns also allowed for a tracing of “shimmering” verb behaviour 
across different spaces. Chapter 7 was the most direct application of CPA, and it 
yielded a number of important findings related to (de)individuation and (un)killability. 
Invariably, CPA has demonstrated that ‘killing’ verbs should be considered in terms 
of their patterns, rather than as verbs generally. CPA has also shown that where 
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different semantic types occur in certain argument slots, so too do different patterns 
and – with them – quite often, different meanings. The CPA-assisted discourse analysis 
presented in Chapter 7 made explicit the mechanisms by which meanings of the 
patterns of a verb can seep into, or even be ‘borrowed’ by, other patterns of the verb. 
This blurring of pattern boundaries is one of the ways in which nonhumans were found 
to be subtly coerced into a state of thinghood or (un)killability.  
The analysis demonstrated that ‘killing’ verbs, when applied to humans, did not imply 
such fatal consequences as they do for animals. Destroy, for instance, refers to the 
killing of animals, while for humans it refers to an emotional damage or defeat in sport, 
for example. Put down, applied to a human, does not mean “kill” but “criticise”. To 
put a baby to sleep is to put them to bed, not to end their life in a considerate way. 
Humans may be wiped out in a killing sense, but they may also be wiped out in the 
abstract sense of being made bankrupt or very tired. 
The concrete/abstract divide between animals and humans was seen consistently 
throughout the study, with the resulting implication that non-fatal misfortunes that 
might beset humans are in some way comparable with the loss of life suffered by 
nonhuman animals. This is unsurprising, given what we know from the ethics literature 
on the perceived value of different lives. Even in cases such as put down and put to 
sleep – the ‘killing’ terms used almost exclusively for nonhuman family members – 
the death of the animal was presented in terms of the loss of companionship on the part 
of the human, rather than the loss of life on the part of the animal. 
A similar dichotomy observed in the behaviour exhibited by the verbs in this study 
was the nature/culture divide, or in other words the idea that animals exist in the 
‘natural’ realm, while humans hold social and political importance. Animals can be 
harvested, in the same way as ‘natural’ plant resources, while humans are not. (Some) 
humans are assassinated, if they hold enough sociopolitical influence, while no 
individual animals come close being considered such a threat to society. Some animals 
were described as being murdered, but this was generally done by campaigners 
wishing to emphasise the immorality of animal-killing. This was not corroborated by 
the BNC data, because it is not standard use of English to describe the premeditated 
killing of an animal in such terms. Murder is reserved for persons, those with social 
and moral relevance.  
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Finally, ‘killing’ verbs were found to be used in more vague, ambiguous ways for 
animals than for humans. Exterminate, for instance, while it can be applied to both 
human groups and animal groups to mean ‘kill’, has far more specific connotations 
when applied to humans and typically encodes a specific, political motive. The 
‘animal’ pattern does not entail such details. In other cases, there was ambiguity 
intrinsic to the ‘animal’ patterns with regard to whether or not the process being 
described was fatal. Does butcher mean ‘kill’, or ‘carve up’? Does harvest refer to 
killing, or gathering? Does cull mean ‘kill’, or ‘remove’? Such distinctions do not 
appear to matter where the killing of nonhumans is concerned. 
 
RQ2. How is the involvement in acts of killing, of humans and nonhumans 
respectively, typically represented in the extracts of discourse analysed?  
RQ2a. Are these representations stable across the different discourse domains 
represented in the corpus? 
 
Annotation of the data revealed that 97% of HUMAN actants in the KVD featured as 
Agent, while 94% of ANIMAL actants featured as Patient. On the whole, humans were 
presented as ‘doers’, active initiators of processes, with a degree of control over a given 
situation. Animals were presented as passive, ‘done-to’ entities who are relatively 
powerless. While this varied to some degree across Contexts and domains, the overall 
trend remained the same. The implied passivity of animals, to whom things simply 
‘happen’, has a damaging effect on their construal as victims capable of suffering. As 
described in Chapter 3, Coates and Wade (2007) identified four discursive operations 
that often feature in such accounts: the “concealing of violence”, the “obfuscating of 
perpetrators’ responsibility”, the “concealing of victims’ resistance”, and the “blaming 
and pathologizing of victims”. All four of these were observed to some degree in the 
data analysed in this study, but it was especially true that humans who act as Agent 
tend to have their responsibility obfuscated, either through use of distance or the 
concealing of violence (by e.g. construing the animal Patient as an unkillable inanimate 
object). Animals were, in some instances, blamed for their own killing by being 
represented as troublesome ‘pests’ or threats, whose killing is therefore unavoidable. 
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The analysis in Chapter 6 demonstrated that while animals are always presented as 
being dominated by humans, this power dynamic manifests differently in different 
Contexts. In the Context of ‘animal industries’, animals represent products. In a 
laboratory Context, animals are construed as ‘stuff’, resources to be harvested and 
sacrificed. In a ‘domestic’ Context, animals are put down or put to sleep, but this 
softening of the action did not stand up to scrutiny; even beloved pets are essentially 
property whose lives are no longer considered worthy if they are unwanted by humans. 
In some cases, such animals were simply destroyed. In other cases, like the Context of 
‘wild’, animals were seen to occupy several roles: as agents free to exert their own 
power over their environments, and as ‘natural’ features to be killed or harvested. 
Humans featured rarely as Patients in the KVD, and this was either in the few cases of 
violence reported between humans (e.g. family members, classified as ‘domestic’) or 
as recipients of non-killing actions in the Context ‘general’.  
Representation of entities was therefore stable in some ways and unstable in others, 
and this demonstrated that while place, space and circumstances certainly influence an 
event, they do not determine its outcome. 
 
RQ3. What does CPA contribute to the task of discourse analysis?  
 
CPA, being based firmly in data, brings reliability and a degree of reproducibility to 
this critical discourse analysis. The process of tagging and sorting all lines in the 
sample creates a complete snapshot of meaning upon which to comment critically. 
Engaging with the semantic types in the Ontology brings into sharp focus some of the 
key issues dealt with in this project: how entities are conceptualised, and how this is 
linguistically achieved. CPA is a reflexive task, and its insistence on looking at the 
data helps to counter bias in some ways. 
CPA facilitates the construction of lexicographic entries for words, in this case verbs, 
and these entries of patterns make the task of surveying the entirety of a corpus sample 
far easier than using concordances alone. Seeing semantic types in their patterns 
alongside the pattern implicatures also allows the analyst to see, at a glance, exactly 
what the differences in meaning between two patterns and their arguments are. The 
percentages of the pattern numbers also enables the analyst to make informed 
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judgements on the prominence of a particular usage and decide whether it warrants 
further investigation. 
One of CPA’s most important contributions to the discourse analysis task is its ability to 
clearly pinpoint where, when and how patterns are exploited, by first demarcating the 
pattern boundaries. This kind of information – as opposed to the general, anecdotal 
observations that certain ‘killing’ terms are applied to inanimate objects and therefore 
have an objectifying effect on their patients – empowers the discourse analyst to make 
precise and persuasive arguments about the impact of certain language choices. Not only 
can a corpus-lexicographical discourse analyst make claims about that particular instance 
of language, as is typically the case in critical discourse analysis of a particular text or set 
of texts, but – if they have used a large, general reference corpus suited to lexicographic 
work, such as the BNC or enTenTen – then they may also make claims about the lexicon 
itself. In the case of this study, CPA has helped to demonstrate instances of speciesism 
that are inherent in the English language and not just specific to one particular text, 
discourse or speaker. 
Finally, CPA is a powerful tool for engaging in a politics of sight. A CPA annotation of 
a sample of language may prove time-consuming, and often difficult, depending on the 
complexities of the term being investigated, but its systematicity means that no stone is 
left unturned; every line in a sample is accounted for. CPA has the power to expose 




All corpus studies have certain limitations by virtue of the method. The data included in 
a text corpus is restricted to digitised texts and transcripts and this will inevitably exclude 
some materials of interest. The use of a concordancer also takes the text out of its wider 
context, committing a “violence” on the text. Given that this study was fully reliant on 
corpora for data, it was not possible to comment on the motivations of speakers and 
writers. Issues of authorial intent were especially present in Chapter 5, where the 
relationship between distance and perceived culpability was being explored.  
Furthermore, the results are only as good as the corpus. The data used in this study was 
sampled from the PPPP corpus, which was compiled opportunistically and was heavily 
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skewed in favour of journal article texts. This is taken into account during the analysis, 
and unexpected results that were suspected to have been caused by this imbalance were 
tested by removing the journals subcorpus. In some cases the PPPP sample was too small 
to draw authoritative conclusions on word meaning, and in these instances the reference 
corpus was referred to for supplementary data. In the case of assassinate, the reference 
corpus data was the only data available and it was not possible to compare the features 
and patterns of assassinate with those of the other verbs in the study, whose annotation 
was based on the KVD. 
This was a study into ‘killing’ verbs, but one in five (21%) lines in the KVD was an 
example of a ‘killing’ verb being used in a non-killing sense. This was important, 
methodologically, for me to be able to compare killing and non-killing patterns and see 
where their boundaries fall, but it also means that some of the quantitative results in this 
thesis do not speak directly to the theme of killing. This was anticipated, indeed intended, 
and was discussed in Chapter 4 with regard to looking “sideways” at the research topic. 
Although a great deal of this thesis is dedicated to the evaluation of CPA as a potential 
aid to discourse analysis, not all verbs in this study were analysed using the full corpus-
lexicographical discourse analytical method showcased in Chapter 7. This was because 
the project had other research priorities as well as these specific methodological interests, 
and other methods – such as Referential Distance, analysis of grammatical voice, tracking 
of events across Contexts and text types – were deemed useful for those purposes. CPA 
has been implemented, in some way, in all parts of the study. 
The outcome of the annotation in this project is no doubt heavily influenced by coder 
outlook. Although an interannotator agreement test was conducted, achieving a 
respectable overall result of 0.88, I acknowledge that my own views as an animal 
advocate will have played a role in some of the tagging and other methodological 
decisions. I make no apologies for this, given that bias is unavoidable, but feel it is 
necessary to raise this issue and try to keep it in mind. I, like anyone reading this, am 
affected by the most significant source of bias of all: being human. All language is 






This project has provided some evidence for what was already suspected but difficult to 
prove: the subtle and pervasive objectification of animals through language. More 
specifically, the method trialled here has demonstrated examples of the precise 
mechanisms by which animals are deontologised and their killing legitimised. This 
represents an empirical and defensible way for critical discourse analysts to make claims 
on the oppressive nature of certain kinds of language, and how this might be countered in 
order to help those most affected. 
This study has drawn on a wide range of disciplines and theoretical positions, choosing 
to combine the fast-growing and influential projects of critical posthumanism, material 
semiotics and corpus linguistics. The result is a progressive and empirically sound 
methodology that can be applied to almost any subject. 
In critical discourse studies, a question that tends to be asked is, “who benefits?”. In this 
sense, there are both positive and negative implications of the findings in this project, 
depending on the outlook. In the case of animal advocates – and indeed the animals 
themselves – the findings of this research benefit their cause by helping to explain how, 
and potentially why, animals are treated the way they are, and offers insights into how 
damaging language relating to animals might be countered. The project has provided 
evidence that backs up the claims often dismissed by those sceptical of animal justice, 
and helps to bring animal discussions into the academic domain. Those who benefit from 
animal exploitation, on the other hand, have the potential to be affected negatively by 
these findings: animal farmers, slaughterers and traders; advertisers and marketers 
working to obfuscate animal suffering; and those whose livelihoods and lifestyles depend 
upon the unquestioned subjugation of nonhumans in society. In reality, all humans enjoy 
the privileges of speciesism and human supremacism, in the same way that white people 
benefit from systemic racism and men benefit from institutionalised sexism. Of course, 
we must also acknowledge that all of these injustices are interconnected, and that all of 




8.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This project represents a preliminary exploration of corpus-lexicographical discourse 
analysis. The first recommendation for future research is therefore more analyses of a 
similar kind, applied to different research areas. Given that interesting differences in 
modality were encountered at several points throughout the study, investigations into 
‘killing’ discourse and modality would also be worth pursuing. 
Lexicographers, lexicologists and grammarians would no doubt find common ground in 
some of the themes explored in this work. In particular, an exploration of the Deleuzian 
notions of ‘sense’, preliminary ideas on pattern-as-assemblage, as well as the material-
semiotic concept of distributed agency in discussions of linguistic relations, may well 
prove useful. The potential relationship between norms, exploitations and (in)stability 
could be particularly interesting to examine. 
The investigation into Referential Distance, presented in Chapter 5, was also an 
experimental approach to incorporating novel measures in a critical discourse analysis 
task. My findings raise a number of questions. For one, how different should we expect 
the results of my Referential Distance (based on sufficiently disambiguating references) 
to be, compared with the original, non-discerning referential distance approach used by 
Givón and others? Secondly, why might humans and other animate entities feature with 
greater Referential Distance than their inanimate counterparts, given the original findings 
to the contrary? Could it be to do with the nature of the process, i.e. killing, rather than 
the nature of the participant? This will require a number of experiments to account for 
different types of entities involved in processes of varying kinds. Another interesting line 
of enquiry might be the effect of text types on Agent Referential Distance, when we 
consider, for example, that Agents of news articles might be named explicitly in one news 
story and then mentioned more ambiguously in the news stories that follow shortly after. 
We all know, for instance, that the noun phrase ‘the Yorkshire Ripper’ refers to a human 
man and not a combine harvester, but this is dependent upon our world knowledge based 
on previously published news stories. Exophoric reference and its impact on ambiguity is 
no doubt a fruitful area of investigation. 
While this project was predominantly concerned with how different ‘killing’ verbs can 
be found to change their behaviour in response to different arguments, there is scope for 
future research into trends in the language of animal justice, specifically how this has 
264 
changed and increased over time. When the new BNC is ready to use, this could be an 
excellent source of recent data with which to carry out a diachronic study in conjunction 
with the original BNC. 
Observed in this study was an inconsistency between supposed views on animals and the 
language used to construe them. Surprisingly damaging and contradictory examples were 
found to have come from the subcorpus of campaign literature, in which authors of public-
facing texts had uncritically adopted the language of animal-killers, presenting animals 
either as passive beings who do not resist their abuse, or as recipients of ‘humane’ 
treatment. My most urgent recommendation is therefore directed at campaigners, social 
justice advocates and professional communicators, whose roles as spokespersons afford 
them a degree of power and influence in public spheres. In advocating for others we have 
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Appendix A: Full list of ‘killing’ terms 
 
Below are all 370 of the ‘killing’ terms identified and the number of sources in which 
they appeared (in brackets). 
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Appendix B: Annotation guidelines 
 
The instances to be annotated are arranged in a random order in a KWIC format with the node 
(verb) in the middle, and there are columns to the right-hand side for recording information about 
each instance. If more context is needed, click on the file name cell and then on the ‘open file’ 
button in the top left of the spreadsheet. This will open the specified file in a notepad program. 
The following fields need to be filled in: 
• Pattern 
Patterns for each verb are already available and these should be referred to as a guide. However, 
the annotator should remain open-minded to the possibility that new or different patterns might 
occur in the PPPP data. Refer to the ‘patterns’ tabs in the Excel workbook. 
• Active/passive (a/p) 
Label ‘a’ for ‘active’ and ‘p’ for passive.  
• Agent and Patient 
Type out, or select from the drop-down list, the most specific semantic type available in the 
ontology. For example, if the context makes it clear that the entity in question is not only a 
HUMAN but also a FARMER, then choose FARMER over HUMAN. If the Agent or Patient is 
elided and cannot be reasonable inferred, then select X from the drop-down list. NB: all semantic 
types are listed in the singular form. Plurality is specified separately in the Agent Number (AN) 
and Patient Number (PN) columns. 
• Agent Referential Distance (ARD) and Patient Referential Distance (PRD) 
This is the number of clause boundaries traversed when starting from the immediate referent and 
working backwards (or forwards, if closer) to find the nearest sufficiently disambiguating referent 
for either the Agent or the Patient. A clause is understood here to be a subject and a predicate. See 
the following examples, where clause boundaries are marked // and zero anaphors are marked Ø. 
Sufficiently disambiguating references are underlined. The node is in bold. 
A crazed teen held a sick Facebook party just hours after // Ø murdering his parents with a 
hammer. (ARD = 1; one boundary between the zero anaphor and the disambiguating 
reference) 
They thought // the bird was a witch // and Ø had summoned the tempest // so they killed it.  
(PRD = 2; two boundaries between the ambiguous ‘it’ and the disambiguating reference) 
If a subordinate clause is completely traversed, count both the left and right boundaries. If a clause 
is nested, count any stacked clause boundaries as just one boundary. A referent is considered 
‘sufficiently disambiguating’ if it provides enough evidence for making a selection from the drop-
down list of semantic types when filling out the ‘Agent’ or ‘Patient’ field. 
If the identity of the Agent is clear from the immediate referent, the score is ‘0’. If the distance is 
greater than 5, or if the identity is never revealed and/or specialist knowledge is required to 
identify the Agent, mark with an ‘NF’ (‘not found’).  
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In the following example, the ‘Agent’ is SLAUGHTERER and the ‘Patient’ is PIG. Since there is 
no mention here or in the surrounding context of the identity of the Agent – who we infer to be 
SLAUGHTERER – then the ARD is ‘NF’. The identity of the Patient is made explicit within the 
same clause as the verb in question, so the PRD is ‘0’. 
Around 1.3 billion pigs are slaughtered annually for meat worldwide. 
• Agent Number (AN) and Patient Number (PN) 
Mark ‘pl’ for plural instances (e.g. dogs, hunters), ‘in’ for individuals (e.g. she, the animal) and 
‘col’ for collective nouns (e.g. family, species). Mark ‘mn’ for ‘not ‘mass noun’ (e.g. money, 
sugar) and ‘ns’ for ‘not specified’ (as found in some passive and to-infinitive constructions). 
• Context 
‘Context’ is a rough indication of the circumstances in which a killing takes place, and is also 
closely linked to the place in which the killing takes place. Choose from the following: 
• ‘Lab’, for killing that takes place for scientific purposes;  
• ‘Animal industries’, for the killing of animals for their flesh, fur and other commodities;  
• ‘Farming’ for arable, i.e. non-animal-killing farming; 
• ‘Entertainment’, for animals used for entertainment purposes, or animals whose roles as 
entertainers have come to an end;  
• ‘Work’ for animals used as workers, e.g. dogs used by the Police; 
• ‘Wild’, for killing that takes place in a ‘wild’ environment as opposed to a controlled 
one;  
• ‘Domestic’, for the killing of a pet or that which takes place in and around the home;  
• ‘War’, for the killing of humans and animals as a result of war; and  
• ‘General’, for killing which does not happen in any one particular context.  
In difficult cases, refer to the following criteria in the order they are given as priority factors: 
Place > purpose (of killing) > circumstances (of living) > source / text type 
For example, in the case of a hunter killing an animal in the wild in the name of entertainment, 
the place will take precedence over the purpose of killing, resulting in the context of ‘wild’ and 
not ‘entertainment'. Where the place of killing is not mentioned and the source is e.g. a journal 
article, but the purpose and circumstances point to, e.g. animal agriculture, then these factors will 
take precedence over the source, in this case resulting in a Context of ‘animal industries’ rather 
than ‘lab’. 
Notes (optional) 
This column is for any further information you would like to record. 
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Appendix C: Full interannotator agreement data 
 












Printed here are the annotation results for the features assessed, as detailed in Chapter 4. Below 
each feature header are the values assigned by the first annotator (‘1’), the values assigned by the 
second annotator (‘2’), and the agreement score generated (‘A’). For each feature, at the bottom 
of the table, are: the observed agreement (OA), the number of categories from which the 
annotators could choose (Cat), the expected agreement (EA), and the final, corrected agreement 
(CA), calculated using the coefficient described in Chapter 4. The average of all of these CA 




































































































Appendix F: Examples of focus group stimulus texts 
 
TEXT – London vegan campaigns 
 













TEXT – Animal Welfare Foundation leaflet – Saying goodbye: The ultimate 














TEXT – Countryside Alliance leaflet – Hunting Act 2004: The Case For 
Hunting  
 
 
 
